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Abstract
School districts implement a variety of initiatives that too often fall short. This case study
investigated how one public school district in southeastern Michigan implemented interest
based-bargaining (IBB). The study also sought to understand the factors that influenced the
decision-making process and what was considered when making implementation decisions. By
carrying out this study, the researcher expanded the current literature base that districts can draw
upon should they decide to implement IBB. District’s implementing IBB can use this study to
better inform their decision-making process.
The primary data sources were the primary decision makers involved with implementing
IBB in the southeastern public school district that was studied. Participants came from the
following groups: (a) district leadership, (b) union leadership, and (c) IBB facilitators. To
investigate how IBB was implemented, this study utilized a qualitative approach, using
unstructured interviews, documentation, and archival records to gather data.
Data analysis was done concurrently with data collection, and the researcher condensed
the data by hand into codes that emerged through the data analysis process. Coding included both
first and second level codes, and tools such as matrix displays were used to present the data. The
interwoven nature of the data analysis process allowed the researcher to move back-and-forth
between data collection, data condensation, data display, and drawing conclusions.
Eight themes emerged from the analysis of how one southeastern Michigan public school
district implemented IBB, and influences, considerations, successes, and challenges related to
each theme were identified. The themes were products of how the district implemented IBB and
speak to trust, transparency, collaboration, and collegiality among staff. The themes were (a)
Board of Education (BOE) members on IBB teams, (b) increased Paraeducator Association (PA)
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and Secretarial Association (SA) voice, (c) consistent joint communications, (d) commitment to
organization, (e) commitment to the process, (f) willingness to open communication, (g)
compensation solved mid-process, and (h) formation of numerous committees. Through the use
of storytelling and presentation of the eight themes, the researcher was able to unpack how the
district implemented IBB.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The Narrative of One Public School District in Southeastern Michigan
This case study used the art of storytelling, a qualitative methodology that creatively
communicates evidence and theory through “tools that merge the subjective and objective forms
of data collection and analysis” (Dundon & Ryan, 2009, p. 569), to share how one public school
district in southeastern Michigan implemented interest-based bargaining (IBB). IBB, according
to Fonstad, McKersie, and Eaton (2005), refers to collective bargaining processes focused on
“understanding, building on interests, and using problem-solving tools as a way of avoiding the
positional conflicts used in traditional bargaining” (p. 6). There are many variations of both
traditional bargaining and IBB. This study focused on IBB as it occurred in this one southeastern
Michigan public school district.
The district lies in a suburb approximately 25 miles from downtown Detroit.
Subdivisions, businesses, lake houses, community parks, and walking trails fill the district’s 16
squares miles, which shrinks to 11 square miles when one subtracts the area taken up by lakes.
Scattered throughout the district are five elementary schools, two middle schools, one high
school, a transition center for students ages 18 to 26 with autistic and cognitive impairments, and
an administration and community services building. The district also operates an early college
program that lies within the borders of a neighboring school district. These buildings are home to
340 teachers and other certified staff, 98 paraeducators, 39 secretaries, six maintenance staff, 15
building administrators, and four central office administrators employed by the school district. In
addition to district employees, the organization has a shared services agreement for technology
through the intermediate school district and outsources through a variety of vendors for
transportation, custodial, and food services.
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The district includes a diverse student body of over 5,500 students that speak 40 different
languages including Chaldean, Arabic, Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Hebrew, Spanish, Korean,
Urdu, Hindi, German, Romanian, and Albanian. Another aspect of the district’s diversity is the
regional flavor it achieves through the Schools of Choice program, which accounts for 30% of
the district’s student enrollment; the other 70% are district residents. Furthermore, according to
the Michigan Department of Education (2017), 55% of the district’s students identify as White,
28% African American, 9% Asian, 4% two or more races, and 4% Hispanic; 27.4% qualify as
economically disadvantaged.
Academically, the district has a 4-year graduation rate of 93.56%, an average ACT score
of 21.6, a dropout rate below 5%, and annually sends over 100 graduates to the University of
Michigan and Michigan State University. Furthermore, the district has implemented a K–12
science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics (STEAM) program. As Feldman (2015)
noted,
STEAM takes the standard STEM formulation (science, technology, engineering, and
math) and adds an A for arts. What the STEAM movement really does is work on
developing higher design and engineering skills while allowing students to innovate,
invent, and succeed on their terms. (para. 2)
In addition to STEAM, the district features programs such as Leader in Me,
Advancement Via Individual Determination, and Cultures of Thinking as well as medical
mentorships, political leadership, an engineering academy, a wide variety of fine arts and athletic
programs, and 24 advanced placement options at the high school level.
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History of District Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining
The district has a long history of unions that work closely with the Michigan Education
Association (+). MEA-sanctioned unions include an education association (EA), paraeducator
association (PA), secretarial association (SA), and an association for the district’s maintenance
and technical employees. Additionally, there is an association of assistant principals, principals,
and directors with no affiliation to a labor organization that operates outside the jurisdiction of
the MEA. In this study, the terms association, union, and collective bargaining unit will be used
interchangeably.
In terms of collective bargaining, the district and its unions have traditionally utilized
positional techniques to settle contracts. The use of positional bargaining is not unique to the
district. According to Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011), “Whether a negotiation concerns a
contract, a family quarrel, or a peace settlement among nations, people routinely engage in
positional bargaining. Each side takes a position, argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a
compromise” (p. 3). Positional bargaining has been called distributive bargaining, adversarial
bargaining, positional bargaining, traditional bargaining, and win-lose bargaining. For the
purpose of this study, the term traditional bargaining will be used. Traditional bargaining refers
to a collective bargaining process characterized by both sides establishing opening positions,
then trading away as few concessions as possible to gain as much from the opposing side as
possible. In traditional bargaining, both parties view one another as the opposition (Hargrove,
2009, p. 230).
From the 1990s through 2008, when per-pupil funding and student enrollment were
increasing, traditional bargaining techniques typically led to agreements that maintained a
balanced budget and increased employee compensation (see Appendix A for the history of step
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and wage movement from contracts between the district and the EA). According to the district’s
salary schedule, teachers at the top of the pay scale could approach and even exceed a salary of
$90,000 during this time period.
Between 2008 and 2016, the district experienced a student enrollment decline of over
20% and a reduction in funding of over $500 per pupil (see Tables 1 and 2). In June 2008, the
district offered teachers and administrators a $70,000 voluntary severance incentive plan for the
2008/2009 and 2009/2010 school years. This was done to reduce the number of highly
compensated employees. Administrators that left the district could take advantage of the
incentive by resigning or retiring from the district. Teachers qualified for the incentive if they
retired under one of the Michigan Public Schools Employee Retirement System (MPSERS)
options or if they were at the top of the pay scale and resigned.
The economic realities facing the district were further impacted by the fact that the perpupil amount paid by the district to the MPSERS nearly doubled from $1,185 per student during
the 2008/2009 school year to $2,044 per student during the 2016/2017 school year (see Tables 1
and 2).
In the past, the district had the ability to go to the voters for additional per-pupil funding,
but this funding mechanism was terminated with the adoption of Proposal A in 1994. According
to Price (2015), Proposal A allowed the voters of each local district to determine the funding for
their schools. Due to this funding structure, Michigan had some of the highest property taxes in
the United States prior to Proposal A, and the locally controlled system created problems for
both equity and adequacy across the state.
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Table 1008/2009–2011/2012
District Enrollment and Financial Trends: 2008/2009–2011/2012
2008/2009

2009/2010

2010/2011

2011/2012

Student enrollment

6,794

6,905

6,811

6,603

Per-pupil funding

$9,375

$9,116

$9,116

$8,646

MPSERS cost per pupil

$1,185

$1,145

$1,121

$1,157

$5,215,000

$1,715,947

($1,722,193)

$551,562

Fund balance

Table 2. District Enrollment and Financial Trends: 2012/2013–2016/2017
District Enrollment and Financial Trends: 2012/2013–2016/2017
2012/2013

2013/2014

2014/2015

2015/2016

2016/2017

Student enrollment

6,350

6,027

5,712

5,545

5,570

Per-pupil funding

$8,646

$8,676

$8,726

$8,796

$8,856

MPSERS cost per
pupil

$1,370

$1,479

$1,721

$1,978

$2,044

$1,812,701

$2,870,039

$1,311,018

$1,021,604

$5,629,599a

Fund balance
a

2016/2017 fund balance includes $1,950,000 in proceeds from sale of an elementary school site.
In response to the decline in funding and student enrollment the district also reduced the

number of staff they employed. This reduction was primarily in response to having fewer
students with marginal differences in the ratio of students per staff member from year to year.
For example, during the 2008/2009 school year there was a full-time equivalent (FTE) of 441.81
teachers for a student to teacher ratio of 15.38 students for every teacher, and in the 2015/2016
school year, there was an FTE of 326.92 teachers for a student to teacher ratio of 16.96 students
for every teacher (see Tables 3 and 4).
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Table 3008/2009–2011/2012
District Staffing Trends: 2008/2009–2011/2012
2008/2009

2009/2010

2010/2011

2011/2012

37

37

37.76

30.9

Student to administrator ratio

183.62

186.62

180.38

213.69

Teacher FTE

441.81

424.9

401.49

394.17

Student to teacher ratio

15.38

16.25

16.96

16.75

Paraeducator FTE

124.81

133.48

141.41

140.06

Paraeducator to teacher ratio

54.43

51.73

48.16

47.14

2012/2013

2013/2014

2014/2015

2015/2016

28

31

28.33

26.33

Student to administrator ratio

226.79

194.42

201.62

210.6

Teacher FTE

382.42

374.98

356.8

326.92

16.6

16.07

16.01

16.96

132.85

121.52

104.32

102.71

47.8

49.6

54.75

53.99

Administrator FTE

Table 4008/2009–2011/2012
District Staffing Trends: 2012/2013–2015/2016

Administrator FTE

Student to teacher ratio
Paraeducator FTE
Paraeducator to teacher ratio

These economic realities all came to a head during the 2010/2011 school year when the
district experienced its first negative fund balance. This shortfall in finances resulted in a
breakdown at the negotiation table as the district asked all employees to take a 10% concession
on wages. According to Murray (2010), the superintendent said “the deficit is $3.1 million now
and will be in excess of $10 million without budget adjustments.” Murray went on to report that
the president-elect of the EA suggested that the district should have taken steps like other
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districts who consolidated schools, adjusted transportation, and made modifications to pay to
play. The president-elect then stated, “We have always made compromises the last five years. No
other unit in the county has given up 10% in one year” (para. 18–22).
In response, association members wore red shirts as a rallying call to stand united in their
quest for fair treatment and pay. Grier (2011) reported, “For the past several months, frustrated
teachers, dressed in red shirts with union emblems, have been picketing before the start of every
Board of Education [BOE] meeting” (para. 5). Other association techniques were employed such
as leaving work as soon as the last bell rang, marching in front of the school during evening
events, outbreaks of the blue flu, and not signing up for committee work or extracurricular
stipends. According to Gantert (2011), “About 40% of the high school’s teachers did not show
up for work on February 15, 2011 in the midst of bitter contract negotiations. The superintendent
said that 41 high school teachers did not show up and that 36 of those teachers were not within a
normal ‘pattern’ of absences” (para. 1).
The response from the district’s unions gained a great deal of attention by district
leadership, the BOE, community members, and the media. Grier (2011) reported, that “The
ongoing conflict over unsettled teacher contracts in the schools has become colorful, with union
supporters wearing red and a community group wearing blue. Families Stand United was started
by parents who are concerned about the escalating contention that has marked negotiations
between school administrators and the EA” (para. 1).
On March 31, 2011, the BOE voted to impose a salary reduction of between 7.5 and 10%
across all associations as a mechanism to eliminate the fund deficit. The BOE meeting was
moved to the auditorium from the typical location of the high school media center to
accommodate the larger audience, and township police were on site. According to Rath (2011),
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“The BOE voted 5–2 Thursday night to impose a collective bargaining agreement [CBA] as
about 450 teachers and supporters protested outside, expressing anger at the latest development
in a month-long, rancorous process” (para. 3).
Furthermore, a high school teacher reported seeing the salary reduction applied to her
paycheck prior to the vote by the BOE. According to Hopkins (2011), “teachers questioned how
the school district could issue checks with a 10% pay cut on Friday when the BOE met and made
the decision on the cut Thursday evening” (para. 1). In response, the superintendent stated in a
letter that no one knew the outcome of the salary vote before it occurred, but because payroll is
time-consuming, by April 1, 2011 the district prepared for cuts reflecting the salary plan and
considered a backup plan of adjustments and supplemental checks in case the pay cut resolution
failed (Hopkins, 2011).
That summer Public Acts 100, 101, 102, and 103 were signed into law in the State of
Michigan. These public acts directly impacted the district and union’s ability to collectively
bargain teacher placement, evaluation, and termination. Public Act 103 added prohibited subjects
of bargaining, including teacher placement, evaluation, performance-based compensation, and
classroom observations. According to Spalding (2005), public Acts 100 through 103 aimed at
making it easier for school districts to retain the most effective teachers (pp. 1–3).
Then in September 2011, Governor Rick Snyder signed Senate Bill 7, which later became
Public Act 152. According to Murray (2011), Public Act 152 limited public school districts to
paying no more than $5,500 for health benefits annually for a single employee, $11,000 for an
employee plus spouse, or $15,000 for family coverage starting on January 1, 2012 (para 4). He
went on to say, “Employers may split the cost of medical coverage with workers, who will have
to pay a proportion of their health insurance costs–but no more than 80 percent of the annual cost
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of medical benefits” (para. 5) under Public Act 152. Previous to Public Act 152 the district paid
the full healthcare premium for employees.
Meanwhile, student enrollment continued to decline, and per-pupil funding was stagnant.
Due to declines in enrollment, the BOE voted during the 2011/2012 school year to close one
elementary school at the end of the 2012/2013 school year. This decision consolidated the
district’s elementary footprint from six to five elementary schools.
Traditional bargaining continued, and the ratified CBAs resulted in salary and step
freezes most every year (see Appendix A). In addition to the current salary schedule, the salary
schedule from before the imposition remained in all CBAs. Association leadership asked that
both salary schedules remain in their respective contracts until wages are fully restored to preimposed levels.
Another impact to district labor relations was the outsourcing of non-instructional
services. The first was in April 2012, when the BOE voted 7–0 to outsource custodial services
and transportation services starting in the 2012/2013 school year. According to Czarnik (2012),
“After picketing outside and packing the high school media center, dozens of protesters voiced
their anger and disapproval of the outsourcing plans” (para. 7). Traditionally, these services were
staffed by the district, and staff members belonged to a collective bargaining unit. The estimated
annual savings of outsourcing was $963,440 for custodial services and $871,041 for
transportation services. Czarnik (2012) went on to report “The superintendent said the BOE has
sometimes considered the privatization options over the past five years and put off any decision
favoring it, but the state’s financial decisions—combined with declining enrollment and
revenue–have burdened school districts and put them in a difficult spot” (para. 3).
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Then in August 2013, the BOE voted 7–0 to enter into an intergovernmental agreement
with the intermediate school district to provide technology services for the district. Plante and
Moran, the district’s technology consulting firm, had recommended to the BOE that the district
would benefit both operationally and financially if they were to contract with the intermediate
school district for informational technology management and support. The MEA UniServ
director shared concerns during public comments at the BOE meeting related to outsourcing the
informational technology department (see Appendix B for the August 26, 2013 BOE minutes).
This further reduced the number of union employees in the district, because employees from the
technology department were part of the district’s maintenance and technical association.
Exploring Partnership and Collaboration
In November 2013, the district’s new superintendent, who was hired in July 2012, sent a
team of teacher leaders, union leaders, and administrators to Building an Agenda for
Collaboration and Partnership: Navigating the Internal and External Environment. The
conference was co-sponsored by the MEA and the Galileo Institute for Teacher Leadership at
Oakland University and held in the conference center at a local school district. Adam Urbanski,
teacher union president from Rochester New York, was the keynote speaker.
District staff that attended the conference formed a committee based on the concepts
shared by Adam Urbanski. The new team was called the Partnership and Collaboration
Committee (PCC), and the committee’s purpose was to explore ways to increase internal
cohesiveness, collaboration, and improve district morale. The committee included a cross section
of staff that represented all employee groups and buildings. Additionally, faculty from a regional
university sat on the committee and served the role as unbiased third party and facilitator. The
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BOE was informed at a study session on February 12, 2014, of the committee’s purpose and that
the committee would hold its first meeting on March 20, 2014.
As these new partnership and collaboration initiatives were being explored, the district
outsourced one final non-instructional unit. In May 2014, the BOE voted 7–0 to outsource food
services. Just like transportation, custodial, and technology services, food services were staffed
by the district prior to being outsourced, and staff members had belonged to a collective
bargaining unit. The estimated annual savings of outsourcing food services was $188,336.
Another impact of outsourcing food services was that the district decreased from eight collective
bargaining units in the 2011/2012 school year to five collective bargaining units in the
2014/2015 school year.
Meanwhile, the PCC continued to meet during the 2014/2015 school year with the aid of
the faculty from the regional university. Simultaneously, the district explored launching a
STEAM program to attract and retain students. They landed on transitioning a K–5 school,
which was a focus school and the district’s only Title I building, to a STEAM school for the
2015/2016 school year. This included a criteria-based application process for both resident
students and students enrolled under Schools of Choice.
With the regional university’s continual guidance, the PCC’s work continued throughout
the school year, and in May 2015, the committee launched a staff survey. The superintendent
sent the following email to staff just before the survey was launched:
As you may recall, over a year ago we established a PCC, whose purpose is to explore
ways to increase internal cohesiveness, collaboration, and improve district morale. The
committee spent most of this year developing employee surveys and discussing ways to
show appreciation for all district employees. Toward that end, the committee has
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partnered with faculty from a regional university who serve as expert resources to the
committee. The committee has now completed their work on the employee surveys and,
with the assistance of the regional university, the surveys will be administered during the
week of May 26th. On Wednesday of this week all employees will receive information
from the regional university, who will be managing the data collection, on how to
respond to the surveys. The surveys are job specific in nature (teachers, secretaries,
paraeducators, and administrators). The regional university will be processing the survey
results and all survey responses are confidential. Once the survey results are in, the PCC
will analyze the results looking for ways to enhance the overall working environment
within the district. Thank you in advance for your participation in this survey.
Shortly after the district launched the staff survey, the deputy superintendent for human
resources left the district, and was replaced by a new assistant superintendent for human
resources (ASHR) on July 1, 2015.
Exploring IBB
The outgoing deputy superintendent had been the chief negotiator when the wage
concessions were imposed on March 31, 2011. The new ASHR had been with the district for the
past 15 years, most recently as principal of the elementary school that was transitioning to a
STEAM school. As the new ASHR came on board, the district was in the middle of bargaining
and decided to hire an attorney to complete the bargaining process with the EA. The ASHR sat
alongside the attorney during these bargaining sessions, and tentative agreements were
completed prior to the start of the 2015/2016 school year.
Shortly after bargaining was completed, the superintendent charged the ASHR to
continue moving the work of the PCC forward as well as to explore the possibility of
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implementing IBB. How the district implemented IBB was central to what this study sought to
understand.
Statement of the Problem
The researcher has experienced contentious collective bargaining as both an employee
and a negotiator. He has also sat at the table and experienced both traditional bargaining and
IBB. This experience increased his awareness that the tone at the bargaining table often spilled
over to the work environment. For many district employees, their work environment and the
learning environment for students are one in the same. The district that was studied is not the
only district with these experiences. Colleagues at local, state, and national meetings, workshops,
and conferences have often asked the researcher how the district implemented IBB. Beyond
sharing his own perspective, he struggled to find current research to share that describes how
IBB has been implemented in other school districts.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this case study was to investigate how one public school district in
southeastern Michigan implemented IBB. The study also sought to understand the factors that
influenced the decision-making process and what was considered when making implementation
decisions.
Significance of the Study
Mattos (2011) asserts that school districts have spent significant fiscal and human
resources implementing an array of well-intentional initiatives that often fall short of their targets
(pp. 125–126). Furthermore, Candido and Santos (2015) report that implementation of a new
strategy can be a difficult task. They go on to say that “the true rate of implementation failure
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remains to be determined, but it is often claimed that 50–90% of strategic initiatives fail” (p.
237).
Likewise, school districts have faced challenges when implementing IBB. Klingel (2003)
shared “while the ideas and concepts transmitted in IBB training were powerful and attractive to
participants, the parties were often unable to put them into practice” (p. 13). Klingel’s (2003)
report IBB in Education: A Review of the Literature and Current Practice included three case
studies of school districts that used IBB and seven elements for improved IBB implementation
(pp. 13–72). These case studies and elements for improved IBB implementation were helpful
resources for districts, but Klingel’s report was broad in nature and focused on more than just
implementation. Additional research was needed with a more precise focus on understanding
how IBB can be implemented in a public school district.
This case study provided an opportunity to investigate how one public school district
implemented IBB, as well as understand the factors that influenced the decision-making process,
and why implementation decisions were made. Ultimately, this case study serves to expand the
literature base that school districts can draw upon as they consider implementing IBB.
Research Questions
The primary research questions that guided this study of the implementation of IBB in
one southeastern Michigan public school district were as follows.


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?



What factors influenced the decision-making process during the implementation of IBB?



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about the implementation of IBB?
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Definition of Terms
The following terms are important for understanding: (a) Collective bargaining; (b) the
differences between traditional bargaining and IBB; and (c) various individuals, groups, and
committees in the district that was studied.


Assistant superintendent for human resources (ASHR): Individual who was hired as the
executive director for human resources and employee relations on July 1, 2015, and
received a title change to ASHR on September 26, 2016 by the district that was studied.



Best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA): The standard any proposed
agreement should be measured against (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 102).



Board of education (BOE): The board of education elected to govern the district that was
studied.



Brainstorming: Used in IBB to produce as many options as possible to solve the issue at
hand. The key ground rule is to postpone all criticism and evaluation of options. The
group simply invents options without pausing to consider whether they are good or bad,
realistic or unrealistic. With those inhibitions removed, one option should stimulate
another, like firecrackers setting off one another (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 62).



Caucus meeting: When one of the bargaining teams requests a break during the
negotiating process to privately discuss what is being considered (Barrett & O’Dowd,
2005, p. 129). Caucus meetings are used in both traditional bargaining and IBB, but are
more common in traditional bargaining.



Collective bargaining: The negotiation process by which a union and employer meet and
confer with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment
(Cihon & Castagnera, 2011, p. 455).
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Collective bargaining agreement (CBA): The contractual agreement between an
employer and a labor union that governs wages, hours, and working conditions for
employees and which can be enforced against both the employer and the union for failure
to comply with its terms.



Concessions: Movement from your starting point in traditional bargaining. The goal in
traditional bargaining is to give as few concessions as possible (Lewicki, Saunders, &
Barry, 2011, p. 42).



Consensus: In IBB, a decision that everyone on the bargaining team supports, even
though it may not be their first choice (Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, p. 129).



Education association (EA): The union, governed by the MEA, that represents the
teachers, social workers, reading consultants, counselors, speech and language
pathologists, and psychologists in the district that was studied.



Interest-based bargaining (IBB): The collective bargaining processes focused on
understanding, building on interests, and using problem-solving tools as a way of
avoiding positional conflicts and achieving better outcomes for all stakeholders. IBB uses
an array of skills and tools, including (a) training, (b) facilitation, (c) storytelling and
active listening, (d) focusing on interests over positions, (e) brainstorming, (f) applying
acceptable standards to potential agreements, (g) consensus decision-making, and (h)
effective communication with constituents (Fonstad et al., 2005, p. 6). IBB has been
called integrative bargaining, win-win bargaining, principled negotiations, getting to yes,
and mutual gains bargaining. For the purpose of this study, the term IBB will be used.
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Interests: The underlying needs, wants, and concerns of a party regarding an issue that
needs to be resolved. The term is used typically in IBB (Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, p.
130).



Issues: The topics for discussion in negotiations (Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, p. 130).



MEA UniServ director: The individual employed by the MEA to support the district’s
EA, PA, SA, and maintenance and technical association both in and out of bargaining.



Mutual gains: Solutions sought through IBB that satisfy the interests of both parties
(Fisher et al., 2011, p. 74).



Narrative: The researcher utilized the art of storytelling to narrate how the district
implemented IBB, and the IBB model used by the district has a story phase. To avoid
confusion, the researcher used the word narrative as he shared how the district
implemented IBB, and the word story as he referred to story phase of the IBB model used
by the district.



Options: Possible solutions to an issue that can be used individually or in combination
with other options. In IBB, options are generated on flip chart paper through
brainstorming in response to interests that the parties are trying to satisfy (Barrett &
O’Dowd, 2005, p. 130).



Paraeducator association (PA): The union, governed by the MEA, that represents the
paraeducators in the district that was studied.



Partnership and Collaboration Committee (PCC): A committee comprised of a cross
section of staff that represented all employee groups and buildings from the district that
was studied. Additionally, faculty from a regional university sat on the committee, and
served the role as unbiased third party and facilitator. The faculty from the regional
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university also administered, analyzed, and processed the results from the PCC’s staff
survey. The committee’s purpose was to explore ways to increase internal cohesiveness,
collaboration, and improve district morale.


Positions: One party’s solution to an issue. Positions are typically used in traditional
bargaining (Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, p. 131).



Resistance point: In traditional bargaining, the resistance point is a negotiator’s bottom
line—the most he or she will concede on an issue (Lewicki et al., 2011, p. 29).



Secretarial association (SA): The union, governed by the MEA, that represents the
secretaries in the district that was studied.



Starting point: In traditional bargaining, the starting point is the opening position
presented by one party to the other on an issue. This is typically far from the party’s
resistance point (Lewicki et al., 2011, p. 29).



Story: The researcher utilized the art of storytelling to narrate how the district
implemented IBB, and the IBB model used by the district has a story phase. To avoid
confusion, the researcher used the word narrative as he shared how the district
implemented IBB, and the word story as he referred to story phase of the IBB model used
by the district. The story phase of IBB involves scoping out why an issue has arisen, why
it needs to be resolved, and what the broad parameters are. This process is used during
IBB, and is recorded on flip chart paper (Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, pp. 71–72).



Target point: In traditional bargaining, the target point is the point at which a negotiator
would like to conclude negotiations on an issue—his or her optimal goal. The target point
is typically somewhere between the starting point and resistance point (Lewicki et al.,
2011, p.29).
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Traditional bargaining: A collective bargaining process characterized by both sides
establishing opening positions, then trading away as few concessions as possible to gain
as much from the opposing side as possible. In traditional bargaining both parties view
one another as the opposition (Hargrove, 2009, p. 230). Traditional bargaining has been
called distributive bargaining, adversarial bargaining, positional bargaining, traditional
bargaining, and win-lose bargaining. For the purpose of this study, the term traditional
bargaining will be used.

Summary
The purpose of this case study was to investigate how one public school district in
southeastern Michigan implemented IBB. The study also sought to understand the factors that
influenced the decision-making process, and what was considered when making implementation
decisions. By carrying out this study, the researcher expanded the literature base that school
districts can draw upon as they consider implementing IBB.
The next chapter is a literature review of decision-making, followed by the history of
collective bargaining, an overview of traditional bargaining, and a look into IBB. The history of
IBB will be explored, followed by an examination of IBB training, IBB facilitation, the IBB
process, IBB outcomes, and perceptions of IBB. Other collaborative collective bargaining
models and the differences between traditional bargaining and IBB will be outlined.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Decision-Making Process
Lundberg (2010), asserts that the “success of a school or school district is critically linked
to effective decisions.” He goes on to say, that “while decision-making is an important
administrative process,” important school decisions are increasingly being made by nonadministrative personnel (p. 1). This trend can be the result of administrators who are too busy to
make all decisions or due to more intentional efforts such as shared decision-making.
According to Hoy and Miskel (2001), the classical decision-making process is a series of
sequential steps: “Classical decision theory assumes that decisions should be completely rational;
it employs an optimizing strategy by seeking the best possible alternative to maximize the
achievement of goals and objectives.” (p. 317). In essence, the classical decision-making process
assumes that there is an optimal decision for each situation, and practitioners just need to follow
the sequential steps to discover it. Lundberg (2010), defines the rationale decision-making
process as (a) identifying the problem, (b) generating alternatives, (c) evaluating alternatives, (d)
choosing an alternative, (e) implementing the decision, and (f) evaluating decision effectiveness.
Hoy and Miskel (2001), contend that scholars typically consider the classical decisionmaking model unrealistic, if not naive. In reality, decision makers rarely have access to all the
relevant information, and generating all the possible alternatives and their consequences is
virtually impossible (p. 317). Furthermore, “Because individuals are not capable of making
completely rational decisions on complex matters, they are concerned with the selection and
implementation of satisfactory alternatives rather than optimal ones. To use Simon's words,
administrators ‘satisfice’ rather than ‘optimize.’ Nonetheless, administrators continue to talk
about finding the best solutions to problems. What is meant, of course, is the best of the
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satisfactory alternatives” (p. 318). In essence, school administrators have limited time and
resources and are not able to always optimize decisions. For this reason, finding the best
satisfactory alternative, while not optimal, is typically utilized in schools over the classical
decision-making process.
History of Collective Bargaining
According to Barrett and O’Dowd (2005), “Prior to World War One, the Courts had
labelled trade unions as conspiracies in restraint of trade and had routinely issued injunctions
prohibiting strikes” (pp. 31–32). Post (1990) echoed this sentiment, and said that unions did not
have protections under the law until federal legislation in 1935 (p. 495).
These new protections, since the New Deal, have proved to promote workplace stability
and continuity in business operations by reducing strikes and lockouts. At the same time, they
have been foundational for industrial democracy and employee voice (Michael & Michael, 2013,
p. 461). Post (1990) concurs that unions and the collective bargaining process have been
legitimized since the protection of the original Wagner Act and it subsequent amendments,
collectively referred to as the National Labor Relations Act. He goes on to say to the following:
However, the National Labor Relations Act did not encourage direct cooperation between
an employer and employees; it merely prescribes a legal framework within which the
employee representative bargains about the working conditions of represented employee
groups. Furthermore, both the administrative agency directed by congress to oversee the
Labor Act, the National Labor Relations Board, and reviewing federal courts consistently
issue decisions that perpetuate an adversarial labor management environment. (Post,
1990, p. 495)
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As described by Post, despite the improvements seen through the National Labor Relations Act,
collective bargaining legislation did not cultivate collaborative labor relations.
Traditional Bargaining
Until the late 1980s, collective bargaining had traditionally been adversarial bargaining
rooted in arms-length labor and management relationships underpinning hard fought gains
(Michael & Michael, 2013, p. 472). These positional techniques are not just unique to labor
management relationships. According to Fisher et al. (2011), “Whether a negotiation concerns a
contract, a family quarrel, or a peace settlement among nations, people routinely engage in
positional bargaining. Each side takes a position, argues for it, and makes concessions to reach a
compromise” (p. 3). Barrett and Dowd (2005) found that the most common names for adversarial
collective bargaining are distributive bargaining, adversarial bargaining, positional bargaining,
traditional bargaining, and win–lose bargaining (p. 13). For the purposes of this study, it will be
labeled traditional bargaining.
Starting, target, and resistance points. In traditional bargaining, parties arrive at the
negotiation table knowing what specific outcomes they want to achieve (Barrett & O’Dowd,
2005, p. 14). According to Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry (2011), parties should establish a
starting, target, and resistance point prior to beginning the traditional bargaining process. The
target point is what the party hopes to get out of negotiations, while the resistance point is the
furthest the party is willing to go before breaking off negotiations. The target and resistance
points are meant to be kept secret from the other party (pp. 29–30). Lewicki et al. (2011) noted,
When the buyer’s resistance point is above the seller’s—he is minimally willing to pay
more than she is minimally will to sell for—there is a positive bargaining range. When
the reverse is true—the seller’s resistance point is above the buyer’s, and the buyer will
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not pay more than the seller will minimally accept—there is a negative bargaining range.
Negotiations with a negative bargaining range are likely to stalemate. (pp. 30–31)
As can be seen from Lewicki’s example above, the use of predetermined starting, target, and
resistance points set bargainers up with the tools to either end bargaining with an agreement if a
common range exists, or no agreement if there is no common range.
Opening positions. Traditional bargaining is characterized by both sides establishing
opening positions where they reveal their starting points and then trade away as few concessions
as possible to gain as much from the opposing side as possible. Both parties view the other as the
opposition, a process often referred to as adversarial bargaining (Hargrove, 2009, p. 230).
According to Barrett and O’Dowd (2005), both parties typically prepare in advance for
these opening positions by identifying issues, preparing fall back positions and developing
supporting evidence and arguments (p. 63). They further noted,
A position is defined as one party’s solution to an issue. So, if the issue is wage levels the
union position is likely to be “we want x% extra” and the management position is likely
to be “no, we cannot afford anything right now.” Adversarial bargaining, as already seen,
revolves around positions taken up early on by the parties to a negotiation. (Barrett &
O’Dowd, 2005, p. 52)
As can be seen from Barrett and O’Dowd’s example, opening positions are rooted in what each
party independently wants to retain or take from the other. Likewise, Lewicki et al. (2011)
averred this notion, stating that “in a traditional bargaining situation, the goals of one party are
usually in fundamental and direct conflict with the goals of the other party. Resources are fixed
and limited, and both parties want to maximize their share” (pp. 27–28). For example, a district
may receive 20 million dollars in state funding and spend 11 million on teacher salaries and 9
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million on other expenses. In traditional bargaining, the union’s opening position may strive to
capture 12 million of the 20 million for teacher salaries, while management’s opening position
may aim to secure 10 million for other expenses.
Caucus meeting. Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) defined a caucus meeting as the time when
one bargaining team requests a break to discuss something separate from the other bargaining
team during a negotiation session (p. 129). According to Friedman (1994), “During caucuses
negotiators try to discern their opponent’s true position and to clarify and disagreements on their
own goals” (p. 5). Caucus meetings allow bargaining team members to communicate and plan,
while at the same time keeping information and plans secret from the other side.
Tactics. Post (1990) stated that “tactics employed in adversarial collective bargaining to
achieve victory include deception, lying and the abandonment of truth as a moral value” (p. 495).
Lewicki et al. (2011) added that there are names for these tactics such as (a) good cop/bad cop,
(b) lowball/highball, (c) bogey, (d) making commitments, (e) the nibble, (f) chicken, (g)
intimidation, (h) aggressive behavior, and (i) snow job. They go on to state that the best way to
employee these tactics is for a negotiator to: (a) assess the other party’s target point, resistance
point, and cost of terminating negotiations; (b) manage the other party’s impression of the
negotiator’s target point, resistance point, and cost of terminating negotiations; (c) modify the
other party’s perception of its own target point, resistance point, and cost of terminating
negotiations; and (4) manipulate the actual costs of delaying or terminating negotiations (p. 35).
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) delved further into traditional bargaining tactics, stating,
The rules of the game, however, encourage them to conceal their real hands and to
exaggerate, bluff and threaten in order to advance their true positions. In many instances,
the negotiating teams address each other through spokespersons and the role of many
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participants is confined to talking during side sessions or caucus meetings. Members of
negotiating teams are expected to sing off the same hymn sheet and not to contradict one
another during bargaining sessions. (p. 14)
These tactics, shared by Barrett and O’Dowd, limit transparency, communication, and open
dialogue. By concealing and limiting the flow of information, negotiators prioritize upholding
their positions.
Fisher et al. (2011) cautioned that when negotiators bargain over positions, they tend to
lock themselves into those positions. Furthermore, the more the parties clarify their position and
defend it against attack, the more committed they become to it (p. 4).
Lewicki et al. (2011) go on to say that in some ways the most powerful tactic can be in
threatening to delay or terminate negotiations. One side will have more leverage than the other
when using this technique. In years where finances are good, this technique tends to benefit the
employer, and in years where concessions are needed, this technique most likely would benefit
the union. There are three ways to manipulate the costs of delay in negotiation (a) plan disruptive
action, (b) form an alliance with outsiders, and (c) manipulate the scheduling of negotiations (p.
40). Fisher et al. (2011) concurred, adding that dragging one’s feet, threatening to walk out, and
stonewalling are other commonly used techniques in traditional bargaining
(p. 7).
Role of power both real and perceived. Post (1990) asserted that “traditional collective
bargaining makes the battle lines clear, and it grants victory to the more convincing display of
power, but it leaves casualties. Indeed, it cannot operate except upon the casualties of the
opposing party, and those casualties are the basis for ever-renewed combat” (p. 495). For
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example, wage concessions, won by the employer, will leave employees feeling betrayed, and
wanting their side to be tougher on management the next time the parties negotiate.
The ability that one side has over the other in the battle of positions many times lies in
perceived power. According to Barrett and O’Dowd (2005),
In a given year, if a union has the power to call and maintain an effective work stoppage,
it will be able to strongly influence the nature and content of the settlement. Conversely,
when unemployment is high, or the employer’s market is poor, the settlement will likely
favor management. (p. 16)
A school district in deficit, for example, would more likely be able to negotiate wage
concessions compared to a district that has a large surplus. Conversely, a union in a district with
a large surplus would more likely be able to negotiate a salary increase compared to a union in a
district with an operating deficit.
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) went on to state that “The power of an employer rests not on
that employer’s perception of the employer’s power but rather on the trade union perception of
the employer’s power and vice versa” (p. 16). Negotiators can alter the other side’s perception by
concealing or manipulating information. For example, a district may be ultra conservative on
enrollment and budget projections to mislead the union into thinking that things are worse than
they really are.
Concessions. Another important component of traditional bargaining is making
concessions to the other side, which is movement from one’s starting point. Good distributive
bargainers will ensure that there is enough room in the bargaining range to make concessions by
beginning negotiations far from their own resistance point. Concessions can be directly related to
the issue at hand, such as when talking about the price of a car, the seller may come down $100
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when the buyer comes up by $100. In this example, each party made a concession of $100.
Concessions can also be indirectly related to the core issue at hand, such as when the buyer may
agree to the purchase the car at the seller’s price if he/she is able to make delivery of the car that
day. In this example, the buyer made a concession of $100, while the seller made a concession of
expediting the delivery of the car (Lewicki et al., 2011, pp. 42–44).
Stakeholder fallout. When engaged in this positional power struggle between
stakeholder interests, and wise decision-making can be forgotten. Post (1990) stated:
Adversarial collective bargaining frequency ignores the remaining stakeholders’ interests
due to its inherent myopia, and often even ignores stockholders’ interests because the
control of bargaining strategy is lodged in top management. This small group has much
to gain by obtaining results directed to its specific short-run interests. Thus, the
management negotiating team is often compelled to advance positions that are
irresponsible from a long-term perspective in order to satisfy short-term gains. This
shortsighted view by management almost destroyed the U.S. auto industry. (p. 500)
In addition to forgotten stakeholder interests, employee feelings and allegiances can also
become confused during the positional bargaining process used by many employers and unions.
According to Post (1990), employees have a basic need for friendship among people, and they
simply do not know where their allegiances are due to the confusion and distrust caused by
adversarial collective bargaining. Do they work for the employer or the union? If they are proemployer, that must make them anti-union; if they are pro-union, then they must be antiemployer. This all creates an unsettling division of loyalty among employees and violates a basic
human need for friendship and compatibility among both one’s peer group and one’s superiors in
the workplace (p. 500).
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History of IBB
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) stated that the use of interest-based bargaining (IBB) in
labor-management relations, under a variety of names, began to appear in the late 1980s. IBB has
also been called integrative bargaining, win–win bargaining, principled negotiations, getting to
yes, and mutual gains bargaining (pp. 31–32). They further stated,
New circumstances challenged traditional union approaches to labor-management
relations, and forced them to respond, at first reluctantly, but gradually more willingly, to
the cooperative initiatives proposed by some employers. It seems unlikely that unions
would have shifted to IBB if traditional bargaining had continued to produce the results it
did from the end of World War Two until the end of the 1970s. That period of
phenomenal growth in wages and an expanding list of new benefits resulted from a
traditional negotiation process that had served unions and their members very well. But
for foreign competition that ended those golden years, traditional bargaining might still
be king. (Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, pp. 108–109)
External pressures, as described by Barrett and O’Dowd, influenced labor and management to
explore other negotiation strategies, such as IBB, to remain competitive. IBB presented
bargainers an opportunity to collaboratively problem solve a wide variety of issues in an external
environment that provided less resources.
Fisher and Ury are credited with starting the IBB movement, having said that, “Richard
Walton and Robert McKersie, in developing A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations,
published in 1965, drew heavily on Follet for shaping one of the four sub processes present in all
negotiations, specifically, integrative bargaining” (Fonstad et al., 2005, p. 7). This integrative sub
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process focused on negotiators creating value with their counterparts as collaborators, which
connects to the mutual gains prioritized throughout the IBB process.
Fisher and Ury, in their classic book Getting to Yes, originally published in 1981, and in
Fisher, Ury, and Patton’s revised second edition in 1991, the concept of creating value in
collective bargaining was taken to the next level. The authors’ fundamental insight was that in
conducting negotiations, parties are never disadvantaged by advancing their interests; rather, this
approach facilitates productive problem solving and developing solutions of mutual benefit
(Fonstad et al., 2005, p. 7). Further, Barrett & O’Dowd (2005) contended that Getting to Yes
popularized an interest-based approach to problem solving and negotiations that provided a
useful alternative to power-based negotiations—an alternative that had remained largely
theoretical since Walton and McKersie's 1965 book, A Behavioral Theory of Labour
Negotiations. Although the impact of Getting to Yes began to catch on in other conflict arenas, it
held little to no sway in collective bargaining during most of the 1980s (Barrett & O’Dowd,
2005, pp. 31–32). Barrett and O’Dowd further explained,
A large boost to the use of IBB came in 1993 when President Clinton issued an Executive
Order directing Federal Agencies to create partnerships with the unions of their
employees and to engage them in IBB. President Bush, however, cancelled the Clinton
Executive Order. Although that cancellation did not make partnering or using IBB illegal,
Bush appointees who headed agencies discouraged their use. (p. 110)
IBB began to appear in other industrialized nations in addition to the United States.
According to Paquet, Gaétan, and Bergeron (2000), during the second half of the 1990s, in
Canada and particularly in Quebec, management and unions turned in rising numbers toward a
cooperative approach when embarking upon the renewal of the collective agreements that bound
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them together. This had largely been in reaction to their perception of an environment that left
them little room to maneuver and in which the issues they had to confront were becoming
increasingly complex (p. 281).
IBB Overview
Fisher et al. (2011) in Getting to Yes, which is based on the work of the Harvard
Negotiation Project, stated,
In contrast to positional bargaining, IBB focuses on basic interests, mutually satisfying
options, and fair standards typically resulting in a wise agreement. The method permits
you to reach a gradual consensus on a joint decision efficiently without all the
transactional costs of digging into positions only to have to dig yourself out of them. And
separating the people from the problem allows you to deal directly and empathetically
with the other negotiator as a human being regardless of any substantive differences, thus
making possible an amicable outcome. (p. 15)
These IBB outcomes are rooted in collaboratively addressing the interests of all constituents,
which is different from traditional bargaining where each side is primarily concerned with
obtaining something for those they represent.
They went on to say that, any method of negotiation may be fairly judged by three
criteria: (a) it should be produce a wise agreement if agreement is possible, (b) it should be
efficient, and (c) it should improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties.
Positional bargaining fails to meet the basic criteria of producing a wise agreement efficiently
and amicably (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 4).
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IBB Training
Rayfield (2000) emphasized the need for specialized training in the techniques of IBB as
essential to the process (pp. 42–43). By contrast, however, Wentz (2004) stated that IBB may be
adversely affected if training is deficient (p. 95). Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) explained,
IBB teams are always jointly trained in the bargaining sequence and the tools and
techniques used. Effective training should provide ample opportunity for parties to tease
out and discuss the principles, assumptions, tools and techniques of IBB and to relate this
to their own experiences of adversarial bargaining and other forms of joint problem
solving. The training should also provide an opportunity for the parties to practice taking
an issue through the entire bargaining or problem-solving sequence. (p. 67)
IBB training also includes setting ground rules. Some examples include not engaging in
personal attacks or threats, treating everyone with respect, remaining as open and nondefensive
as possible, not bringing in hidden agendas, allowing only one conversation at a time, basing all
agreements on consensus, having the freedom to invent without criticism, experiencing full and
willing participation by all members, and not attributing comments or ideas to named individuals
(Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, p. 96).
Shared notes. A key aspect of IBB is that there are no minutes and the team has one set
of shared notes written on flip charts hung on the walls. McKersie, Eaton, and Kochan (2004)
explained that shared notes processes are used to avoid people looking back at the minutes and
saying “You said so-and-so, and here are my notes to prove it.” By design, not being on the
record, people can speak more easily, openly, and candidly, and explore more adventurously,
without worry about being quoted or called to task by someone after the fact (p. 31).
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Side by side. Another component of IBB training is that negotiations are structures as a
side-by-side activity in which the two parties—with their different interests, perceptions, and
emotional involvement—jointly face a common task. Fisher et al. (2011) noted that “separating
the people from the problem is not something you can do once and forget about; you have to
keep working at it. The basic approach is to deal with the people as human beings and with the
problem on its merits” (p. 41). To accomplish a side-by-side environment, IBB bargainers
employ an alternating union, management, union, management seating arrangement.
Fisher et al. (2011) further noted that “People facing each other tend to respond
personally and engage in dialogue or argument; people sitting side by side in a semicircle of
chairs facing a flip chart or whiteboard tend to respond to the problem depicted there” (p. 63).
The alternating seating arrangement, described above, creates an environment more conducive to
collaborative problem solving.
Strong on problem, soft on people. IBB teaches participants to be hard on the problem
and soft on the people. According to Fisher et al. (2011), “You can be just as hard in talking
about your interests as any negotiator can be in talking about their position. In fact, it is usually
advisable to be hard. It may not be wise to commit yourself to your position, but it is wise to
commit yourself to your interests” (p. 56). By being soft on people and hard on the problem,
bargainers can create an environment where interests are prioritized and collaborative problem
solving can occur.
IBB Facilitation
A central component of IBB is the use of facilitators during bargaining. According to
McKersie et al. (2004),
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To do the interest-bargaining process, you need a knowledgeable facilitator who knows
when to challenge, when to allow people to go off process, when to keep them on
process. It is not easy, and it takes constant skills of facilitation, reminding people that
“that was a position,” or “that was an interest,” or “are we coming up with solutions that
are meeting everyone's interests?” And if someone did not like a particular solution, are
they taking responsibility for finding another solution? Individuals who serve as
facilitators need to be thoroughly knowledgeable about the interest-based process in order
to be able to do all of this. (p. 33)
As stated by McKersie et al., not only are facilitators important to IBB, but the facilitators must
be knowledge and skilled in assisting bargainers stay within the confines of the process. The IBB
process is further described under IBB process.
Wentz (2004) added that IBB processes that use a facilitator are much less likely to stray
from the structure of the collaborative process (p. 101). Moreover, Barrett and O’Dowd (2005)
contended that in order for facilitators to be effective when working with groups, they must
demonstrate independence and integrity so that a relationship of trust can be developed (p. 91).
In fact, they stated,
During the bargaining or problem-solving sessions, it will be the facilitator’s role to be a
neutral process guide to the bargaining teams. This will involve some practical work such
as flip charting but more importantly it will involve observing the group in action and
intervening to ensure that the ground rules are being adhered to. It will mean helping if
conflicts arise that the parties do not know how to handle effectively, protecting team
members against an attack. (Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, p. 91)
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Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) further emphasized that it is not necessary to have a high
level of trust in initiating the IBB process as “the IBB process itself builds trust based on the
parties dealing honestly and transparently with each other. A good facilitator will find teachable
moments and exercises to help the group process their experience of growing trust” (p. 91). For
example, a previous decision by management may be a reason that the union does not trust the
district. A skilled facilitator will sense this, and encourage both sides to talk through the past
experience that is getting in the way of collaborative problem solving.
IBB Process
Issues. Regarding issues, Hargrove (2009) noted that “IBB introduces a collaborative
approach to the collective bargaining process, and attempts to cultivate a negotiating
environment in which both parties work together to resolve common issues in a way that is
respectful and supportive of the needs of both sides” (p. 230). Common issues can include
wages, benefits, and working conditions.
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) claimed that bringing issues rather than positions to the table
is the primary difference between IBB and traditional collective bargaining (p. 31). They further
clarified that an issue constitutes a topic or problem that the parties want to address, and either
management or trade unions can raise an issue (p. 51). A common way that bargainers develop
issues after the pre-bargaining training, when negotiators meet and dialogue on ground rules for
negotiating, which typically involves jointly identifying specific issues and then identifying
interests underlying these issues (Michael & Michael, 2013, p. 463).
Story. After an issue has been selected for resolution, the bargaining teams tell the story
of that issue. Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) asserted,
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When the parties have made their opening statements on the first issue they want to
handle, they then need to focus or frame this issue. They do this in a joint session. This
simply means scoping out why the issue has arisen, why it needs to be resolved and what
the broad parameters are. A member of one of the bargaining teams or an external
facilitator will flip chart the discussion and help keep the group focused on the immediate
task which is focusing or scoping the issue as opposed to looking at interests or options.
The chart paper should be titled and dated for later use. (pp. 71–72)
This description by Barrett and O’Dowd describes a process where bargaining teams create
common understanding for an issue through a discussion that is transcribed by a facilitator.
Fisher et al. (2011) explained why the process of telling the story is so important to IBB:
Many consider it a good tactic not to give the other side’s case too much attention, and
not to admit any legitimacy in their point of view. A good negotiator does just the
reverse. Unless you acknowledge what they are saying and demonstrate that you
understand them, they may believe you have not heard them. When you then try to
explain a different point of view, they will suppose that you still have not grasped what
they mean. They will say to themselves “I told him my view, but now he’s saying
something different, so he must not have understood it.” Then instead of listening to your
point, they will be considering how to make their argument in a new way so that this time
maybe you will fathom it. So, show that you understand them. “Let me see whether I
follow what you are telling me. From your point of view, the situation looks like this.” (p.
37)
This description by Fisher et al. adds that listening to understand the other side’s story is an
important component to telling the story. It is important, because listening paves the way for
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bargainers to feel that they were heard and understood. When bargainers feel heard, they are
more open to developing common interests.
Interests. After the issues have been shared and the stories have been told, the parties
share their interests. As notes Barrett and O’Dowd (2005), “Interests are the underlying
concerns, desires, and needs that parties have about an issue. Parties usually have multiple
interests rather than a single one” (p. 53). Thus, IBB works best and is used most extensively on
issues where the parties share common issues (McKersie et al., 2008, p. 94). Nonetheless, Barrett
and O’Dowd (2005) noted that the IBB approach helps bargainers express themselves through
dialogue about the underlying interests, concerns, and desires. Furthermore, IBB focuses on
achieving better outcomes for all stakeholders by utilizing problem solving tools and avoiding
positional conflicts (p. 6). Lewicki et al. (2011) provided a classic example of the difference
between interests and positions:
Consider the story of two men quarreling in a library. One wants the window open and
the other wants it closed. They bicker back and forth about how much to leave it open (a)
crack, (b) halfway, (c) three-quarters, or (d) all the way. No solution satisfied them both.
Enter the librarian. She asks one why he wants the window open. “To get some fresh air.”
She asks the other why he wants it closed. “To avoid the draft.” After thinking a minute,
she opens wide a window in the next room, bringing in fresh air without a draft. (p. 69)
This example illuminates the two parties’ focus on the opposing positions of whether to open or
close the window rather than their interests of fresh air without a draft. Translated to a school
setting, opposing positions may be higher vs. lower wages whereas their common interests are
financial stability and fiscal responsibility.
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Interests come in many shapes and sizes, but according to Fisher et al. (2011), the most
basic powerful interests are human basic needs. In searching for the basic interests behind a
declared position, it is critical to look particularly for those bedrock concerns that motivate all
people. If you can take care of such basic needs, you can then increase the chance both of
reaching agreement and, if an agreement is reached, of the other side’s keeping to it. Basic
human needs include security, economic well-being, a sense of belonging, recognition, and
control over one’s life (p. 50).
To sort out the various interests of each side, it helps to makes a list and write them down
as they come up. This not only helps bargainers to remember them, but also enables the team to
improve the quality of the assessment as they learn new information and situate interests in their
estimated order of importance. Furthermore, it may help stimulate ideas for how to meet these
interests (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 51).
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) expanded on this thinking by clarifying that “interest
statements are more flexible and less specific. They do not provide the solutions to the issues
(e.g., controlling costs and protecting earning). Instead they allow for open discussion and
provide a basis for joint exploration of the issues” (p. 59). Examples of interests include fiscal
responsibility, job security, and a safe work environment.
Options. Options are then created after the issue, its story, and related interests have been
framed. Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) noted,
An option is one of several possible solutions intended to meet or satisfy an interest on an
issue. If only a single option is discussed it is the same as a position in which case the
parties are really engaged in positional bargaining. Therefore, in IBB the parties are
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always seeking multiple options. When parties first begin to work with IBB, a good
practice or rule of thumb is “the more options on an issue, the better.” (p. 59)
For example, options for bargainers tackling wages may include; (a) 1% wage increase, (b) 2%
wage increase, (c) no wage increase, (d) 1% wage increase for staff on step 15, (e) no wage
increase for staff eligible for movement on steps, (f) no wage increase for staff rated minimally
effective or ineffective on their most recent year end performance appraisal, (g) 2% wage
increase for staff rated effective or highly effective on their most recent year end performance
appraisal (h) full step for all staff, or (i) full step for staff rated effective or highly effective on
their most recent year end performance appraisal.
Fisher et al. (2011) stated, “To invent creative options, then, you will need to (a) separate
the act of inventing options from the act of judging them, (b) broaden the options on the table
rather than look for a single answer, (c) search for mutual gains, and (d) invent ways of making
their decisions easy” (p. 61). For example, a 2% wage increase may not appeal to management,
and tying performance appraisals to wage increases may not appeal to the union. However, a
creative option developed through the process such as a 2% wage increase for staff rated
effective or highly effective on their most recent year end performance appraisal may be an
option that appeals to both parties and allows for mutual gains.
Brainstorming. When inventing options, the art of brainstorming is a useful tool that
assists bargainers with being non-positional (Ridge, 2015, p. 55). This tool allows for the
creation of an extensive list of options. Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) found that productive
brainstorming sessions can yield several pages of flip-charted options (p. 79).
Fisher et al. (2011) explained that it is important not to judge options during
brainstorming and further stated,
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A brainstorming session is designed to produce as many ideas as possible to solve the
problem at hand. The key ground rule is to postpone all criticism and evaluation of ideas.
The group simply invents ideas without pausing to consider whether they are good or
bad, realistic or unrealistic. With those inhibitions removed, one idea should stimulate
another, like firecrackers setting off one another. (p. 62)
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) agreed with Fisher et al. adding that there should be an emphasis on
creating as many options as possible during brainstorming. Evaluating options should occur, but
not until after the brainstorming process has completed (p. 76). Brainstorming a large number of
options allows bargainers to consider and combine them into a much more diverse set of
solutions, which increases the likeness of finding a solution that meets the interests of both union
and management.
Furthermore, Lewicki et al. (2011) added that participants in brainstorming sessions are
encouraged to be spontaneous and to have someone designated to record the options without
comment, as the team comes up with as many uncensored options as possible (pp. 76–77).
Straw designs using acceptable standards. After identifying an issue, telling its story,
listing interests, and brainstorming an exhaustive list of options, acceptable standards are then
assigned to those options as straw designs are created. Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) provided an
example of this process:
When using consensus to develop solutions, for example, with the union and
management teams working as one group, and with the lists of interests, options and
standards displayed on the wall in front of the entire group, one member of the group
might suggest: “With a minor revision, the fourth and seventh options could be combined
to read as follows–and that new option would address six of the eight mutual interests
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and all three standards would be met.” Following a few questions by group members,
another member might suggest a further modification that would help the new option
meet an additional mutual interest. As more discussions follow, consensus emerges. (p.
83)
As described above, a process unfolds that allows packages of options to be created, rooted in
mutual interests, that can serve as potential solutions for the issue.
Consensus. Consensus decision-making seeks agreement by all participants and aims to
enable people to negotiate agreements and find collective solutions. A benefit of consensus
decision-making is that it binds each individual participant to the decisions made and the ensuing
outcomes (Cunningham, 2014, p. 237). According to Barrett and O’Dowd (2005), the primary
method for making key decisions in IBB is consensus, not majority vote or allowing leaders to
decide. They further add that consensus decisions protect minority groups against majority
decisions, and provide individuals with decisions that they can live with, take ownership for, and
support outside of bargaining. Ultimately, “They support the course of action, even though it
may not be their first choice, because it was decided upon fairly and openly and because it is the
best solution for the group at this point in time” (p. 101).
IBB Outcomes
Innovation. IBB allows broader range of topics to be covered at the table; items usually
not negotiated are not addressed (Hiraoka, 1994, p. 12). For those aspects of agreements that
cannot be placed into the contract, bargainers may create letters of understanding to govern a
process for extra-contractual decision-making or implementation of solutions. Labormanagement committees are often used as vehicles for further work on solutions developed in
bargaining (Klingel, 2003, p. 22).
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IBB is successful in innovating new contract language and negotiating agreements on a
number of strategic workplace issues necessary for flexibility (Michael & Michael, 2012, p. 46).
Both union and management respondents who have past experience with IBB are also more
likely to report contracts with increased flexibility in work rules, new pay arrangements,
language on team-based work systems, and new language on joint committees. At the same time,
little or no observable effect is associated IBB use on outcomes such as wage increases, benefits
increases, wage reductions, benefit reductions, or health and safety issues. The results indicate
that the impact of IBB is primarily observable on more complex issues associated with the
changing nature of work and that it is less salient on basic economic issues (CutcherGershenfeld, Kochan, & Wells, 2001, p. 8).
In all, interest-based agreements count for more than double the number of innovations
compared to that found in traditional agreements. In fact, although traditional agreements include
an average of 2.05 innovations per agreement, this number climbs to 4.32 per agreement for
interest-based agreements. Based on this data, it appears that IBB facilitates the introduction of
organizational innovations in collective agreements. It is also interesting to examine the diversity
of the organizational innovations introduced. In the case of traditional negotiations, innovations
are to a large extent (77%) found in the same category (labor-management cooperation), whereas
only eight innovations are outside of this category. Meanwhile, innovations subsequent to IBB
are far more varied. In fact, even if 55% of them are found in the first category, 37 others are still
located in other categories, which is nearly as many as the total number of innovations in
traditional negotiation. One can thus conclude from this third analytical section that the variety
of organizational innovations in IBB is greater than in traditional bargaining (Paquet et al., 2000,
pp. 290–292).
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Labor-management relationship. The biggest benefit to the IBB process, however, has
been the building and maintenance of a positive relationship. Problems no longer fester and new
issues can be taken on more easily (Klingel, 2003, p. 53). Freeman (2012) substantiated this in
his study of public school employees, finding that the IBB process strengthened the relationship
between the administration and faculty (p. 125). Further, Rayfield (2000) found that the IBB
process allows for open-ended communication between staff and administration and leads to a
reduction in grievances (p. 42).
Straut’s (1998) study of Ontario school districts suggested that those using the IBB
approach are provided the skills to support a continuing relationship between labor and
management, both in and out of the collective bargaining arena (p. 146). In fact, Klingel (2003)
noted,
IBB can have a profound effect on the labor-management relationship in instances where
there has been enough discord or poor bargaining experience to motivate the parties to do
something different. However, there is strong agreement from practitioner experience that
the use of IBB in negotiations cannot by itself salvage a particularly acrimonious
relationship between bargaining parties. It can improve an existing, troubled relationship
but will not create a relationship where there has been a complete breakdown. (p. 22)
The labor management relationship is an important consideration prior to implementing IBB. For
this reason some IBB processes include a component that assesses if the union and management
are ready to engage in the collaborative IBB process.
Similarly, Peace (1994) contended that collaborative bargaining practices preserved and
strengthened relationships (p. 368).
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Mutual gains. When one does look behind opposed positions for the motivating
interests, one can often find an alternative position that meets not only one’s own interests but
the opposition’s as well (Fisher et al., 2011, p. 44). Those interests that both parties have in
common are called mutual interests, and they are the richest source of the option needed for IBB.
People using IBB for the first time are usually surprised at the high incidence of common
interests around any given issue (Barrett & O’Dowd, 2005, p. 54). IBB is offered as a way to
turn distributive contests into opportunities for mutual gain, where separate interests and needs
are integrated into a satisfactory outcome (Klingel, 2003, p. 3). In addition, Hoynes (1999) also
found mutual gains in a study of public school districts in Ohio, concluding that “IBB results in
CBAs with more contract language that benefits both the union and management” (p. 170).
Among nine CBAs that used IBB and nine that used traditional bargaining, those using
IBB had 109% more mutual gains than those that used traditional bargaining. This is an
important factor that partly confirms the claims made by proponents of IBB, namely, that the
outcomes of such negotiations often produce gains that benefit both parties to the negotiation.
These gains deal especially with the implementation of joint mechanisms to regulate the
relationship between the parties (Paquet et al., 2000, p. 290). A second relevant observation is
that there were five mutual gains made on grievances and disciplinary measures articles in the
IBB cases, and there were none in traditional negotiations (Paquet et al., 2000, p. 290).
Participation and communication. Hiraoka (1994) asserted that IBB goes beyond the
traditional bargaining season, and paves the way for both parties working together year-round
both in and out of bargaining (p. 13). Peace (1994) added that collaborative bargaining models,
such as IBB, lead to cooperative and participatory relationships (p. 369).
Brainerd (1998) found that:
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The IBB project in Ramset County marked a significant achievement because employees
and managers involved in bargaining had a much greater opportunity to participate and to
put forth their ideas than they would have under the traditional bargaining process. The
generation and evaluation of options gave both union and management representatives
opportunities to express ideas, generate alternative options for consideration and provide
a better understanding of the options created. (p.58)
Brainerd (1998) stated that this marked a significant achievement because
communication improved between management and the bargaining units involved. Participants
learned about the union and its views, and union representatives learned about management and
its concerns. Both sides had been unaware of many of these viewpoints and concerns before this
time (Brainerd, 1998, p. 58). Rayfield (2000) reinforced that communication between staff and
administration increased through the mechanism of IBB in his study of a public school district in
Ohio (p. 42).
Problem-solving culture. Klingel (2003) asserted that using “IBB techniques extends
well beyond contract negotiations. District Unions, administrators, BOE members, and parents
have been using an interest-based agreement process to solve problems, create policies, plan
changes, and govern a new set of relationships and decision-making mechanisms” (p. 58).
Klingel further cited examples where the IBB problem-solving method has been taught to groups
in the organization for use in contract administration, problem solving, and shared governance
venues (p. 22). As stated by Brown (2016), “IBB becomes a way of life. It seems that as the IBB
processes are used on a regular basis by negotiators the value system begins to blend into
everyday life, positively impacting the organizational culture as well” (p. 115). For example, a
school district may employ the IBB problem-solving method to address an issue between two
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departments within the organization. In this instance, may not be an outside facilitator, but
instead a district employee trained in IBB from a department not involved in the dispute.
Brainerd (1998) studied an IBB project that led to an “Action Plan” created to address
items between bargaining rounds to ensure that union and management would continue to work
together in a cooperative manner and to focus attention on the problems rather than the
differences in positions (p. 59).
Perceptions of IBB
As previously noted, IBB is a relatively new form of collective bargaining. Negotiators
typically introduce IBB practices into their collective bargaining process in order to improve
relations between labor and management that have been damaged from a history of traditional
bargaining (Fonstad et al., 2005, p. 9). Klingel (2003) added:
After more than a decade of experience and refinement, much learning has occurred, but
it is still unclear whether IBB performs better than traditional bargaining in satisfying the
goals of bargainers. Research on the extent of use of the process, or the effectiveness of
IBB in meeting its stated goals, is even more scarce. Little is known about why parties
choose it over traditional negotiation approaches, its effect on the parties’ relationship,
bargaining outcomes, and the ability of the parties to effectively advocate for their
constituents. (p. 1)
As stated by Klingel, perceptions of IBB are diverse, and this lack of clarity appears to be
connected to our inability to understand why parties chose IBB and how to measure IBB’s
effectiveness in reaching its goals. Having said that, in a sample of 1,172 union and management
respondents, Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. (2001) found that “approximately 80 percent (79.8
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percent) of managers who have employed IBB report that it is their preferred method compared
with approximately 60 percent (59.6 percent) of union leaders” (p. 8).
Perceptions of IBB tend to be positive for those aspects of agreements that cannot be
placed into the contract. To address nontraditional items, bargainers may create letters of
understanding to govern a process for extra-contractual decision-making or an implementation of
solutions. Extra-contractual decision-making can take the form of labor-management committees
that can be used as vehicles for further work on solutions developed in IBB (Klingel, 2003, p.
24).
Criticism and Challenges of IBB
Michael and Michael (2013) found that IBB can improve collaboration through the
exploration of common interests during the early phases of negotiation. However, collaborative
bargaining practices are difficult to sustain when bargainers face economics issues or topics that
do not present common interests between labor and management (p. 473). Furthermore,
McKersie et al. (2008) stated, “Distributive bargaining, complete with classic positional tactics
worked best for dealing with the issues where the parties' basic interests were in deepest conflict
and, importantly, where chief negotiators were faced with deep and difficult-to-resolve conflicts
within their organizations” (p. 94). They go on to explain that negotiating does not have to be
exclusively traditional bargaining or IBB. Parties may execute a mixed process that draws on the
best features of both traditional bargaining, on more distributive issues and IBB approaches on
issues such as working conditions (p. 95).
Miller, Farmer, Miller, and Peters (2010) noted that some union negotiators have shown a
feeling of vulnerability toward IBB (p. 195). Peace (1994) added that IBB is not a good fit for
everyone, because “It is a process that requires a willingness to share information (and therefore
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power), take risks, and change established patterns of behavior” (p. 379). According to McKersie
et al. (2008), constituents often view the collaborative actions of their negotiators with the
opposing party’s negotiators as a reason for giving in or agreeing to concessions in IBB. As
noted by Michael and Michael (2012), “This pressure from constituents has resulted in a
reversion to adversarial bargaining in IBB especially around economic or bread and butter issues
are negotiated” (p. 46).
Furthermore, negotiating parties have expressed concern that, in adopting the
collaborative bargaining model, the committee may give up power in areas where it is not
required to bargain (Peace, 1994, p. 371). Lewicki et al. (2011) added that “If negotiators
approach the problem and their opponent in win–lose terms—IBB cannot occur” (p. 66).
Other Collaborative Collective Bargaining Models
IBB is not the only collaborative collective bargaining model. Klingel (2003) focused on
IBB as developed by the Harvard Negotiation Project and popularized by Fisher and Ury in the
book Getting to Yes. In addition to IBB, he acknowledged that other collaborative collective
bargaining models such as Mutual Gain Bargaining (MGB), developed by the U.S. Department
of Labor, and the P.A.S.T. model (Principles, Assumptions, Steps, and Techniques) exist.
Furthermore, individual practitioners, consulting and university groups, and state-level networks
of facilitators and trainers have all modified these processes based on their experience and needs.
(p. 29)
MGB model. According to Freidman (1993) “in MGB, negotiators are encouraged to
present interests, leaving open how those interests should be addressed. In this way, they do not
become locked into positions and can continue to explore new options if any one idea is
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rejected” (pp. 436–437). Conry (1999) outlined the following eight-step process of the MGB
process:
1. The parties agree to use the process and abide by its rules.
2. Specific issues are identified.
3. The parties discuss their interests on an issue.
4. Working together, options are generated.
5. Criteria for evaluating the options are developed and agreed upon.
6. The evaluation criteria are applied to each option.
7. The best option is selected.
8. The option is reduced to writing for inclusion in the CBA. (p. 5)
Principles, assumptions, steps, and techniques model. According to Barrett and
O’Dowd (2005), the P.A.S.T. model focuses on principals, assumptions, steps, and techniques:
Principals (focus on issues not on personalities, focus on interests not on positions, seek
mutual gain, use a fair method to determine outcomes), Assumptions (bargaining
enhances the parties' relationship, both parties can win in bargaining, parties should help
each other to win, open and frank discussion and information sharing expands the areas
of mutual interests and this in turn expands the options available to the parties, mutually
developing standards for evaluating options can move decision-making away from
reliance on power), Steps (pre-bargaining steps 1 prepare for bargaining 2 develop
opening statements, bargaining steps 1 agree on a list of issues and focus on one at a time
2 identify interests on one issue 3 develop options on one issue 4 create acceptable
standards 5 test options with standards to achieve solution or settlement), Techniques
(idea charting, brainstorming, consensus decision-making). (p. 37)
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Connections between IBB and P.A.S.T. can be seen by looking at Barrett and O’Dowd’s
description. Connections include; (a) focusing on interests over positions, (b) looking for shared
interests, (c) developing issues prior to bargaining, and (d) techniques such as idea charting,
brainstorming, and consensus decision-making.
Hybrid models. Klingel (2003) goes on to say that “IBB appears to have become more
integrated into the larger, existing framework of bargaining practices as a set of techniques not
wholly separate from traditional bargaining practices” (p. 37). Wilson (1999) asserts that
traditional and alternative bargaining techniques lie along a single continuum, with any number
of hybrid models between the two extremes (see Figure 1 for Wilson’s continuum of bargaining
behaviors).

Figure 1. Continuum of bargaining behaviors. Retrieved from Wilson, R. (March 1999). The
Life Cycle of Labor and Management Relations. Negotiator's Notebook. Salem, OR, Oregon
School Boards Association. (p. 1)
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Differences Between Traditional Bargaining and IBB
Lewicki et al. (2011) outlined what they believed to be the three main differences
between traditional bargaining and IBB. The first is that traditional bargaining can create an
environment where parties may distrust one another, conceal and manipulate information, or
attempt to understand the other party purely for their own advantage. One the other hand,
successful IBB bargainers cultivate free and open dialogue around all relevant issues and
concerns. The second is that traditional bargainers make little to no effort to understand the other
side’s needs and interests unless this understanding helps them challenge, undermine, or even
deny the other party the opportunity to have those needs and interests met. However, successful
IBB bargainers take the time to really understand what the other side wants to achieve. The third
is that traditional bargainers have a strong desire to win or defeat their opponent. They are not
interested in finding solutions that satisfy both sides. In contrast, successful IBB bargainers are
mindful of the other side’s goals, and search to find solutions that satisfy the needs and interests
of both sides (pp. 64–56).
Barrett and O’Dowd’s (2005) text, Interest Based Bargaining: A User’s Guide, provides
a helpful tool for further understanding the main differences between traditional bargaining and
IBB, as seen in Table 5.
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Table 5rences between Traditional and IBB
Differences Between Traditional Bargaining and IBB
Traditional Bargaining

IBB

The main focus is to give as little and to get as The main focus is to ensure that each side’s
much as possible.
interests are addressed.
The parties prepare separately by drafting
opening positions as targets.

The parties prepare together by agreeing ground
rules and ways of working.

These positions take the form of wish lists. The The parties prepare separately by discussing
parties frequently table unreal positions that
interests with constituents. If constituents
they can subsequently concede.
present positions, the negotiators convert these
into interests.
They also prepare resistance points above or
below which they are not prepared to go.

They approach bargaining with open minds as to
what the final agreement might be.

The negotiations take the form of two sides
bargaining across a table with breaks for
caucus meetings; options are explored in
private sessions.

The negotiations take the form of one group
with occasional breaks for caucus or side
meetings; options are openly explored in joint
sessions.

If the parties undergo negotiation training it is
done separately.

If using IBB for the first time the parties
undergo joint training.

The negotiations open with positional
statements and follow a sequence of offers and
counteroffers with frequent deferrals and
breakdowns.

The negotiations open with discussions around
an issue and each party’s interests underlying
that issue followed by a problem-solving
sequence.

Information is kept tight and only disclosed
under pressure or to extract a concession.

Information is openly shared and research is
usually conducted jointly.

Decisions are made by compromise or under
pressure.

Decisions are made by consensus after an
agreed objective evaluation of options.

Mainly involves industrial relations managers
and union officials.

Involvement is extended to others with expertise
around relevant topics.

Spokespersons present key positions and
moves.

Spokespersons outline key interests, but all
members participate.

Each side attempts to keep the other under
pressure by power tactics.

The parties agree not to use pressure as a
negotiation lever.

The parties use a facilitator when they reach an The parties use a facilitator during the entire
impasse.
process.
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As can be seen in the Table 5, differences between traditional bargaining and IBB include
elements such as (a) positions versus interests, (b) two sides versus one group, (c) withholding
information versus sharing information, (d) facilitators during impasse versus facilitators
throughout, and (e) compromised decisions versus consensus decisions.
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Conceptual Framework
This study’s conceptual framework (see Figure 2) starts with a representation of how IBB
was implemented in the district, and acknowledges that IBB was implemented over time.

Figure 2. Conceptual framework.
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The arrows in the conceptual framework that point toward how IBB was implemented
represent the various decisions that district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators made
when IBB was implemented. These decision makers were influenced by the BOE, perceptions,
biases, assumptions, finances, the community, current reality, other collaborative efforts, CBAs,
past practice, parents, working relationships, local politics, state politics, national politics, the
MEA, the NEA, research, staff, and the success of previous implementation decisions. The
circular arrows represent what the decision makers considered, including the influences above,
when making implementation decisions.
Summary
This chapter reviewed the literature of decision-making, the history of collective
bargaining, an overview of traditional bargaining, and a critical examination of IBB. The review
of IBB literature started with exploring the history of IBB followed by looking at IBB training,
IBB facilitation, the IBB process, IBB outcomes, perceptions of IBB, criticism and challenges of
IBB, other collaborative collective bargaining models, and the differences between traditional
and IBB.
The next chapter will outline the research methodology utilized in this study. Included
within the methodology are sections on data sources, data analysis, ethical considerations,
limitations, and delimitations.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
The purpose of this case study was to investigate how one public school district in
southeastern Michigan implemented interest-based bargaining (IBB). The use of case study,
according to Bloomberg and Volpe (2016), “affords significant interaction with research
participants, providing an in-depth picture of the unit of study” (p. 46). The study also sought to
understand the factors that influenced the decision-making process, and what was considered
when making implementation decisions. Bloomberg and Volpe (2016) contend, “Since
understanding is the primary goal of qualitative research, the researcher is the primary instrument
for data collection and data analysis. However, the subjective lenses that both the researcher and
research participants together bring to a qualitative study form the context for the findings” (p.
41). For this study, interviews, documentation, and archival records were used to investigate how
the district implemented IBB. The researcher, as assistant superintendent for human resources
(ASHR) in the district that was studied, had access to the participants and information outlined in
this chapter.
Data Sources
Interviews. According to Creswell (2014), “In qualitative interviews, the researcher
conducts face-to-face interviews with participants, telephone interviews, or engages in focus
group interviews with six to eight interviewees in each group. These interviews involve
unstructured and generally open-ended questions that are few in number and intended to elicit
views and opinions from the participants” (p. 190). Similarly, the researcher conducted
unstructured face-to-face interviews that elicited views and opinions about how the district
implemented IBB. Yin (2014) asserts that “Interviews are an essential source of case study
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evidence because most case studies are about human affairs or actions. Well informed
interviewees can provide important insights into such affairs or actions” (p. 113). Likewise, the
researcher gained insights into how the district implemented IBB from each interviewee.
The researcher used an unstructured interview protocol (see Appendix C for the interview
protocol). Yin (2014) shared that unstructured interviews are common in case study research and
resemble guided questions (see Appendix D for the questions that will guide the unstructured
interviews) rather than structured inquires (p. 110). The researcher began each interview by
thanking the participant for their participation, explaining the purpose of the study, and
reminding the participant of the procedures put in place to protect their confidentiality. The
researcher took notes and audiotaped all interviews. Creswell (2014) recommended, “Even if an
interview is taped, I recommend that researchers take notes in the event that the recording
equipment fails” (p. 194). The notes were taken on a password protected Microsoft Word
document with a header that that indicated the date, time, location, interviewer, and interviewee.
Spaces were left on the document between the questions to record the responses. At the end of
the interview, the researcher thanked the participant for their participation in the study. After the
interview, the researcher filled in gaps not captured in the notes with those from the audiotape.
Participants were comprised of the primary decision makers involved with implementing
IBB in the district that was studied. Participants signed a consent agreement (see Appendix E for
the consent agreement) and came from the following groups (a) district leadership, (b) union
leadership, and (c) IBB facilitators.
The two district leaders that were asked to participate were the superintendent and a
board of education (BOE) member. The superintendent was asked to participate, because he was
the ultimate decision maker for implementing IBB as directed by the BOE. The BOE member
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participated in the district’s (a) IBB assessment with the full BOE; (b) IBB training with all
education association (EA), paraeducator association (PA), and secretarial association (SA)
bargaining team members; and (c) sat on the EA’s IBB team. Her IBB training took place in the
district over the course of two days and was led by two IBB trainers. One of the two IBB trainers
was also an IBB facilitator with the district. The methods used by the IBB trainers came from
training they received through the Michigan education association (MEA), which was based on
Fisher et al.’s (2011) work, Getting to Yes, and was developed by the national education
association (NEA), the North American Association of Educational Negotiators, and the
Michigan Education Collaborative Alliance. The EA is the district’s largest collective bargaining
unit, and this BOE member sat on this IBB team during both the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017
school years. She was selected to sit on the EA’s IBB team by decision of the superintendent,
ASHR, and BOE president.
The union leader that was asked to participate was the MEA UniServ director who served
all of the district’s MEA affiliated collective bargaining units. Her appointment to this role was
outside the jurisdiction of the district, and she sat on all MEA affiliated IBB teams during both
the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 school years, participated in the IBB assessment, and received the
same IBB training as the BOE member that was asked to participate.
The IBB facilitators that were asked to participate worked with the district during both
the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 school years. One of the IBB facilitators represented management,
was paid by the district, and was not employed by the MEA. He was an IBB facilitator with the
district during both the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 school years. The other IBB facilitator
represented the union, and was employed and paid by the MEA. He was an IBB assessor and
trainer with the district during the 2015/2016 school year and an IBB facilitator with the district

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

58

during the 2016/2017 school year. They both were arranged through the MEA, but the
superintendent, BOE, and MEA UniServ director were the ultimate decision makers in approving
their assignment to facilitate the district’s IBB process.
Documentation and archival records. To collect documentation, the researcher
gathered newspaper articles, agendas, meetings minutes, collective bargaining agreements
(CBA), memos, presentations made to staff, and communications sent to staff in the district that
was studied. According to Yin (2014), “except for studies of preliterate societies, documentary
information is likely to be relevant to every case study” (p. 105). Yin (2014) went on to say that
letters, e-mails, agendas, minutes from meetings, administrative documents, announcements of
meetings, proposals, news clippings and other articles are examples of documentation (p. 106).
The researcher also used archival records in this case study. Yin (2014) stated that,
“survey data produced by others, about your case’s employees, residents, participants” is an
example of archival records used in case studies (p. 109). The primary source of archival records
used for this study was secondary data from a staff survey administered and analyzed by a
regional university for the district’s Partnership and Collaboration Committee (PCC). This
secondary survey data was used to understand factors that influenced the decision-making
process as the district implemented IBB.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was done concurrently with data collection. According to Miles,
Huberman, and Saldana (2014), analysis concurrent with data collection “helps the field worker
cycle back and forth between thinking about the existing data and generating strategies for
collecting new, often better, data” (p. 70).
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As data was collected it was processed into text and placed onto a password protected
Microsoft Word document. Miles et al. (2014) suggest that collected data may be condensed and
simplified considerably from the raw notes or recordings into refined text that is clear to the
reader or analyst (p. 71).
The researcher condensed the data by hand into codes that emerged through the data
analysis process onto a Microsoft Excel document. According to Creswell (2014), “The
traditional approach in social sciences is to allow the codes to emerge during the data analysis”
(p. 199). Coding included both first and second level codes. Miles et al. (2014) explain that “First
Cycle coding is a way to initially summarize segments of data. Pattern coding, as a Second Cycle
method, is a way of grouping those summaries into a smaller number of categories, themes, or
constructs” (p. 86). Additionally, the researcher used tools such as matrix displays and network
displays to display the data as patterns emerge. According to Miles et al. (2014), a matrix display
has defined rows and columns and network displays are a series of notes with links (lines and
arrows) between them (p. 109).
Miles et al. (2014) go on to say that “Codes are primarily, but not exclusively, used to
retrieve and categorize similar data chunks so the researcher can quickly find, pull out, and
cluster the segments relating to a particular research question, hypothesis, construct, or theme.
Clustering and the display of condensed chunks then set the stage for further analysis and
drawing conclusions” (p. 72). This process allowed the researcher to categorize and view the
data from various vantage points that resulted in a more comprehensive analysis.
See Figure 3 for the interwoven nature of the data analysis process that was used by the
researcher as presented by Miles et at. (2014).

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

60

Figure 3. Components of data analysis: Interactive model (p. 14).
Researcher-as-Instrument
The researcher acknowledges the potential-biases involved in researcher-as-instrument,
which is typical of qualitative research. According to Bloomberg and Volpe (2014), we have to
leave open the possibility that other researchers may tell a different narrative given the same set
of data: “What we learn from our research, how we understand what we find, and how we report
it is but one view” (p. 249). The following markers of good qualitative researcher-as-instrument
were adapted from Miles et al. (2014). The researcher had a strong familiarity of the
phenomenon and setting under study and had reviewed literature on other collaborative
collective bargaining models as well as literature on IBB use in other settings in order to broaden
his perspective. He was committed to using good investigative skills that draw people in with a
meticulous attention to detail. Furthermore, he was comfortable, resilient, and nonjudgment with
participants. Lastly, he was committed to having a heightened state of empathetic engagement,
balanced with a heightened sense of objective awareness (p. 42).
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Ethical Considerations
The researcher’s role as ASHR of the district that was studied presented an ethical
consideration. As ASHR, the researcher served as chief negotiator and was actively involved as
the district implemented IBB. Having said this, the initial implementation of IBB occurred prior
to when the researcher selected this topic, which reduced concern of manipulating
implementation for purposes of the study. Additionally, this study’s focus on implementation
allowed the researcher to be objective in a biased environment.
Another ethical consideration was the reduction of risk of anticipated harm for all
participants. Participation was voluntary, and the researcher protected all participants through
procedures outlined on the consent form that was signed prior to participation (see Appendix E
for the consent form).
Furthermore, archival records in the form of secondary survey data were used by the
researcher in the results section of this study as he sought to understand influences on the
decision-making process used by the district as they implemented IBB. This secondary data was
from the district’s PCC, which worked with a regional university who administered and analyzed
the results from the staff survey. Although not a requirement of secondary data, the researcher
informed the regional university and the superintendent of the school district that was studied
and asked for consent to use this secondary data (see Appendix F for the letter of consent).
Limitations
A study’s limitations are those characteristics of design or methodology that will impact
or influence the interpretation of the findings from the research (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2015, p.
164). This study’s intentional focus on implementation allowed the researcher to be objective in
a biased environment. Having said that, the following limitations remained:
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The researcher’s role in the district that was studied.



The familiarity between the participants and the researcher.



The interviews were conducted by the researcher.



How reliable participant answers were when interviewed.



How reliable participant answers were when responding to the staff survey that was used as
an archival record.



The models of traditional bargaining and IBB used by the district that was studied represents
just one of the many models.

Delimitations
Delimitations, according to Bloomberg and Volpe (2015), refer to the initial choices
made about the broader, overall design of a study. They are those characteristics that define and
clarify the conceptual boundaries that the researcher selected and a way to clarify to the reader
how he narrowed the scope of the study (p. 165). The delimitations of this study were as follows:


This study was limited to examining the process used by one southeastern Michigan public
school district as they implemented IBB.



The methods of investigation were (a) interviews, (b) documentation, and (c) archival records



Five individuals were interviewed, and those participants were limited to the superintendent,
MEA UniServ director, a BOE member, and two of the district’s IBB facilitators.



This study examined the implementation of IBB that occurred between July 1, 2015 and
December 31, 2016.

Summary
This qualitative case study used interviews, documentation, and archival records as data
sources. Furthermore, the researcher performed data analysis concurrently through a cycle of
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data collection, first and second level coding, matrix displays, and drew and verified conclusions.
In the next chapter, the results of the case study are presented and shared through the art of
storytelling.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Introduction
The purpose of this case study was to investigate how one public school district in
southeastern Michigan implemented interest-based bargaining (IBB). The study also sought to
understand the factors that influenced the decision-making process and what was considered
when making implementation decisions.
Mattos (2011) asserted that school districts have spent significant fiscal and human
resources to implement an array of well-intentioned initiatives that often fell short of their targets
(pp. 125–126). Furthermore, Candido and Santos (2015) reported that implementation of a new
strategy can be a difficult task. They went on to say that “the true rate of implementation failure
remains to be determined, but it is often claimed that 50–90% of strategic initiatives fail” (p.
237).
Likewise, school districts have faced challenges when implementing IBB. Klingel (2003)
shared “while the ideas and concepts transmitted in IBB training were powerful and attractive to
participants, the parties were often unable to put them into practice” (p. 13). Klingel’s (2003)
report IBB in Education: A Review of the Literature and Current Practice included three case
studies of school districts that used IBB and seven elements for improved IBB implementation
(pp. 13–72). These case studies and elements for improved IBB implementation were helpful
resources for districts, but Klingel’s report was broad in nature and focused on more than just
implementation. Additional research was needed with a more precise focus on understanding
how IBB can be implemented in a public school district.
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Research Questions
The primary research questions that guided this study were as follows:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?



What factors influenced the decision-making process during the implementation of IBB?



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about the implementation of IBB?

Data Sources
A qualitative study typically analyzes qualitative data for patterns or themes, and is
presented based on the major themes found in the data. Common methods to present themes are
based on the unit of analysis. For example, a unit of qualitative measurement could be leadership
traits and organized into major patterns (Yin, 2004). If the design is historical, organize the
findings by time (Creswell, 2004). If the design is a single-case study, the unit of presentation is
the entire case being studied (Yin, 1993). For this case study, the methodology used to gather the
data needed to investigate how one southeastern Michigan public school district implemented
IBB was interviews, documentation, and archival records.
Interviews. The interview process began with identification and agreement to participate
by each interviewee. All participants were informed of the process and the method to achieve
confidentiality, and each participant signed a consent agreement. The interviews were
unstructured and conducted between May 17, 2017 and May 31, 2017. Notes were placed onto a
password protected Microsoft Word document during each interview, and the interviews were
audio recorded. After each interview, the researcher listened to the audio recordings to fill in the
gaps from the original transcription, and conducted follow-up interviews with four of the five
participants.
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According to Yin (2014), “Interviews are an essential source of case study evidence
because most case studies are about human affairs or actions. Well informed interviewees can
provide important insights into such affairs or actions” (p.113). To secure well informed
participants, the interviewees were the primary decision makers involved when the district
implemented IBB, and came from the following groups (a) district leadership, (b) union
leadership, and (c) IBB facilitators (see Table 6 for a demographic breakdown of participants).
Table 6
Demographic Breakdown of Participants
Position

Represented

Terms

Paid By

Gender

Participated in the
district’s IBB

Superintendent

Management

Employed by
the district

The
district

Male

Assessment and
training

BOE member

Management

Elected to serve
the district

Un-paid

Female

Assessment,
training, and EA
bargaining

MEA UniServ
director

Union

Employed by
the MEA

The
MEA

Female

Assessment,
training, and EA,
PA, and SA
bargaining

Management
facilitator

Management

Contracted by
the district

The
district

Male

EA, PA, and SA
bargaining

Union

Employed by
the MEA

The
MEA

Male

Assessment,
training, and EA,
PA, and SA
bargaining

Union
facilitator

The district leaders interviewed were the superintendent and a board of education (BOE)
member. The superintendent went through the district’s IBB assessment and training and was the
ultimate decision maker for IBB implementation for the district as directed by the BOE. The
BOE member participated in the district’s (a) IBB assessment with the full BOE; (b) IBB
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training with all education association (EA), paraeducator association (PA), and secretarial
association (SA) bargaining team members; and (c) sat on the EA’s IBB team. She was placed
on the EA IBB team by decision of the superintendent, BOE president, and assistant
superintendent for human resources (ASHR) based on availability, interest, and fit. Additionally,
one BOE member sat on the PA IBB team, and another on the SA IBB team, but they were not
interviewed. The union leader was the Michigan educator association (MEA) UniServ director
who served all of the district’s MEA affiliated collective bargaining units, went through the
district’s IBB assessment and training, and sat on all MEA affiliated IBB teams during both the
2015/2016 and 2016/2017 school years. The IBB facilitators worked with the district during both
the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 school years and were both trained to facilitate IBB by the MEA.
Their IBB facilitaor training was conducted by the MEA and was a requirement for serving as an
MEA-sponsored IBB facilitator. One of the IBB facilitators represented management, was paid
by the district, and was not employed by the MEA. He was an IBB facilitator with the district
during both the 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 school years. The other IBB facilitator represented the
union, and was employed and paid by the MEA. He was an IBB assessor and trainer with the
district during the 2015/2016 school year and an IBB facilitator with the district during the
2016/2017 school year.
Documentation and archival records. To gather documentation, the researcher
collected newspaper articles, agendas, meeting minutes, collection bargaining agreements
(CBA), memos, presentation handouts, and emails from the district that was studied. Yin (2014)
stated that letters, e-mails, agendas, minutes from meetings, administrative documents,
announcements of meetings, proposals, news clippings and other articles are examples of
documentation (p. 106).
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Additionally, the researcher used archival records in this case study. Yin (2014) stated
that “survey data produced by others, about your case’s employees, residents, participants” is an
example of archival records used in case studies (p. 109). The primary source of archival records
used for this study was secondary data from a staff survey administered and analyzed by a
regional university for the district’s partnership and collaboration committee (PCC). This
secondary survey data was used to understand factors that influenced the decision-making
process as the district implemented IBB.
Data Analysis
Human subjects approval was granted on May 8, 2017 (see Appendix G). Data analysis
and the collection of interview data, documentation, and archival records were completed
concurrently between May 17, 2017 and July 27, 2017. According to Miles et al. (2014), analysis
concurrent with data collection “helps the field worker cycle back and forth between thinking
about the existing data and generating strategies for collecting new, often better, data” (p. 70).
The raw data was condensed and simplified into refined text, and further condensed and coded
onto a Microsoft Excel document. First and second level codes emerged, and data was placed
into matrix displays with defined rows and columns, which allowed for further analysis and
conclusions to be drawn. Miles et al. (2014) stated that “Codes are primarily, but not exclusively,
used to retrieve and categorize similar data chunks so the researcher can quickly find, pull out,
and cluster the segments relating to a particular research question, hypothesis, construct, or
theme.” The process of clustering and displaying condensed chunks sets the stage for the
researcher to further analyze and draw conclusions from the data (p. 72).
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Presentation of Themes
Eight themes emerged during data analysis. The themes were products of how the district
implemented IBB and speak to trust, transparency, collaboration, and collegiality among staff.
IBB was just one tool used to improve the culture and climate of the district, and is
interconnected with other efforts such as the work of the distirct’s PCC. The themes were as
follows:


Theme 1: BOE members on bargaining teams



Theme 2: Increased PA and SA voice



Theme 3: Consistent joint communications



Theme 4: Commitment to organization



Theme 5: Commitment to the process



Theme 6: Willingness to open communication



Theme 7: Compensation solved mid-process



Theme 8: Formation of numerous committees
The themes are not ordered by importance; instead they are shared sequentially to best

match the narrative of how one southeastern Michigan public school district implemented IBB
(see Table 7 for a display of the themes).
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Eight Themes: Influences, Considerations, Successes, and Challenges
Influences and Considerations

Successes and Challenges

Theme 1:
BOE members
on bargaining
teams

BOE participation on PCC,
disconnect between what the
union presented and the BOE
understood, IBB assessors’
recommendation to place a
BOE member on each IBB
team, BOE wanted to better
understand issues, union leaders
wanted the BOE to hear their
side, and bargainers wanted
decision-making authority.

Successes: BOE members added the
perspective of district families, the
community, and the BOE to bargaining;
decisions were allowed to be made at
the table; and BOE members left with a
better understanding of the issues.
Challenges: The facilitators were
initially gentle on telling BOE members
to get in line or stay in process, and
selecting bargaining dates that worked
for staff, facilitators, and BOE
members.

Theme 2:
Increased PA
and SA voice

Themes from PCC staff survey,
the inclusive nature of the PCC,
and the district wanted to honor
secretary and paraeducator
feelings and make a change
based on feedback from the
PCC staff survey.

Successes: The PA and SA bargaining
teams had positive and productive
bargaining experiences, and left
bargaining feeling heard.
Challenges: Implementing the full IBB
process with both the PA and SA
required a substantial financial and
operational commitment.

Theme 3:
Commitment to
sending joint
communications

Previous joint communications
sent by the PCC and bargaining
team members expressed the
desire to send joint
communications during checkout.

Successes: Staff were kept informed
throughout the bargaining process, and
apprised that union and management
were collaboratively problem-solving.
Challenges: All parties had to commit to
the contents of each communication to
avoid potential unfair labor allegations.

Theme 4:
Commitment to
organization

Previous contentious bargaining
cycles that went into the
summer, a sense of pride by
district staff and the BOE, a
want for change, and a desire to
have bargaining done by the end
of the school year.

Successes: The process was allowed to
operate as designed, and bargaining was
finished by the end of the school year.
Challenges: Some bargaining team
members became less productive
nearing the end of full day bargaining
sessions.
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Table 7 continued
Theme 5:
Commitment to
the process

Previous contentious
bargaining, a sense of pride by
district staff and the BOE,
limited to no knowledge of or
experience with other IBB
models, a want for a change,
and the financial and
operational cost of
implementation.

Successes: The process was allowed to
operate as designed.
Challenges: EA team veered off of
process on a few occasions.

Theme 6:
Willingness to
open
communication

A sense of pride by district
staff, a new ASHR, the open
communication experienced
through the work of the PCC,
and a want for a change.

Successes: A wider variety of issues
were able to be addressed.
Challenges: Prohibited subjects of
bargaining had to remain outside of
CBAs.

Theme 7:
Compensation
solved midprocess

Themes from PCC staff survey,
BOE priority to increase staff
compensation, and bargaining
team members wanted to honor
staff frustrations regarding
compensation.

Successes: After compensation was
resolved, everything else went much
faster.
Challenges: After compensation was
resolved, bargaining teams concluded
that there was no money to spend on
other issues.

Theme 8:
Formation of
numerous
committees

Limited financial resources,
pent-up unresolved issues from
contentious bargaining,
previous bargaining cycles went
into the summer, an increased
sense of trust, a want for
meaningful resolution to issues,
and a desire to finish bargaining
by the end of the school year.

Successes: Provided additional
resources, expertise, and time to resolve
issues.
Challenges: Many issues ended up in
committee, which was time consuming
work that continued six months after all
CBAs were ratified.

As can be seen from Table 7, there were influences, considerations, successes, and
challenges found related to each of the eight themes. A more thorough presentation of the eight
themes is outlined below.
Theme 1: BOE Members on IBB Teams
BOE members sat on the recently formed PCC, but having a BOE member on bargaining
teams was not something that the district had previously done. Several interview participants said
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the desire to have one BOE member on each bargaining team was expressed by both employees
and BOE members during all five IBB assessment sessions, and their participation in bargaining
was a recommendation of the IBB assessors. Interview participants suggested that association
leadership felt that having a BOE member on bargaining teams would help with the BOE's
understanding of the issues, because there seemed to be a disconnect between what association
representatives were presenting in bargaining and the BOE’s understanding. Additionally,
several other interview participants expressed that some BOE members felt a need to be more
involved, so that they fully understood the issues behind the tentative agreements that they voted
on. Similarly, Sharp (2012) reported that faculty at Ball State University launched and analyzed a
survey in 2010 which found that 61.3% of school superintendents agreed or strongly agreed that
having a BOE member on the team allows the BOE member to hear teacher demands and
feelings directly. Sharp (2012) went on to report that 62.2% of school superintendents agreed or
strongly agreed that having a BOE member on the team provides direct communications to other
BOE members.
Another influence for having one BOE member on each bargaining team, shared by
interview participants, was a belief from both union and management that their presence would
allow for quicker decision-making. The thinking was that the BOE member on the team could
communicate what the BOE would support, which would avoid having to continually run ideas
by the BOE before making decisions in bargaining. Stepp, Sweeney, and Johnson (2003)
similarly said that bargaining teams should include key decision makers, and bargaining teams
should be empowered to make most, if not all, of the decisions that must be made to reach an
agreement (p. 2).
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There was consensus among interview participants that having a BOE member on each
bargaining team was a success, and allowed for decisions to be made at the table. One interview
participant stated, “The BOE members were able to give a perspective that the union side does
not normally think of. The BOE members were able to bring some information about the district
families, the community and regarding the BOE itself and its responsibilities, and I think that
was very helpful in the decision-making process.” Another interview participant said, “Many
times, the facilitators complimented the district for having a BOE member on each team during
bargaining, because that is rare, and is not a normal thing that occurs.” Another interview
participant said, “Having a BOE member on a bargaining team is not something that I have seen
or recommended in the past, but it worked extremely well, and they left with a better
understanding of the issues.”
Having a BOE member on each bargaining team was not without challenges. The
facilitators were initially gentle on telling BOE members to get in line or stay in process. Off
process behaviors included (a) participating in side conversations, (b) skipping phases of the
process such as offering options during the story phase, (c) commenting on options during
brainstorming, (d) being hard on people instead of being easy on people and hard on problems,
and (e) debating someone else’s piece of the story instead of just adding your own story segment.
One interview participant stated:
At first, the facilitators treaded lightly on telling BOE members how to get in line and
stay in process, but once this barrier was crossed they treated BOE members just like
everyone else. This was important, because the process will not work unless everyone
follows it equally. The fear at first was that if a facilitator corrected a BOE member they
could say “get rid of this guy.”
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This fear, although it impacted initial facilitator behavior, did not materialize. BOE
bargaining team members followed facilitator instructions, and did not use their role to
circumvent the process. Another interview participant shared that having a BOE member on each
bargaining team was a challenge, because it required having BOE members who were willing to
volunteer for this commitment. Sharp (2012) reported a similar challenge from a 2010 survey
which found that 64.1% of superintendents agreed or strongly agreed that it is a disadvantage to
have a BOE member on the team because it is very time consuming and may be hard to schedule
meetings with them (p. 41).
Theme 2: Increased PA and SA Voice
The district decided to implement the full IBB process with both the PA and SA. Both
groups had full bargaining teams with central office administration, building administration, the
MEA UniServ director, a BOE member, and association staff just like the EA did. Furthermore,
they were trained right alongside BOE members, EA members, and administrators.
These decisions were influenced by themes from the district’s May 2015 PCC staff
survey, which found that paraeducators and secretaries in the district did not feel valued by
school and district leaders and wanted more voice. There was one related theme from the
secretarial survey:
There was an overall sense that their duties were underestimated and unsupported. There
appears to be two categories that employees are referred to “clerical” and “staff.” They
would like to be included as “staff.” To not be included makes the secretaries feel less
valued and unappreciated
See Appendix H for the results and findings from the PCC staff survey.
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In addition to this theme from the secretarial survey, the May 2015 paraeducator survey
revealed a similar theme:
Paraeducators would like to be more involved with staff meetings so that their ideas and
concerns can be shared. Involvement in these meetings would help the paraeducators feel
more like part of a team. They also want to be informed about what is happening.
See Appendix H for the results and findings from the PCC staff survey.
Furthermore, several interview participants shared that there was a belief that the
inclusive style of labor relations experienced through the district's PCC could transfer to
collective bargaining through the implementation of the full IBB process with the PA and SA.
One interview participant said, “There was a carry-over from the PCC. Support staff felt
more respected because they were listened to in terms of district issues. The possibility of
carrying this into negotiations was viewed by them as a step in the right direction where they
would have a more respected voice in the negotiation process.” Similarly, interview participants
mentioned that the ASHR clearly and consistently communicated, both in and out of bargaining,
that all groups would be treated in a similar fashion, and that no group would be given preference
over another.
According to one interview participant, “Secretaries and paraeducators can be very
difficult to bargain with, and the ease in which they settled, was like someone had just taken an
anvil off of them and said ‘let’s talk and hear what you have to say and see if we can solve some
problems’. I mean they just ate it up. They both found voice in this process.” This connected to
Fisher et al. (2011) who said:
Listen before you launch into a rebuttal. Inquire. Make sure you understand their view,
and make sure they know you understand. Once the other side knows that you understand
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what they have said, they cannot dismiss your disagreement as simple lack of
understanding. (p. 186)
Previous to the implementation of IBB, lack of understand, not the listening described above,
was commonplace. PA and SA bargaining teams did not feel listened to or understood during
contentious bargaining cycles, and they attributed poor decision making by district leaders to
their lack of understanding. The IBB process used by the district created an environment where
parties listened to each other, and PA and SA bargaining team members left the IBB process
feeling heard and understood.
The decision to implement large PA and SA bargaining teams allowed for the
representation of many viewpoints. Consensus from large teams increased the confidence that
the team had truly found common interests of the people they represented. The challenge of
larger teams, as expressed by one interview participant, was that “Large teams increased the
financial and operational stress experienced by pulling additional staff away from their jobs for
IBB.” Another interview participant added, “At times, it was more difficult to have in-depth
discussions with large teams.”
Theme 3: Consistent Joint Communications
The bargaining process began with a commitment to the practice of continuous
communication to staff through joint communications, which relates to Brown’s (2015) finding
that IBB provided a mechanism for more effective communications with constituents including
joint communications (p. 79). The first of which, was a joint communication sent to all district
staff directly after the second day of IBB training on March 24, 2016. The contents of this
communication were discussed and agreed upon during the end of the second day of training,
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and the communication was electronically signed by all 31 participants. The communication
said:
We wanted to take this opportunity to update you on the IBB process. On March 23rd and
24th we completed a two-day training with all EA, PA, SA, maintenance, administration,
and BOE members that will be sitting on our bargaining teams. The training was two full
days led by a pair of trainers arranged through the MEA, and was intended to build the
relationships needed to effectively engage in IBB. IBB is a collaborative team approach,
guided by our two facilitators, that requires full consensus and problem-solving. The
process is centered on interests opposed to the traditional model where the two sides
battle back and forth over positions. All team members are excited to engage in
bargaining using the IBB model, which will start shortly after we return from Spring
Break. We have challenging issues before us, but are confident that this process will
forge contracts that continue our work of building healthy relationships, shared purpose,
and a collaborative culture
See Appendix I for the email and responses.
One staff member responded to the email by saying, “Thank you, I appreciate the update.
Always nice when something going on is communicated.” Another staff member said, “It sounds
like the IBB training sessions were highly successful. Several of the participants commented on
how beneficial the training was.”
Several interview participants expressed that there was a commitment to emailing joint
communications to staff after every bargaining session. One interview participant said:
The communication piece was very well done, and it kept people informed without
getting into the details, because you cannot, and it was consistent. I think that this helps
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keep all of the constituents that are not at the table at ease. One thing that happens with
IBB is that a lot of the constituents that you are all representing will say, well what is this,
do you all sit in a room and sing Kumbaya. They think this, because you are all getting
along, and they are not used to seeing that. Constituents tend to get suspicious when they
are not constantly communicated with or informed about what is going on. Whereas here,
there was a conscious effort to always communicate after every session.
The interview participants explained that the ASHR gathered the information to be shared
with staff at the end of every bargaining session, drafted a communication, sent the draft
communication to IBB team members for feedback, modified the communication based on the
feedback, and then released the communication to staff. One of the joint communications
emailed to EA staff after a bargaining session said:
For the last two days, the EA IBB team has started the negotiation process. We are joined
by our two facilitators who have been excellent additions to the team. We are all
committed to no hidden agendas, honest communication, and collaboratively solving
problems both inside and outside of negotiations. While we cannot share the specifics of
the issues, we can share that we have joined together successfully through transparency,
open dialogue and shared interests. We began by listing the issues important to us, shared
our reasons why they were important, and then brainstormed a list of solutions. When we
agreed on a solution for an issue we collaboratively wrote the language for the contract.
This is not a quick process, and it requires continual discussion. We are confident that
together we will create a contract that is best for all parties. We will continue to update
you throughout the IBB process.
See Appendix J for the email.
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One interview participant said that the practice of consistently sending joint
communications was influenced by the success of previous joint communications sent to staff
through the work of the district’s PCC.
Theme 4: Commitment to Organization
A theme consistently shared by interview participants was that there was a commitment
to organization during the IBB process, which created an environment where the process could
move efficiently and operate as designed. Prior to the start of bargaining, four bargaining dates
were scheduled for each association. Most of the sessions were scheduled for full days that
started at 9:00 a.m. and ended at 4:00 p.m. A majority of the interview participants believed the
main consideration for scheduling this way was to move the process along, with hopes of
finishing bargaining by the end of the 2015/2016 school year. Klingel (2003) described a
compressed model for scheduling IBB sessions:
The length of bargaining and the number of bargaining sessions utilized in IBB varies
widely. Some models compress contract negotiations into a one or two-month period,
with a minimal number of intensive bargaining sessions. A workshop model may be
employed to achieve the shorter time frame, where two major bargaining sessions occur
at the beginning and end of the negotiation, with an active process of issue exchange,
optional subcommittee meetings, and information sharing throughout. (p. 35)
The district’s scheduling of bargaining was compressed, and one interview participant
said, “This set the tone that we were here to work, and gave a sense of urgency to get the work
done.” Interview participants revealed that this strategy did help move the process along but
mentioned that the first four hours of IBB tended to be the most productive. They expressed that

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

80

full day sessions can be mentally exhausting, and participants can get tired at the end of long
days of bargaining.
The interview participants went on to share that the ASHR took digital pictures of all
bargaining notes from the flip chart paper after every bargaining session and then posted them to
a shared Google folder. He shared this folder with all bargaining team members, which gave
them online access to the bargaining notes and the to-do list. Furthermore, one interview
participant said, “The flip chart paper was always available, the bargaining dates were scheduled
ahead of time and communicated with reminders, and any information that was needed from one
meeting to the next was always available. There were several times it took a few meetings to
gather the information dependent on the scope of what was needed, but the organization was
very smooth.”
It was expressed by another interview participant that there was a real sense of pride by
district staff and the BOE to improve the district, and that this attention to organization was
probably influenced by staff wanting to make things better. Further expressed was that previous
contentious bargaining cycles had continued into the summer, and staff wanted to have
bargaining done by the end of the school year.
Theme 5: Commitment to the Process
All interview participants expressed that bargaining team members bought into the
MEA’s IBB process, which allowed the process to operate as designed. Similarly, Wentz (2004)
stated, “merely abiding by the structure of a cooperative collective bargaining model can yield a
high potential of success for the endeavor” (p. 98). It was consistently shared that this
commitment was influenced by a real pride in the district, a want to do things differently, and the
fact that team members had little to no experience with other IBB models. One interview

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

81

participant said, “Feelings from bargaining team members were that there had to be a better way
of doing this, put the past in the past, and launch into a new future.” Another interview
participant stated, “There was a real pride in the district, and I truly believe the focus was on the
district, not on individual groups. I felt this really helped.” Later in the interview the participant
shared, “The district followed the process by the book; there was a commitment to making a
change.” These statements by the interview participants connected with Klingel (2003) who said,
“bargainers who have experienced costly poor negotiations and are highly motivated to make
changes to avoid incurring those costs again will work hard to make a new, unproven and
potentially risky process work” (p. 25). Similarly, the district had been through tough times,
including wage concessions and outsourcing, and these experiences provided them motivation to
change bargaining practices.
Another interview participant said, “The IBB teams were trained in the process, and that
is the only IBB process they knew.” Another interview participant expressed, “bargaining team
members followed the process with little to no skepticism, and did not rush the process.”
Despite this commitment to the process, one interview participant said, “Some districts
can rush through the process, which can get you back to a positional style of bargaining. There
were times that members of the teacher group would veer off of process, and this is typical in
other districts, but the teacher group quickly got back on process with reminders from the
facilitators.” Veering off process included (a) participating in side conversations, (b) skipping
phases of the process such as offering options during the story phase, (c) commenting on options
during brainstorming, (d) being hard on people instead of being easy on people and hard on
problems, and (e) debating someone else’s piece of the story instead of just adding your own
story segment (see Table 8 for a description of each component of the MEA’s IBB process).
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Table 8 The MEA’s IBB Process
The MEA’s IBB Process
Component

Description

Check-in

Every participant answered (a) who am I, (b) how am I, (c) time
constraints, (d) who is missing, (e) elephants, and (f) expectations.

Physical
Environment

The team sat in a circle with facilitators on one side and participants sat
around the rest of the table alternating between union and management.
Flip chart paper was hung on the walls and served as the official
documentation of bargaining.

Participants as
Equals

The expectation was that everyone contributed at all stages of the process,
and no one person dominated.

Role of the
Facilitators

To be the process police, and call people out when they were veering off
process.

Elephants in the
Room

Process for participants to get something off of their chest that was getting
in the way of them moving forward.

Issues

The items that each side wanted to tackle during the IBB process.

Story

Explained the issue in detail, clarified and answered who, what, and when.

Interests

The motivations to solve the problem, and answered why.

Options

When the team brainstormed possible solutions to the problem, and
answered how.

Straw Designs

Packages of options the team felt would solve the issue.

Rule of Thumb

Strategy used to reach consensus.

Non-linear

The team went back and forth between story, interests, options, and straw
designs until consensus was reached.

Action Plan

Defined the who, what, where, and by when for the consensus agreement
that typically resulted in contract language.

Check-out

Every participant shared their thoughts about the day’s bargaining.

Note. The district used the MEA’s IBB model. The model was based on Fisher et al.’s (2011)
text Getting to Yes and developed by the NEA, the North American Association of Educational
Negotiators, and the Michigan Education Collaborative Alliance.
Another interview participant shared that some districts try to cut corners, and will
conduct a few bargaining sessions without facilitators to save money. The interview participant

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

84

then said, “This can actually result in more cost for the district, because the district many times
will call the facilitator and say ‘we need you back.’ When the facilitator returns it will take a half
or full day just to clean up the mess from the previous two days of bargaining before they can get
the team back on process.” The district did not have this experience, because there was a
commitment to pay for facilitators throughout the entire IBB process, despite some initial
concern expressed by the BOE about the financial and operational cost of implementation.
The components of the IBB process developed and supported by the MEA were (a)
check-in, (b) physical environment, (c) participants as equals, (d) role of the facilitators, (e)
elephants in the room, (f) issues, (g) story, (h) interests, (i) options, (j) straw designs, (k) rule of
thumb, (l) non-linear, (m) action plan, and (n) check-out. Please note, that the researcher utilized
the art of storytelling to narrate how the district implemented IBB, and the IBB model used by
the district had a story phase. To avoid confusion, the researcher used the word narrative as he
shared how the district implemented IBB, and the word story as he referred to story phase of the
IBB model used by the district. A more comprehensive description of the IBB process used by
the MEA is outlined below. The information about the process was shared consistently across all
interview participants, and consistent with the training documents used on March 23–24, 2016.
Check-in. Every bargaining session started with a check-in procedure where each team
member answered the following questions (a) who am I, (b) how am I, (c) time constraints, (d)
who is missing, (e) elephants, and (f) expectations. A fresh check-in sheet on flip chart paper was
hung on the wall at the start of each bargaining session listing the six check-in questions. Each
check-in question was written by the facilitator in alternating colors of ink (see Figure 4 for an
example check-in sheet).
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4.22.16

Who am I?
How am I?
Time constraints? (J.S. leave at 3p.m.)
Who is missing? (T.J.)
Elephants?
Expectations?
Figure 4. Example of what a check-in sheet looked like.
The facilitators wrote under the appropriate question if a team member was missing,
running late, had a time constraint, or shared any other information that had the potential to
impact that day’s bargaining session. For example, a participant may check in by saying “my
name is Jane Smith, I am feeling great today, I have to leave today at 3:00 p.m. to get my son to
piano lessons, Ted Jones is running late because he had a flat tire, I have no elephants, and my
expectation is that we come to resolution on two issues today.”
One interview participant explained, “The process was designed this way to present an
opportunity for team members to let each other know what was on their mind, or if someone had
to leave early or take a phone call, this got it out there, so that it did not become an issue itself.”
Another interview participant shared, “If I had a bad back, I might say ‘I have a sore back, and
you may see me getting up throughout the day.’ By going through this process other team
members would not wonder ‘why did he keep getting up all of the time.’”
Physical environment. Bargaining teams included anywhere from 11 to 14 individuals:
the ASHR, between two to four administrators, the MEA UniServ director, between four to five
association members, one BOE member, and two facilitators. Barrett and O’Dowd (2005)
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similarly stated that 10 to 12 members is a desirable size for bargaining teams, but circumstances
may dictate higher or lower numbers (p. 65).
The bargaining team sat in a circle with the facilitators on one side and participants sat
around the rest of the table alternating between management and union. One interview
participant explained, “The process was designed with alternating seating to stop side
conversations and the perception that people were plotting.” A name placard, with the norms
printed on the back, was placed on the table in front of each bargaining team member. The norms
were as follows:


Smile



Ask a question if you have one



Feel free to share an illustration



Search for ways to apply new knowledge



Keep an open mind



Listen and participate



Have fun

Multiple sheets of flip chart paper were hung on the wall behind the facilitators, and they
were the only individuals authorized to write on the flip chart paper. This differed slightly from
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) recommendation that “The facilitator should do the flip charting at
the first several bargaining sessions. With the facilitator modeling best practices, group members
will develop confidence in performing the charting later” (p. 98). Team members were not
allowed to take individual notes, and the flip chart paper was the official documentation of the
bargaining process. Flip chart paper included that day’s check-in sheet, a list of all issues for that
bargaining unit, and the story, interests, options, and straw design sheets for the issue that the
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team was currently working through (see Figure 5 for the physical layout for IBB sessions in the
district).
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As can be seen from Figure 5, at times there were multiple sheets of issues, story,
interests, options, or straw designs hung on the walls, but the most common phases of the
process with multiple sheets of flip chart paper tended to be story and options.
Participants as equals. During the process, all team members were treated as equals.
The expectation was that everyone was to contribute at all stages of the process, and no one
person was to dominate.
Role of the facilitators. The main role of the facilitators was to be the process police,
and call people out when they veered off process. Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) similarly stated,
that “During the bargaining or problem-solving sessions it will be the facilitator’s role to be a
neutral process guide to the bargaining teams” (p. 94).
Several interview participants mentioned that there was little to no attention paid to
which facilitator represented management and which facilitator represented the union during
bargaining. The feeling was that they were both facilitators of the full bargaining team. One
interview participant said, “There was a trust in the IBB facilitators as being neutral. They knew
the process well. They stuck to the role of facilitating as opposed to advocating for any particular
point of view. They were seen by the participants as doing that and not advocating for the BOE
team or the union team. They relied on the process to solve the issues.” It was further expressed
by interview participants that this allowed the facilitators to remain neutral parties, and paved the
way for collaborative problem-solving.
Elephants in the room. Merriam-Webster (2017) defines an elephant in the room as “an
obvious major problem or issue that people avoid discussing or acknowledging.” Throughout the
process, team members were given the freedom to address an elephant with the full team. An
elephant was something they needed to get off of their chest that was getting in the way of them
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moving forward. Team members were then given the opportunity to add to, ask questions about,
and respond to the elephant. One interview participant said, “Sharing of elephants was nice in
that it gave bargaining team members an opportunity to get rid of some baggage that was getting
in the way collaborative problem solving.” Another interview participant shared, “It was
challenging having to deal with the elephants, which at times led to tears about several issues
that had festered for years. We had to give support to people who needed support, but ultimately
this is what helped propel us forward.”
Issues versus positions. Both management and the union shared a list of issues on the
first day of bargaining that they wanted to tackle during the IBB process. Barrett and O’Dowd
(2005) similarly said that both the union and management can bring issues to the table, and “the
single most important difference between IBB and traditional bargaining is that issues are
brought to the table rather than positions” (p. 31).
The facilitators wrote the issues onto flip chart paper as they were shared by bargaining
team members. They labeled the top of each sheet with that day’s date, the word issues, and what
page of issues they were on (see Figure 6 for two examples of issue sheets).
4.22.16

Issues

1

4.22.16

Issue A

Issue F

Issue B

Issue G

Issue C

Issue H & I

Issue D

Issue I

Issue E

Issue J

Figure 6. Example of what two sheets of issues looked like.

Issues

2
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Typically, there were only one or two pages of issues, but more could be added if needed.
Additionally, each issue was written by the facilitator in alternating colors of ink. The list of
issues was left on the wall throughout the entire bargaining process. There was an unwritten rule
that new issues were not to be added after the initial list of issues was made without consent from
both sides. When appropriate, related issues were combined (see Figure 6 for the combination of
issues H and I), and issues were crossed off the list when resolved (see Figure 6 for the
elimination of issue B). As issues were solved, the team collectively decided what issue would
be tackled next.
Story. After the bargaining team collectively decided on an issue to tackle, they would
start by telling the story of that issue. The facilitators wrote the story onto flip chart paper as it
was shared by bargaining team members. They labeled the top of each sheet with that day’s date,
the issue being solved, the word story, and what page of story they were on. Additionally, each
segment of the story was written by the facilitator in alternating colors of ink (see Figure 7 for
two examples of story sheets).
4.22.16

Compensation

Story

1

4.22.16

Compensation

Story segment A

Story segment F

Story segment B

Story segment G

Story segment C

Story segment H

Story segment D

Story segment I

Story segment E

Story segment J

Story

2

Figure 7. Example of what two sheets of story looked like.
The story explained the issue in detail, clarified, and answered who, what, and when. The
story was not intended to place blame; for example, the union's story was their story and the
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district's story was their story. It was ok if everyone had a unique story, and some parts were the
same and other parts different from person to person. The story honored each individual's
thinking, emotions, and feelings on the topic. The purpose was to get everything on the table.
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) similarly explained that during IBB bargainers flip chart “why the
issue has arisen, why it needs to be resolved, and what the broad parameters are” (pp.71–72).
One interview participant said, “There was a lot of lost story and history over the years
due to new people in positions. For this reason, not everyone understood each other's story
before going through this process.” Another interview participant added, “What we want, is
when the participants look at the flip chart paper on the walls that they can see that we have
really talked this through and everyone’s story is up there.” Another interview participant stated,
“Part of telling the story is to honor the voices, the thinking, the feelings, and the emotions
around the topic. It is not unusual to have five, ten, or fifteen pages of story about an issue.”
Interests. After the bargaining team’s understanding of an issue reached saturation, the
team moved to interests. Interests were the motivations to solve the problem, and answered why.
Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) noted, “Interests are the underlying concerns, desires, and needs that
parties have about an issue” (p. 53). One interview participant shared that interests are difficult,
because interests can easily become positions. Fisher et al. (2011) says that it helps to write down
interests, which “may stimulate ideas for how to meet those interests” (p. 51).
The facilitators wrote the interests onto flip chart paper as they were shared by bargaining
team members. They labeled the top of each sheet with that day’s date, the issue being solved,
the word interests, and what page of interests they were on. Typically, there were only one or
two pages of interests, but more could be added if needed. Additionally, each interest was written
by the facilitator in alternating colors of ink (see Figure 8 for two examples of interest sheets).
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Figure 8. Example of what two sheets of interests looked like.
After all of the interests were listed, the facilitators went through each interest one at a
time to see if it was a shared interest. They did this by asking bargaining team members to raise
their hand for those interests that they personally held for the issue at hand. An interest was
considered a shared interest when the team, by a show of hands, had consensus on that interest.
The facilitators would then circle all of the shared interests, and the shared interests guided the
next phases of the process (see Figure 8 for an example of how shared interests B, C, D, and H
were circled). Examples of interests included (a) fiscal responsibility, (b) increased student
learning, and (c) decreased employee workload.
Options. After the team had determined what their shared interests were for the issue at
hand, they moved on to developing options. Developing options occurred when the team
brainstormed possible solutions to the problem, and answered how. The options were rooted in
the shared interests. Participants were encouraged to think outside of the box, and let the options
flow without judgment. Ridge (2015) asserted, “When inventing options, the art of brainstorming
is a useful tool that allows for a separation from starting with a specific position” (p. 55). One
interview participant stated that “the craziest ideas were sometimes the foundation of the
agreement.” There was no commenting on options until the brainstorming process was complete.
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Another interview participant said, “The biggest problem that can happen with options is that
people judge them, so it is important for the facilitators to allow the options to flow before they
are evaluated.”
The facilitators wrote the options onto flip chart paper as they were shared by bargaining
team members. They labeled the top of each sheet with that day’s date, the issue being solved,
the word options, and what page of options they were on. Additionally, each option was labeled
numerically and written by the facilitator in alternating colors of ink (see Figure 9 for two
examples of option sheets).
4.22.16

Compensation

Option

1

4.22.16

Option 1

Option 6

Option 2

Option 7

Option 3

Option 8

Option 4

Option 9

Option 5

Option 10

Compensation

Options

2

Figure 9. Example of what two sheets of options looked like.
When the options were all on the flip chart paper, participants were given the opportunity
to ask clarifying questions about them.
Straw designs. Straw designs were a package of options the team felt would solve the
issue (see Figure 10 for an example that shows straw design F as a combination of options 1, 3,
4, 7, and 10). During the straw design phase, the team evaluated and analyzed the options against
the interests. Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) provided an example of this process:
With a minor revision, the fourth and seventh options could be combined to read as
follows…and that new option would address six of the eight mutual interests…another
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member might suggest a further modification that would help the new options meet an
additional mutual interest. (p. 83)
The facilitators wrote the straw designs onto flip chart paper as they were shared by
bargaining team members. They labeled the top of each sheet with that day’s date, the issue
being solved, the phrase straw design, and what page of straw designs they were on. Typically,
there were only one or two pages of straw designs, but more could be added if needed.
Additionally, each straw design was labeled alphabetically and written by the facilitator in
alternating colors of ink (see Figure 10 for two examples of straw design sheets).
4.22.16 Compensation Straw Design 1

4.22.16 Compensation Straw Design 2

A. 1,3,4,7

F. 1,3,4,7,10

B. 1,4,7,8

G. 1,4,7,8,9,10

C. 2,3,4,8

H. 2,3,4,8,9

D. 1,2,3

I. 1,2,3,8,9,10

E. 7,8

J. 8,9,10

Figure 10. Example of what two sheets of straw designs looked like.
Straw designs were dismissed (see Figure 10 for an example that shows that straw
designs A, B, and C were dismissed) and new straw designs were created until consensus was
reached on a straw design. One interview participant stated, “It’s called straw design for a
reason, because things made out of straw do not always last.”
Rule of thumb. The rule of thumb was used as a strategy for the team to reach
consensus. According to Cunningham (2014), “A benefit of consensus decision-making is that it
binds each individual participant to the decisions made and the ensuing outcomes” (p. 237). All
thumbs had to either be in the up position or in the horizontal position for there to be consensus.
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Thumbs in the up position meant “I am for this,” thumbs in the horizontal position meant “I will
support this but I am not enthusiastic about it,” and thumbs in the down position meant “I cannot
live with this.” If a participant's thumb was in the down position, they had the responsibility to
explain what would move their thumb to the horizontal or up position. The expectation was that
participants had to support the decision with their constituents if their thumb was in the
horizontal or up position. If there was no consensus, the team kept going through the process
until they came to consensus on a straw design.
Non-linear. The team went back and forth between story, interests, options, and straw
designs until consensus was reached. One interview participant explained, “Everything with IBB
is in a circle. We sit in a circle, and for example you could be on straw design and the next thing
you know is you circled back to story.”
Action plan and contract language. The action plan phase of the model defined the
who, what, where, and by when for the consensus agreement. After the team had reached
consensus on a straw design, the action plan assigned a small team to draw up the contract
language or the letter of understanding. To accomplish this, the facilitators wrote all of the items
that needed to be completed prior to the next bargaining session onto a piece of flip chart paper.
The top of the sheet was labeled to do with that day’s date. Next to each item they wrote what
person or people were responsible for completing the item. Additionally, each to-do item was
written by the facilitator in alternating colors of ink (see Figure 11 for an example to-do sheet).
In addition to writing contract language and letters of understanding, to-do items included
sending joint communications, or gathering information needed to solve a bargaining issue. Then
at the start of the next bargaining session, just after check-in, the team reviewed the to-do items
from the previous bargaining session. If the to-do item was informational, it was added to the
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appropriate story. If the to-do item was drafted contract language or a drafted letter of
understanding, it was voted on for inclusion in the tentative agreement through consensus.
To Do

4.22.16

Item A (people responsible)
Item B (person responsible)
Item C (person responsible)
Item D (people responsible)
Item E (people responsible)
Figure 11. Example of what a to-do sheet looked like.
Check-out. Every day of bargaining ended with check-out where bargaining team
members shared their thoughts about the day’s bargaining. The check-out procedure was less
formal than the check-in procedure. For example, a team member may check-out by saying, “I
thought we made a lot of progress today, and feel the conversation we had about class size was
difficult but important. My hope is that we can get to calendar at our next bargaining session.
Thank you for a great day.”
Theme 6: Willingness to Open Communication
There was a commitment to open communication by management, which connected with
Klingel’s (2003) assertion that “one of the most important elements of the IBB process is open
sharing of information” (p. 27). One interview participant said, “It was clearly communicated
where the BOE stood on issues.” Another interview participant stated, “Everything was allowed
to be talked about. Even if it cannot go into a contract; let's hear and learn from the concern,
interests, and thinking. An administration that is really willing to open the door to talk about a
variety of topics, whether or not they can be put into contract language, makes a big difference.”
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With this willingness by management, the teachers, paraeducators, and secretaries see
negotiations as they should be, a way to solve problems in the district.” Klingel (2003), similarly
shared:
In an IBB process, decisions about inclusion of issues into the bargaining agenda are not
made based on whether they are mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining. Instead,
bargainers develop a list of problems, use the bargaining process to develop a set of
solutions and then decide how the solutions can be best implemented. For those aspects
of agreements that cannot be placed into the contract, bargainers may create memoranda
of understanding to govern a process for extra-contractual decisions making or
implementation of solutions. (p. 22)
Several interview participants felt a want for a change by bargainers. They went on to
share that this willingness to open communication was influenced by a sense of pride by district
staff and the BOE, the fact that the new ASHR was willing to discuss any topic, and by the open
communication experienced through the work of the PCC.
Theme 7: Compensation Solved Mid-Process
Several interview participants mentioned that there was a mutual agreement by the EA
bargaining team to get wages done earlier in the process. They went on to explain that
compensation was traditionally left for the end of bargaining. These interview participants felt
this was influenced by the fact that staff wages had been stagnant for so long, and with the
BOE’s commitment to increase compensation, bargainers were motivated to find a way to get
additional compensation for staff. Further influencing this drive were themes from the May 2015
PCC staff survey. The survey was administered and analyzed by the regional university that had
been working closely with the PCC. The survey given to EA staff found:
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Constant pay cuts and step freezes are impacting teacher morale. Teachers feel that they
are working longer and harder than ever for less pay, which leads to not feeling valued,
respected or appreciated. They notice that administration pay levels remain high and
constant, and do not think this is fair. Pay cuts should be equitable across all levels of
employment, including upper management. Teachers want wages increased.
See Appendix H for the staff survey results.
In addition to these frustrations by EA staff, the PCC staff survey given to PA staff found
a similar theme:
PA frustrations found from PCC staff survey. They would like better pay with benefits.
Pay raises have been frozen for many years. More equitable pay cuts are needed. There is
a perception that administrators are not impacted by the pay freezes/cuts, which impacts
overall attitudes. The constant layoffs make them feel insecure—each spring wondering
if they will be losing their jobs. They also do not want their hours cut.
See Appendix H for the staff survey results.
Not only did EA and PA staff findings show frustrations related to compensation, but the
PCC staff survey administered to SA staff further found:
The lack of raises definitely effects morale and their perceived value or worth. They also
feel that pay cuts should be more equitable; having a perception that administration is not
impacted by the cuts. More equitable cuts would lead to an increased sense of morale.
See Appendix H for the staff survey results.
The results from the PCC staff survey made clear that staff were frustrated about
compensation levels, and according to interview participants, this influenced bargaining team
members’ desire to resolve compensation before the end of the IBB process.
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Klingel (2003) described the experience of another school district that addressed wages
before the end of the IBB process:
In another departure from past negotiation practice, economic issues were addressed at
the beginning of negotiations instead of at the end. Early tentative agreement on a wage
and benefit package allowed the parties to address other issues on their own merits,
without concern about whether they would be changed later or removed from the table as
part of last minute trading to reach an agreement on wages. (p. 67)
The benefit realized by the district, was different from that of Klingel’s example. One
interview participant shared that “once money was out of the way, everything else was much
easier, because there was not any more money to spend.” Later in the interview the participant
added, “I think the district saved a whole lot of money on the facilitators by moving money
earlier in the process, because I could have seen it go another four or five sessions without doing
this.” This strategy worked, and the EA, PA, and SA all reached tentative agreements through
the IBB process by the end of the school year.
Theme 8: Formation of Numerous Committees
Unique about the agreements was that IBB teams agreed to form 17 committees to
finalize contract language and resolve issues after the contracts were ratified, which was 16 more
than included in the previous year’s CBAs (see Table 9). Klingel (2003) stated that during IBB
“labor management committees are often used as vehicles for further work on solutions
developed in bargaining” (p. 22).
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Table 9
Number of Committees: 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 Agreements
Unit

2015/2016

2016/2017

EA

1

5

PA

0

4

SA

0

8

Total

1

17

Note. The district utilized traditional bargaining to settle all CBAs for the 2015/2016 school year
and the MEA’s model of IBB to settle all CBAs for the 2016/2017 school year.
Table 9 further breaks down the number of committees per unit. The EA’s 2015/2016
CBA called for the formation of one committee, while their 2016/2017 CBA called for the
formation of five committees. The PA’s 2015/2016 CBA called for the formation of zero
committees, while their 2016/2017 CBA called for the formation of four committees. The SA’s
2015/2016 CBA called for the formation of zero committees, while their 2016/2017 CBA called
for the formation for eight committees.
The IBB committee work was guided by language contained in letters of understanding
that came from agreed upon straw designs during collective bargaining. The letters of
understanding defined the parameters that the committee had to operate within such as (a) when
the committee work had to be completed by, (b) who was to sit on the committee, and (c) what
elements had to be included or considered in the committee’s solution (see Table 10 for a list of
IBB committee work).
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Table 10
IBB Committee Work
Unit

Committee Task

EA

Explore possible discounts for the children of EA members.

EA

Explore implementing a K–12 positive behavior support system (PBIS) that is
consistent, but allows for differences by level.

EA

Review staff attendance data, develop goals for reducing EA sub usage, and
explore what committee work can be done outside of the school day.

EA

Explore options for increasing staff collaboration time.

EA

Reestablish EA participation on the literacy assessment committee.

PA

Define and communicate standards of acceptable paraeducator attendance.

PA

Clarify and restructure the layoff, recall, postings, seniority, and transfer language
in the PA CBA.

PA

Conduct an inventory and needs assessment of walkie talkies at all buildings.

PA

Update medical tech language in the PA CBA.

SA

Create and communicate a procedure for students who are not picked up by their
parent/guardian in a timely manner.

SA

Create a new secretarial evaluation tool that includes four effectiveness ratings
with performance indicators.

SA

Develop a process to report custodial issues to the third-party vendor.

SA

Create a list of relevant professional development opportunities for secretaries.

SA

Write a procedure and guidelines for student heads checks.

SA

Clarify and cleanup layoff and recall language in the SA CBA.

SA

Tackle a variety of items related to reducing secretarial workload.

SA

Review, and adjust if appropriate, job classifications in the SA CBA.
According to one interview participant, “Previous adversarial bargaining did not solve

underlying issues. Most committees dealt with items outside of finances, which allowed for
improvement in working conditions despite limited resources, and some of the issues even dealt
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with topics that we would not normally talk about in bargaining.” Similarly, Hoynes (1999)
found:
Committees to look at the cost of insurance and supplemental contracts were found in
many traditionally negotiated and IBB contracts. But, most unusual or unique committees
were found in IBB contracts. These committees were formed as a result of the issues
brought to the negotiations table. For example, the formation of a joint committee to look
at staff attendance in Ross Local School District represents an issue that was brought to
negotiations. (p. 175)
Likewise, the district’s 2016/2017 CBAs settled through IBB contained unique
committees such as (a) head check committee, (b) custodial services committee, (c) med tech
committee, (d) paraeducator attendance committee, (e) teacher attendance committee, and (f)
after school pick-up committee.
The SA CBA, for example, included a letter of understanding that called for a head check
committee. The committee was chared with writing a procedure and guidelines for student head
checks. Committee members included the ASHR, MEA UniServ director, two building
administrators, three secretaries, and a paraeducator. The committee created and communicated a
district-wide head check procedure that included (a) online training, (b) when head checks were
necessary, (c) who would administer the head checks, (c) head lice identified on your child
parent letter, (d) head lice identified in your child’s class parent letter, (e) when a student with
head lice may be readmitted to school, (f) head lice manual for parents, and (g) a head lice
manual for staff. The procedure and resources were loaded into a Google folder and shared with
staff so that they had instant access to the documents.
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One interview participant added, “There were so many pent-up issues due to the
previously viewed adversarial negotiations that there were far more issues than would be typical
in a highly collaborative environment.” Another interview participant said that the challenge
with the committee work was that there were a lot of issues that ended up this way, and the
committee work was time consuming. A success was that there was enough trust in the system
and the people for the bargaining teams to trust the issues to be resolved this way. “Everyone
wanted to do a good job of resolving the issues and not rush through them” explained one
interview participant. Several interview participants went on to say that the committee work
allowed for contracts to be ratified earlier than normal and paved the way for meaningful
resolution to issues that included members on committees with expertise relevant to the issue.
Summary of Themes
As described above, the following eight themes emerged during data analysis:


Theme 1: BOE members on bargaining teams



Theme 2: Increased PA and SA voice



Theme 3: Consistent joint communications



Theme 4: Commitment to organization



Theme 5: Commitment to the process



Theme 6: Willingness to open communication



Theme 7: Compensation solved mid-process



Theme 8: Formation of numerous committees
Contained within the themes were relevant influences, considerations, successes, and

challenges. Further described below are those influences and consideration followed by the
success and challenges related to the eight themes that emerged.
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Influences and considerations. Some of the influences and considerations outlined
above were unique to one theme that emerged during the study, while others were connected to
multiple themes (see Figure 12).

Influences and Considerations

Limited financial resources
A desire to finish bargaining by the end
of the school year
Previous contentious bargaining
A sense of pride by district staff and the
BOE
A want for change
The work of the PCC
0

1

2

3

4

5

Frequency
Figure 12. Influences and considerations tied to the eight themes.
As seen in Figure 12, there were six influences and considerations connected to more
than one of the themes that emerged: (a) the work of the PCC was connected to five of the eight
themes, (b) a want for change was connected to four of the eight themes, (c) a sense of pride by
district staff and the BOE and previous contentious bargaining were connected to three of the
eight themes, and (d) limited financial resources and a desire to finish bargaining by the end of
the school year were connected to two of the eight themes. Other influences and considerations
included (a) bargainers wanted to honor staff feelings, (b) bargainers wanted decision-making
authority, (c) disconnect between what union presented and BOE understood, (d) BOE wanted to
better understand issues, (e) a new ASHR, (f) priority set by the BOE to increase compensation
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for staff, (g) an increased sense of trust, (h) little to no knowledge of or experience with other
IBB models, and (i) a want for meaningful resolution to issues.
Successes. The following successes were outlined within the eight themes that were
described throughout the narrative of how one southeastern Michigan public school district
implemented IBB.
Theme 1: BOE member of bargaining teams. BOE members added the perspective of
district families, the community, and the BOE to bargaining. Additionally, decisions were
allowed to be made at the table and BOE members left with a better understanding of the issues.
Theme 2: Increased PA and SA voice. PA and SA bargaining teams had positive and
productive bargaining experiences, and left bargaining feeling heard.
Theme 3: Consistent joint communications. Staff were kept informed throughout the
bargaining process and were apprised that union and management were collaboratively problemsolving.
Theme 4: Commitment to organization. The process was allowed to operate as designed
and bargaining was finished by the end of the school year.
Theme 5: Commitment to process. The process was allowed to operate as designed.
Theme 6: Willingness to open communication. A wider variety of issues were able to be
addressed.
Theme 7: Compensation solved mid-process. After compensation was resolved
everything else went much faster.
Theme 8: Formation of numerous committees. Committees provided additional
resources, expertise, and time to resolve bargaining issues.
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Challenges. In addition to the successes, challenges also existed. The following
challenges were outlined within the eight themes that were described throughout the narrative of
how one southeastern Michigan public school district implemented IBB.
Theme 1: BOE member of bargaining teams. The facilitators were initially gentle on
telling BOE members to get in line or stay in process, and selecting bargaining dates that worked
for staff, facilitators, and BOE members took additional planning.
Theme 2: Increased PA and SA voice. Implementing the full IBB process with large
bargaining teams for both the PA and SA required a substantial financial and operational
commitment.
Theme 3: Consistent joint communications. All parties had to commit to the contents of
each communication to avoid potential unfair labor allegations.
Theme 4: Commitment to organization. Some bargaining team members became less
productive nearing the end of full day bargaining sessions.
Theme 5: Commitment to process. The EA bargaining team veered off process a few
times.
Theme 6: Willingness to open communication. Prohibited subjects of bargaining had to
remain outside of CBAs.
Theme 7: Compensation solved mid-process. After compensation was resolved
bargaining teams concluded there was no money for other issues.
Theme 8: Formation of numerous committees. Many issues ended up in committee,
which was time consuming work that lasted six months after ratification.
As can be seen above, there were both successes and challenges related to all eight
themes. The next section will provide a narrative of how IBB was implemented in the district.

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

108

How IBB Was Implemented in One Southeastern Public Michigan School District
IBB implementation timeline. From start to finish, the district’s implementation of IBB
spanned eighteen months from July 1, 2015 through December 31, 2016 (see Table 11).
Table 11
IBB Implementation Timeline
Date

Implementation decision or event

July 1, 2015

New ASHR hired

September 8, 2015

Concept of exploring IBB proposed to union leadership

September 14, 2015

IBB implementation inquiry sent to the MEA

October 12, 2015

IBB presentation made to the BOE

December 1, 2015

IBB assessments conducted with management, EA, PA, and SA

December 14, 2015

IBB presentation and assessment conducted with the BOE

December 16, 2105

IBB assessors’ recommendation

January 19, 2016

The district, EA, PA, and SA committed to implement IBB

February 8, 2016

IBB implementation communicated to staff

March 23–24, 2016

Bargaining teams participated in IBB training

April 15–21, 2016

Management and union leadership met separately to prep for IBB

April 22, 2016

IBB began with the EA, PA, and SA

June 15, 2016

Tentative agreements reached with all bargaining units

June 24, 2016

The BOE ratified all CBAs

December 31, 2016

IBB committee work completed

The IBB implementation timeline provided an overview of the implementation process.
A more detailed description of how the district implemented IBB is shared through the following
narrative.
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IBB implementation narrative. The district’s implementation of IBB was rooted in its
narrative as a diverse suburban public school district in southeastern Michigan that experienced
contentious labor relations, declining enrollment, and fiscal constraints that started to intensify in
2008. During this time, custodial, technology, transportation, and food services were outsourced,
wage concessions were made, and employee healthcare costs increased. The district hired a new
superintendent in 2013, and efforts were made to improve labor relations through initiatives such
as the district’s PCC, which was formed in 2014 to explore ways to increase internal
cohesiveness, collaboration, and improve district morale.
New ASHR hired. On July 1, 2015, the superintendent hired an ASHR to replace the
outgoing deputy superintendent for human resources. One of his first charges to the new ASHR
was to explore the possibility of implementing IBB.
Concept of exploring IBB proposed to union leadership. Based on the superintendent’s
charge, the ASHR, superintendent, and deputy superintendent for teaching and learning asked
the EA president, EA vice president, and the MEA UniServ director at a labor management
meeting on September 8, 2015, if they were interested in transitioning from traditional
bargaining to IBB. This charge from the superintendent, according to one interview participant,
was rooted in his belief that “It was not healthy for the overall culture of the district to have an
adversarial way of bargaining when the district was trying to build a collaborative decisionmaking culture.” The union leaders at the meeting agreed, and another interview participant
added “From the perspective of the association, the number one reason to try IBB was to
improve relationships. A secondary reason was to broaden what could be talked about at the
bargaining table, because the district had limited financial resources.” The MEA UniServ
director told the district leadership team that she would be happy to reach out to the MEA to
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inquire about implementing the IBB process that they facilitate. The district leadership team
agreed to this, and another interview participant expressed that there was a belief by management
that implementing the MEA’s IBB model would strengthen employee buy-in.
IBB implementation inquiry sent to the MEA. After the labor management meeting, the
MEA UniServ director reached out to the MEA to obtain a basic outline of the IBB process that
they facilitate. The MEA informed her that the process started with an assessment designed to
determine if the district and each union were ready to implement IBB, followed by a two-day
training that should be held just prior to the start of bargaining. The MEA went on to explain that
two facilitators, one representing the union and the other representing management, were
required for both the assessment and training. The MEA provided the district with the union
facilitator at no cost. The management facilitator was paid for by the district, and cost $600 per
day plus lodging and mileage reimbursement. The MEA UniServ director then forwarded this
email to the ASHR on September 14, 2015 (see Appendix K for the email).
IBB presentation to the BOE. Armed with the first steps to implement the MEA’s IBB
model, the ASHR conducted a presentation before the BOE at their October 12, 2015, Study
Session. During the presentation, he briefed the BOE that the district worked closely with the
MEA UniServ director during the exploration of IBB, explained that this undertaking was an
outgrowth from the work of the PCC, clarified that the IBB model used by the MEA included a
two-day training, made clear that the facilitator would cost $600 per day plus expenses,
described the basic differences between IBB and traditional bargaining, and told them that the
district was moving forward with the assessment process used by the MEA to help determine
whether or not the district was ready to implement IBB (see Appendix L for the study session
minutes).
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The BOE supported this next step towards possible IBB implementation, and one
interview participant said, “BOE members felt the new ASHR who had been through the tough
times in our district’s history, would be able to see all sides, which would benefit the IBB
implementation process.” This support from the BOE was not without concern. One interview
participant shared that “Previous contentious labor relations made some skeptical that IBB would
work, but key BOE members wanted a more collaborative approach to labor relations.” Another
interview participant said, “There were concerns about how expensive the process would be,
because the BOE did not know how long it would take or how much time it would take teachers
out of the classroom.” Interestingly, it was expressed that there was no discussion about
exploring other IBB models, and one interview participant said, “no one came in and said ‘there
is another way to do this.’”
IBB assessments with management, EA, PA, and SA. Meanwhile, the ASHR, the MEA
UniServ director, and the IBB assessors coordinated and scheduled the IBB assessment, which
occurred on December 1, 2015. Interview participants shared that the IBB assessment was
designed to determine whether to (a) not approve IBB, (b) approve IBB training, (c) approve
IBB training for use at labor management meetings but not for bargaining, or (d) approve IBB
training for use in labor management meetings and in bargaining. Two assessors led the
assessment, one representing management and one representing the union, who provided a check
and balance to each other in an effort to maintain a neutral and honest assessment. They
conducted a focus group style assessment with the EA, PA, SA, and district administration to
determine management’s and each union’s readiness to implement IBB. The groups were all
asked the same questions, but assessed separately, so that one group would not be denied moving
forward if another group had issues that made IBB not a good fit for them. Furthermore, it was
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expressed during the interviews that the process was designed to assess each group separately, so
that individuals did not hold back from fully expressing themselves, because they may feel
uncomfortable saying things in front of management or the other bargaining units.
IBB assessment with BOE. On December 14, 2015, the two assessors conducted an
assessment with the BOE similar to the assessments that they carried out on December 1st with
management and each bargaining unit. The only difference was that they started the assessment
with a presentation that explained what the IBB process used by the MEA looked like, and what
successful districts looked like that used IBB.
IBB assessors’ recommendation. After all of the assessments were completed, according
to several interview participants, the assessors had a conversation with each other that
determined the results of the assessment. Based on this conversation, the assessors sent the
district a memo on December 16, 2015, which recommended that the EA, PA, SA, and the
district would benefit from implementing the full IBB process used by the MEA (see Appendix
M for the memo).
On January 5, 2016, the BOE received a memo from the ASHR that recommended that
the district implement IBB with the EA, PA, and the SA (see Appendix N for the memo). The
memo estimated the cost of implementing IBB, based on previous bargaining experience, at
$25,158, which was less than the $34,937 the district spent during the most recent bargaining
cycle on attorney fees. Full days of bargaining were recommended in an effort to reduce
facilitator fees. The estimated costs included facilitator fees, facilitator lodging, facilitator
mileage reimbursement, and employee substitute costs. The memo went on to explain that the
district, upon completion of negotiations, would evaluate the model’s effectiveness, and either

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

113

continue the model in future years, continue IBB without paid facilitators, or discontinue the use
of IBB.
Commitment to implement IBB. On January 19th, the ASHR sent an email to BOE
members which confirmed that the district, EA, PA, and SA all agreed to implement the full IBB
process used by the MEA. Additionally, the email surveyed BOE interest and availability for
sitting on a bargaining team (see Appendix O for the email). The email informed BOE members
that most bargaining sessions were during the school day, and that it was important for all
bargaining team members to attend the two-day training and all bargaining sessions. To survey
BOE interest and availability, the email asked (a) what bargaining teams BOE members were
interested in sitting on, (b) were there any days of the week that typically did not work with their
schedule, and (c) were there any dates or weeks that they were out of town. After BOE members
responded to the email, the BOE president, superintendent, and ASHR placed one BOE member
on each bargaining team based on interest, availability, and fit. One interview participant
expressed that it was important to strategically place BOE members onto IBB teams based on
their past experiences, strengths, weaknesses, relationships, and preferences, so that each
bargaining team was as successful as possible. Additionally, this was done to limit potential
conflicts of interest and or bias.
IBB implementation communicated to staff. On February 8, 2016, ground work was laid
with all district employees through an email that connected the implementation of IBB to
feedback gathered through the district’s PCC. The email explained:
We all have families to support, and want to be valued as professionals. The current
feelings are that people are struggling financially due to low and stagnant wages. The
consequence is that staff, especially staff at the entry level steps, feel unappreciated and
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are inclined to look for higher paying employment outside of the district. We are
embarking on IBB. These bargaining teams will be given the feedback gathered from
staff regarding compensation, and will be charged with addressing these concerns. This is
important, but challenging work, because we have experienced loss in enrollment,
increased retirement costs, and a stagnant foundation allowance from the state. Having
said this, meaningful progress can be made here.
See appendix P for the email that was sent to staff.
This was the first of such communications, which connected to Klingel’s (2003) claim
that in IBB “increased attention is paid to the needs of constituents and to involving or informing
them throughout the bargaining process” (p. 13).
IBB training. On March 23–24, 2016, two trainers, one representing management and
one representing the union, conducted a two-day joint training that started at 9:00 a.m. and ended
at 4:00 p.m. each day. Two interview participants shared that both trainers had been trained by
the MEA, so that they could serve districts as IBB assessors, trainers, and facilitators. The first
day of the district’s training focused on creating a learning environment and problem-solving
skills and the second day of training focused on the team building and the IBB process used by
the MEA (see Appendix Q for the training agenda). One interview participant said, “The training
model used was seamless in terms of the trainers presenting the information in an unbiased nonpositional way.”
The district trained BOE members, administrators, EA members, PA members, and SA
members together on the IBB process used by the MEA. Several interview participants shared
that it was believed that training all groups together would continue the inclusive nature of the
work of the PCC. Another interview participant explained that most districts train all groups
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together, because it is less costly than training the groups separately. Another interview
participant said, “Getting in the room and mixing up staff and the BOE gave everyone an
opportunity to meet and get insight about people that we do not normally get to interact with.”
Bargaining team members were required to attend the training, and one interview
participant stated, “Everyone that was going to be involved in bargaining had to go through the
training, that was one of the requirements.” This connected to Barrett and O’Dowd (2005) who
stated, “It is important for everyone who is going to take part in the bargaining or problem
solving to take part in the training otherwise those who do not will not share whatever ‘common
understanding’ about IBB emerges from the training” (p. 67). Another interview participant
clarified that there were exceptions to the training requirement: “Sometimes you might have the
business person come in and do a financial presentation, and they are not necessarily at the table,
and they do not have to go through the training, but anyone on the bargaining team must go
through the training.”
IBB prep. After the bargaining teams had been trained, and staff had received the joint
communication, the ASHR emailed the bargaining schedule to EA, PA, and SA bargaining team
members on March 31, 2016. Four bargaining dates were scheduled for each association, and
most were full day sessions that started at 9:00 a.m. and ended at 4:00 p.m. A majority of the
interview participants believed the main consideration for scheduling this way was to move the
process along, with hopes of finishing bargaining by the end of the 2015/2016 school year.
Several weeks after the bargaining schedule was emailed to bargaining team members,
steps were taken to prepare for bargaining. Interview participants shared that union and
management met separately between April 15, 2016, and April 21, 2016, and independently
created a list of issues that they brought to the first day of bargaining. The BOE set two priorities

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

116

which guided the management team as they created their list of issues, the priorities were (a)
increase compensation for staff and (b) balance the budget so that the district maintained a fund
balance above 5%. One interview participant shared that these priorities represented a desire by
the BOE to be both fiscally responsible and show appreciation for staff.
IBB began with the EA, PA, and SA. After the bargaining issues were determined,
bargaining began on April 22, 2016. A consistent theme shared by all interview participants was
that bargaining team members bought into the MEA’s IBB process, which allowed the process to
operate as designed. The district utilized the IBB process used by the MEA. The MEA's IBB
model was based on Fisher et al.’s (2011) work, Getting to Yes, and was developed by the NEA,
the North American Association of Educational Negotiators, and the Michigan Education
Collaborative Alliance. A detailed description of the MEA’s IBB process can be found earlier in
the chapter under Theme 5: Commitment to the process.
Bargaining lasted two months, and occurred between April 22, 2016, and June 15, 2016.
During this time, the EA met to bargain eight times for a total of 51 hours, the PA met to bargain
four times for a total of 22 hours, and the SA met to bargain five times for a total of 28 hours. In
all, there were 17 bargaining sessions and 101 hours spent engaged in the IBB process (see Table
12 for the 2016 bargaining schedule).
IBB resulted in pulling educators out of the classroom, secretaries out of the office, and
administrators out of the building for bargaining sessions, but this commitment accomplished the
following goals (a) maintained a fund balance above 5%, (b) increased compensation for staff,
(c) finished by the end of the school year, and (d) cost approximately 20% less than what was
estimated.

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

117

Table 12
2016 Bargaining Schedule
Unit

Bargaining Date

Start and End Times

EA

April 22, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

EA

April 25, 2016

8:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m.

SA

May 2, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

SA

May 12, 2016

5:00 p.m. – 9:00 p.m.

SA

May 13, 2016

8:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

PA

May 17, 2016

8:00 a.m. – 3:00 p.m.

PA

May 24, 2016

5:00 p.m. – 9:00 p.m.

EA

May 25, 2016

12:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.

EA

May 26, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

EA

May 27, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

SA

May 31, 2016

5:00 p.m. – 9:00 p.m.

EA

June 1, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

EA

June 13, 2016

8:00 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

SA

June 13, 2016

12:00 p.m. – 9:00 p.m.

EA

June 14, 2016

7:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

PA

June 14, 2016

5:00 p.m. – 9:00 p.m.

PA

June 15, 2016

8:00 a.m. – 3:00 p.m.

Tentative agreements reached. The EA, PA, and SA all reached tentative agreements
through the IBB process by June 15, 2016. After informing the BOE that tentative agreements
were coming their way for ratification, the ASHR sent a memo to the BOE on June 21st
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informing them that the actual cost of implementing IBB was $20,338 (see Appendix R for the
memo), which was almost $5,000 less than the estimated cost and close to $10,000 less that what
the district spent on attorney fees during the previous bargaining cycle. The actual costs included
facilitator fees, facilitator lodging, facilitator mileage reimbursement, employee substitute costs,
and supplies such as flip chart paper and colored markers.
CBAs ratified by BOE. On June 24, 2016, all CBAs for the 2016/2017 school year were
unanimously approved and ratified by the BOE at a Special Meeting (see Appendix S for the
meeting minutes). The tentative agreements brought to the BOE accomplished the two priorities
set by the BOE for bargaining, which were to increase compensation for staff, while maintaining
a fund balance above 5%.
IBB committee work. On June 28, 2016, the ASHR and the MEA UniServ director met
to schedule the committee work that was contained within the letters of understanding from the
recently ratified EA, PA, and SA CBAs (see Table 11 for the IBB committee schedule). A
detailed description of the IBB committee work can be found earlier in the chapter under Theme
8: Formation of numerous committees. The committee work outlined below was done at
committee meetings, while the committee work not referenced below was completed over the
phone, through email, or via shared Google document.
The IBB teams did not reconvene to vote on or approve the completed committee work.
After the committee work was completed, the ASHR and the MEA UniServ director emailed the
new language, agreement, or procedure to the IBB team for feedback. Additionally, this was
done to ensure that the committee’s work followed what was agreed upon in bargaining. When
appropriate, the committee modified the new language, agreement, or procedure based on the
feedback received from IBB team members.
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Table 13
IBB Committee Schedule
Unit

Committee

Date

Start and End Times

SA

After school pick-up

August 9, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.

SA

Evaluation tool

August 10, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.

SA

Custodial services

August 11, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.

SA

Professional development

August 11, 2016

1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

PA

Attendance

August 26, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.

EA

Attendance

August 29, 2016

3:30 p.m. – 6:30 p.m.

EA

PBIS

August 30, 2016

8:30 a.m. – 11:30 a.m.

EA

Collaboration time

October 16 2016

12:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

EA

Staff discounts

October 18, 2016

12:00 p.m. – 2:00 p.m.

EA

PBIS

October 18, 2016

3:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.

SA

Classification

October 19, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.

EA

Collaboration time

October 20, 2016

12:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

SA

Evaluation tool

October 25, 2016

1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

SA

Head check

September 22, 2016

1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

SA

Evaluation tool

September 27, 2016

1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

PA

Layoff, recall, posting,
seniority, and transfers

September 29, 2016

9:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m.

SA

Evaluation tool

October 25, 2016

1:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

EA

Attendance

November 3, 2016

2:30 p.m. – 3:30 p.m.

SA

Layoff and recall

November 9, 2016

8:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m.

EA

Collaboration time

November 10, 2016

12:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

PA

Medical tech

November 22, 2016

9:00 p.m. – 11:00 a.m.

EA

Collaboration time

December 8, 2016

12:00 p.m. – 3:00 p.m.

EA

PBIS

December 14, 2016

2:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.
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As seen above, there were 23 IBB committee meetings, which eclipsed the 17 bargaining
sessions experienced through the IBB process.
Conclusion
Multiple tools were used to triangulate the data for this study, which included interviews,
documentation, and archival records. The findings from the different tools were consistent and
described eight themes that emerged during data analysis. The themes were products of how the
district implemented IBB and speak to trust, transparency, collaboration, and collegiality among
staff. The themes were (a) BOE members on bargaining teams, (b) increased PA and SA voice,
(c) consistent joint communications, (d) commitment to organization, (e) commitment to the
process, (f) willingness to open communication, (g) compensation solved mid-process, and (h)
formation of numerous committees. Furthermore, influences, considerations, successes, and
challenges connected to each theme were presented. The chapter concluded by outlining how the
district implemented IBB through a timeline and narrative. The next chapter will explore the
implications of the findings and make recommendations for action, further research, and provide
a personal reflection from the researcher.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Introduction
The purpose of this case study was to investigate how one public school district in
southeastern Michigan implemented interest-based bargaining (IBB). The study also sought to
understand the factors that influenced the decision-making process, and what was considered
when making implementation decisions. The primary research questions that guided this study
were as follows:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?



What factors influenced the decision-making process during the implementation of IBB?



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about the implementation of IBB?
The data sources that were used to explore the research questions for the study were (a)

interviews, (b) documents, and (c) archival records. The interviews were unstructured and guided
by four questions (see Appendix D), which prompted responses from the five decision makers
involved with how IBB was implemented in district. The documentation came from newspaper
articles, agendas, meeting minutes, collective bargaining agreements (CBA), memos,
presentation handouts, and emails from the district that was studied. The archival records used
during this study were secondary data from a staff survey administered and analyzed by a
regional university for the district’s partnership and collaboration committee (PCC). From the
data gathered, eight main themes emerged that described how IBB was implemented in the
district, which are outlined below.
Discussion of Findings
Successes. There were 11 key successes found by the researcher related to how the
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district implemented IBB. These successes are first listed, and then further discussed below.


The Michigan education association’s (MEA) IBB process operated as designed.



Board of education (BOE) members added the perspective of district families, the
community, and the BOE to bargaining.



Decisions were made at the bargaining table.



BOE members left bargaining with a better understanding of the issues.



Paraedcator association (PA) and secretarial association (SA) bargaining teams left
bargaining feeling heard.



Staff were kept informed throughout the bargaining process, and apprised that union and
management were collaboratively problem-solving.



A wide variety of issues were addressed.



Committees provided additional resources, expertise, and time to resolve issues.



Bargaining was finished by the end of the school year.



The implementation of IBB cost the district 20% less than anticipated.



BOE priorities were met; increase staff compensation and keep the fund balance above 5%.
The MEA’s IBB process was allowed to operate as designed for a variety of reasons.

First, the district made the financial and operational commitment to implement the full process
with training and outside facilitators. Second, bargainers entered the process wanting to have a
positive and productive bargaining cycle. Previous bargaining had been contentious, and they
wanted a change. Third, bargainers had limited to no experience with, or knowledge of, other
IBB models to cloud their thinking on how the process should operate.
The addition of BOE members on bargaining teams added the perspective of district
families, the community, and the BOE. This allowed more informed decisions that included
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interests from a wider cross-section of stakeholders to be made.
Decisions were allowed to be made at the bargaining table because the BOE bargaining
team member was able to share what the BOE would and would not support. Additionally, BOE
members at the table left bargaining with a much better understanding of the issues facing staff
and management, and were able to share why solutions were agreed upon with other BOE
members. This was especially important for gaining BOE support for agreements that were
creative and out of the box.
PA and SA bargaining team members left bargaining feeling heard. The IBB process
allowed for meaningful dialogue and understanding to occur through the story phase of the
process. Previous bargaining did not allow this free exchange of information to happen, and PA
and SA bargainers were appreciative of the opportunity to talk and collaboratively problem
solve.
Staff were kept informed throughout the bargaining process that union and management
were collaboratively problem-solving. This was done through the use of joint communications
that were sent out after every bargaining session. Staff responded to these communications, and
indicated that they were appreciative of being kept in the loop. The joint communications also
diffused previous feelings that bargaining was us versus them.
A wide variety of issues were addressed, because both the union and management were
willing to have open communication about any topic. Not all discussed issues ended up in
contact language, but open communication allowed for meaningful dialogue and resolution on
non-traditional bargaining issues. Some of this resolution was through committee work.
Committees included individuals with expertise related to what was being solved. Additionally,
committees were given the necessary resources including the time needed to resolve the issues.
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There was a drive by IBB team members to get bargaining done by the end of the school
year, because they wanted to send a positive message to staff about improved labor relations. All
collective bargaining units accomplished this goal, and finished bargaining with tentative
agreements in place by June 15, 2016.
IBB implementation ended up costing the district 20% less than anticipated. This was due
to the drive to get bargaining done by the end of the school year, which was enhanced by the
following items that helped move bargaining along (a) solving compensation mid-process, (b)
the use of numerous committees to resolve issues after ratification, and (c) a commitment to
organization allowed the IBB process to move efficiently and operate as designed.
The BOE gave management two priorities, increase compensation for staff and balance
the budget so that the fund balance remained above 5%, and both priorities were met through the
IBB process. There was no confusion as to what the BOE’s priorities were, and management
openly shared those priorities with all bargaining teams.
Challenges. There were eight key challenges found by the researcher related to how the
district implemented IBB. Those challenges are first listed, and then further discussed below.


Implementing the IBB process required a substantial financial and operational commitment.



The facilitators were initially gentle on telling BOE members to get in line or stay in process.



Joint communications required consensus to avoid potential unfair labor practice allegations.



Some bargaining team members became less productive nearing the end of full day
bargaining sessions.



The education association (EA) bargaining team veered off process a few times.



Prohibited subjects of bargaining had to remain outside of CBAs.



After compensation was resolved, bargainers felt there was no money for other issues.
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Committee work was time consuming and continued six months after CBAs were ratified.
The initial challenge with implementing IBB was that the district had to commit to a

process with facilitator fees that also pulled 25 staff away from their jobs for bargaining sessions.
Not only were staff pulled away from their jobs, but half of the staff at the bargaining table
required substitute coverage when they were out of the classroom or office, which cost $100 per
staff member per day.
Another challenge was that the facilitators were initially gentle on telling BOE members
to get in line or stay in process. This did not last long, and the facilitators started holding BOE
members to the same standards as the rest of the bargaining team. The MEA’s IBB process
would have been compromised had the facilitators not made this adjustment.
Sending joint communications could have been a source of conflict had there not been an
effort to secure consensus with the contents of the communications before sending them to
constituents. It was important to ensure that the joint communications did not include
information that would later expose the district or union to an unfair labor practice allegation.
The full day bargaining sessions lasted six to seven hours, and some bargainers
experienced mental fatigue at the end of long days. This concern was not shared about the
shorter half day sessions, which lasted three to four hours.
Despite the training and presence of outside facilitators, the EA team did get off of
process on occasion. They quickly got back on process with reminders from the facilitators, and
off-process behaviors included (a) participating in side conversations, (b) skipping phases of the
process such as offering options during the story phase of the process, (c) commenting on
options during brainstorming, (d) being hard on people instead of being easy on people and hard
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on problems, and (e) debating someone else’s piece of the story instead of just adding your own
story segment.
Both management and the union were willing to engage in open communication. The
challenge with open communication during bargaining is navigating these conversations, while
not writing prohibited subjects of bargaining into CBAs.
After compensation was resolved mid-process, bargainers felt there was no money to
spend on other issues. The consequence of this, is that this thinking may limit options when
resolving issues outside of compensation.
Bargaining for the EA, PA, and SA was accomplished in a combined 17 sessions, but 23
committee meetings occurred after ratification to fully resolve the issues sent to committee. This
work was time consuming, and further pulled staff away from their normal work during the
summer and fall that followed bargaining.
Discussed above were 11 successes and 8 challenges that the researcher found related to
how the district implemented IBB. In addition to these successes and challenges, is a discussion
below about the implication on practice as related to the primary research questions for the study.
Implications on Practice
The following implications of IBB implementation were derived from the findings of this
study. The implications are expounded on via the eight main themes that emerged. In this
section, the implications of IBB implementation are discussed in relation to the primary research
questions for the study, which were as follows:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?



What factors influenced the decision-making process during the implementation of IBB?
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What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about the implementation of IBB?
The implications on practice are first displayed in Table 14, and further discussed in

more detail by theme. In both instances, the implications on practice are broken down by
how they were implemented, what factors influenced the decision-making process, and what
was considered when making implementation decisions.
Table 14
Implications on Practice
Theme

How

Influences

Considerations

Theme 1:
BOE members on
bargaining teams

The BOE president,
superintendent, and
ASHR placed one
BOE member on each
bargaining team based
on interest,
availability, and fit.

BOE participation on
PCC, disconnect
between what the
union presented and
what the BOE
understood, and the
IBB assessors’
recommendation to
place a BOE on each
IBB team.

The BOE wanted to
better understand
issues, union leaders
wanted the BOE to
hear their side, and
bargainers wanted
decision-making
authority.

Theme 2:
Increased PA and
SA voice

The full IBB process
was implemented with
the PA and SA, they
were trained alongside
EA, and the ASHR
communicated that all
groups would be
treated in a similar
fashion.

Themes from the PCC
staff survey and the
inclusive nature of the
PCC.

The district wanted to
honor secretary and
paraeducator feelings
and make a change
based on feedback
from the PCC staff
survey.

Theme 3:
Commitment to
communications

A joint
communication was
sent after every
bargaining session to
staff.

Previous joint
communications sent
by the PCC to staff.

Bargaining team
members expressed
the desire to send joint
communications
during check-out.
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Table 14 continued
Theme 4:
Commitment to
organization

Theme 5:
Commitment to the
process

Bargaining dates were
proactively scheduled
and reminders sent,
and materials and prep
work were prepared
prior to bargaining
sessions.
The district
committed to the IBB
assessment, training,
and bargaining with
two outside
facilitators.

Previous contentious
bargaining cycles that
went into the summer,
and a sense of pride
by district staff and
the BOE.

A want for change,
and a desire to have
bargaining done by
the end of the school
year.

Previous contentious
bargaining, a sense of
pride by district staff
and the BOE, limited
to no knowledge of or
experience with other
IBB models.

A want for a change
and the financial and
operational cost of
implementation.

Theme 6:
The ASHR made clear A sense of pride by
Willingness to open that IBB teams could
district staff, a new
communication
discuss any issue.
ASHR, and the open
communication
experienced through
the work of the PCC.

A want for a change.

Theme 7:
Compensation
solved mid-process

Decision made by
bargaining team
members.

Themes revealed by
PCC staff survey, and
the BOE priority to
increase staff
compensation.

Bargainers wanted to
honor staff feelings
related to stagnant
compensation, and
follow BOE priorities.

Theme 8:
Formation of
numerous
committees

Letters of
understanding
included each
committee’s marching
orders.

Limited financial
resources, pent-up
unresolved issues
from contentious
bargaining, previous
bargaining cycles
went into the summer,
and an increased sense
of trust.

A want for
meaningful resolution
to issues, and a desire
to finish bargaining by
the end of the school
year.

The discussion below will further inform the reader about implications on practice
connected to how one southeastern Michigan public school district implemented IBB.
Theme 1: BOE members on bargaining teams. From the data used for this study, it
was clear that the association, management, and the BOE wanted a BOE member placed on each
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bargaining team and felt that having a BOE member on each team was a success. BOE
bargaining team members were able to express how options would impact district families, the
community, and the BOE itself. They were also able to share what the BOE would or would not
approve, which gave IBB teams the confidence to make decisions at the table. Furthermore, BOE
bargaining team members were able to talk directly with other BOE members. This increased
their understanding of the issues, and was sometimes needed when creative solutions were
designed.
In relation to the primary research questions, the following conclusions were derived
from Theme 1–BOE members on bargaining teams:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?
Two IBB assessors, trained by the MEA, assessed management, EA leadership, PA
leadership, SA leadership, and the BOE. The assessors recommended that a BOE
member be placed on each IBB team. Board members were then informed of the
expectations and time commitment, and surveyed for their interest and availability for
sitting on a bargaining team. After BOE members responded to the email, the BOE
president, superintendent, and assistant superintendent for human resources (ASHR)
placed one BOE member on each bargaining team based on interest, availability, and
fit.



What factors influenced the decision-making process during implementation of IBB?
The decision to place a BOE member on each bargaining team was influenced by the
work of the district’s PCC, which had BOE members on it. Additionally, the decision
was influenced by feelings from union leadership that there was a disconnect between
what they were presenting in bargaining and what the BOE was understanding, and
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by the IBB assessors’ recommendation that a BOE member be placed on each IBB
team.


What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about implementation of IBB? BOE members wanted to better
understand the issues, union leadership wanted the BOE to hear their side to better
understand where they were coming from, and management and union leadership
wanted the authority to make decisions at the bargaining table.

Theme 2: Increased PA and SA voice. As found through data from this study, it was
clear that PA and SA bargaining team members left bargaining feeling heard. The efforts to
listen to PA and SA bargaining team members and to treat them the same as the EA led to a very
productive bargaining cycle where many issues were resolved. Not only were many issues
resolved, but bargaining was completed in only 4–5 sessions, and the teams trusted the people
and the process enough to allow a variety of issues to be resolved through committee work after
the agreements were ratified.
In relation to the primary research questions, the following conclusions were derived
from Theme 2–Increased PA and SA voice:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?
The district decided to implement the full IBB process with both the PA and SA with
large bargaining teams that included central office administration, building
administration, the MEA UniServ director, a BOE member, and association staff.
Furthermore, all bargaining units were trained together, and the ASHR clearly and
consistently communicated, both in and out of bargaining, that all groups would be
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treated in a similar fashion, and that no group would be given preference over
another.


What factors influenced the decision-making process during implementation of IBB?
Decisions during IBB implementation related to increased PA and SA voice were
influenced by themes from the May 2015 PCC staff survey that found that
paraeducators and secretaries wanted more voice. The inclusive nature of the PCC,
which included PA and SA representation, further influenced decisions related to this
theme.



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about implementation of IBB? The district wanted to honor the
feelings of the secretaries and paraeducators, and make a change based on the
feedback they were getting through the work of the PCC.

Theme 3: Consistent joint communications. As found through data from this study, the
district’s commitment to consistently sending out joint communications was a success. These
communications kept staff informed throughout the bargaining process, and apprised that union
and management were collaboratively problem-solving. The communications talked about
progress and process, but did not get into the details, because the details of the agreement cannot
be shared during bargaining.
In relation to the primary research questions, the following conclusions were derived
from Theme 3–Consistent joint communications:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?
The ASHR gathered the information to be shared at the end of every bargaining
session, drafted a communication, sent the draft communication to IBB team

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

132

members for feedback, modified the communication based on the feedback, and then
released the communication to staff.


What factors influenced the decision-making process during implementation of IBB?
The commitment to consistent joint communications was influenced by previous joint
communications sent by the district’s PCC.



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about implementation of IBB? At the end of each IBB session,
bargaining team members decided what information from the day was to be
communication to staff.

Theme 4: Commitment to organization. As found through data from this study, the
commitment of organization during the bargaining process allowed the MEA’s IBB process to
operate as designed, and resulted in tentative agreements for all of the bargaining units by the
end of the school year. There was consensus that the first four hours spent bargaining were
highly productive. A relative concern from some bargaining team members was there they
became less productive nearing the end of the full day bargaining sessions.
In relation to the primary research questions, the following conclusions were derived
from Theme 4–Commitment to organization:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?
Four bargaining dates were scheduled for each IBB team prior the start of bargaining.
The flip chart paper was always available, and information that was needed from one
meeting to the next was available. The ASHR took digital pictures of all bargaining
notes from the flip chart paper after every bargaining session, and then posted them to
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a shared Google folder. He shared this folder with all bargaining team members,
which gave them online access to the bargaining notes and the to-do list.


What factors influenced the decision-making process during implementation of IBB?
The district’s IBB organizational process worked and there was a sense of pride that
the contracts were completed by the end of the school year. This was influenced by
previous contentious bargaining cycles that went into the summer, and a sense of
pride by district staff and the BOE.



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about implementation of IBB? Bargaining team members wanted a
change based on previous contentious bargaining, there was a real effort to have a
successful bargaining experience, and a desire to have it done by the end of the school
year.

Theme 5: Commitment to the process. As found through data from this study, the
commitment to the process by the BOE and the bargaining team members allowed the MEA’s
IBB model to operate as designed. The BOE’s commitment came in terms of the financial and
operational support needed to implement a bargaining model that pulled staff away from their
jobs for both half and full days as well as pay for facilitator fees, lodging, and mileage
reimbursement. Furthermore, the BOE support came by authorizing a process where decisions
were allowed to be made at the table. With regards to bargaining team members, their
commitment was that they followed the process with little to no skepticism.
In relation to the primary research questions, the following conclusions were derived
from Theme 5–Commitment to the process:
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How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?
The district agreed to implement the MEA’s full IBB process, which included an
assessment, two days of training, and facilitated bargaining sessions. The bargaining
team members commitment to the process was rooted in the training, and reinforced
by the facilitators throughout bargaining. Two trainers, one representing management
and one representing the union, conducted a two-day joint training with all BOE,
management, EA, PA, and SA bargaining team members together on the IBB process
used by the MEA. Bargaining team members were required to attend the two-day
training. The first day of the district’s training focused on creating a learning
environment and problem-solving skills and the second day of training focused on the
team building and the IBB process used by the MEA.



What factors influenced the decision-making process during implementation of IBB?
The district’s commitment to the process was influenced by previous contentious
bargaining, a sense of pride by district staff and the BOE, and the fact that staff and
BOE members had little to no knowledge of or experience with other IBB models.



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about implementation of IBB? Staff and the BOE wanted a change
due to previous contentious bargaining. The district was presented the concept of
using the MEA’s IBB model by the MEA UniServ director, and management felt
using the MEA’s model would strengthen employee buy-in. No other IBB models
were considered by the union or management. Additionally, some BOE members
were concerned about the financial and operational impact of implementing the
MEA’s full IBB process, but not enough to stop support for implementation.
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Theme 6: The willingness to open communication. As found through data from this
study, the willingness to open communication was a success, because a wider variety of issues
were able to be addressed. This was a challenge, because prohibited subjects of bargaining had to
remain outside of CBAs.
In relation to the primary research questions, the following conclusions were derived
from Theme 6–The willingness to open communication:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?
The presence of a BOE member on each IBB team allowed the unions to know where
the BOE stood on issues. The ASHR made clear that IBB teams could discuss any
issue, with the understanding that some items were not permitted to make their way
into CBAs.



What factors influenced the decision-making process during implementation of IBB?
The willingness to open communication was influenced by the transition to a new
ASHR, a sense of pride in the district by staff and the BOE, and the open dialogue
experienced through the work of the PCC.



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about implementation of IBB? Staff and the BOE wanted a change
and management’s willingness to open communication, whether or not it was a
mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining, opened the door for the unions to
follow suit.

Theme 7: Compensation solved mid-process. This study suggested that solving
compensation earlier in the bargaining process was a success. Having compensation out of the
way allowed the rest of the bargaining process to progress faster. This was a challenge, because
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after compensation was resolved, bargaining teams concluded that there was no money to spend
on other issues.
In relation to the primary research questions, the following conclusions were derived
from Theme 7–Compensation solved mid-process:


How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?
In bargaining, the EA IBB team collectively decided to tackle compensation before
resolving a handful of other issues.



What factors influenced the decision-making process during implementation of IBB?
Solving compensation earlier in the bargaining process was influenced by the
bargaining priority set by the BOE to increase compensation for staff, and by the PCC
staff survey theme that revealed frustrations due to low and stagnant wages.



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about implementation of IBB? Bargaining team members were
committed to honoring staff frustrations about low and stagnant wages that were
revealed on the PCC staff survey.

Theme 8: Formation of numerous committees. This study revealed that the district’s
IBB process led to the formation of numerous committees. IBB committees were given the
necessary resources, expertise, and time to resolve issues. Additionally, they paved the way for
bargaining to finish by the end of the school year. The challenge was that many issues ended up
in committee, which was time consuming work that continued six months after all CBAs were
ratified.
In relation to the primary research questions, the following conclusions were derived
from Theme 8–Formation of numerous committees:
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How did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators implement IBB?
The EA, PA, and SA IBB teams agreed on straw designs that included committee
work meant to solve and finalize agreements on 17 issues after ratification.



What factors influenced the decision-making process during implementation of IBB?
The formation of numerous committees was influenced by the fact that there were
many pent-up issues not resolved through previous contentious bargaining, past
bargaining cycles that went into the summer, and there was an increased sense of trust
between bargaining team members.



What did school district leaders, union leaders, and IBB facilitators consider when
making decisions about implementation of IBB? Bargaining team members wanted to
finish bargaining by the end of the school year and desired meaningful resolution to
issues. They accomplished this by authorizing numerous committees to resolve issues
after the CBAs were ratified.

Recommendations for School Districts Implementing IBB
This study revealed successes and challenges related to each theme that emerged. The
researcher utilized this information to make recommendations useful to school district’s
implementing IBB (see Table 15).
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Table 15
Recommendations for Implementing IBB
Related Theme

Recommendation

Theme 1:
BOE members on
bargaining teams

Inform BOE members, if they volunteer to sit on an IBB team, that their
presence is required at all training and bargaining sessions and that they
will be treated the same as all other bargaining team members, including
being called out if they do not follow the IBB process or norms.
Inform BOE members that bargaining teams must have decision-making
authority for the process to operate as designed. The BOE will be
informed throughout the process, but not asked for approval on
individual issues. To make this more palatable, probe the BOE on what
issues they would like tackled in IBB and what their main interests are.

Theme 2:
Increased PA and
SA voice

Conduct IBB training with all bargaining units together, in an effort to
save money, build relationships, and increase understanding throughout
the district.

Theme 3:
Commitment to
communications

At the end of every bargaining session designate an individual to (a)
gather the information to be jointly communicated to staff, (b) draft the
communication, (c) send a draft to the IBB team for feedback, (d) make
modifications based on feedback, and (e) then send the communication.

Theme 4:
Commitment to
organization

Schedule IBB dates far in advance because bargaining team member
calendars can fill up quickly and participation by the full team is key.
Schedule facilitators for full days but have one unit meet in the morning
and another in the afternoon. This will avoid the mental exhaustion
experienced at the end of full days while streamlining facilitator fees.

Theme 5:
Commitment to the
process

Schedule training and bargaining with two outside facilitators. The
facilitator fees for both training and bargaining may be a barrier for
some districts but were found to be well worth the investment.

Theme 6:
Show all of your cards. The more transparent you are, the more
Willingness to open transparent the other side will be, which will pave the way for
communication
collaborative problem solving.
Theme 7:
Compensation
solved mid-process

Consider solving compensation earlier in the bargaining process. This
works best if you are overly transparent about the district’s financial
picture and the financial impact of agreements.

Theme 8:
Formation of
numerous
committee

Have the IBB team set the ground rules, through straw designs, for
committee work that occurs outside of bargaining. This is most
appropriate for issues that do not require the full team, or are better
solved with the inclusion of subject matter experts.

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

139

In this section, the researcher provided recommendations for school districts to
successfully implement IBB. Following are recommendations for further research.
Recommendations for Further Research
The findings of this study suggested the following recommendations that provided
opportunities for further research:


On how other IBB models were implemented in school districts.



That compares and contrasts constituent attitudes towards CBAs in school districts that
use traditional models, hybrid models, and facilitated IBB models.



That compares and contrasts constituent attitudes towards CBAs in school districts that
do and do not have BOE participation on bargaining teams.

Conclusion
The researcher collected and analyzed data of how one public school district in
southeastern Michigan implemented IBB. Furthermore, he studied the factors that influenced the
decision-making process, and what was considered when making implementation decisions. All
interview participants were key decision makers involved with the district’s implementation of
IBB, and the researcher had access to the documents and archival records central to
implementation.
Fonstad et al. (2005) shared that “IBB processes focus on understanding, building on
interests, and using problem-solving tools as a way of avoiding positional conflicts and achieving
better outcomes for all stakeholders” (p. 6). The district’s IBB implementation successes
included: (a) the MEA’s IBB process operated as designed; (b) BOE members added the
perspective of district families, the community, and the BOE to bargaining; (c) decisions were
made at the bargaining table; (d) BOE members left bargaining with a better understanding of
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the issues; (e) PA and SA bargaining teams left bargaining feeling heard; (f) staff were kept
informed throughout the bargaining process, and apprised that union and management were
collaboratively problem-solving; (g) a wide variety of issues were addressed; (h) committees
provided additional resources, expertise, and time to resolve issues; (i) bargaining was finished
by the end of the school year; (j) the implementation of IBB cost the district 20% less than
anticipated; and (k) the BOE priorities to increase staff compensation and keep the fund balance
above 5% were met.
Candido and Santos (2015) stated that implementation of a new strategy can be
challenging (p. 237). The district’s IBB implementation challenges included: (a) substantial
financial and operational commitments; (b) the facilitators were initially gentle on telling BOE
members to get in line or stay in process; (c) joint communications required consensus to avoid
potential unfair labor practice allegations; (d) some bargaining team members became less
productive nearing the end of full day bargaining sessions; (e) EA team members veered off
process on occasion; (f) prohibited subjects of bargaining, despite the willingness to open
communication, had to remain outside of CBAs; (g) bargainers felt there was no money for other
issues after compensation was solved; and (h) IBB committee work was time consuming.
Klingel (2003) said, “bargainers who have experienced costly poor negotiations and are
highly motivated to make changes to avoid incurring those costs again will work hard to make a
new, unproven and potentially risky process work” (p. 25). Likewise, this study found that the
district’s bargaining team members were influenced by previous contentious bargaining as well
as by themes revealed from the PCC’s May 2015 staff survey, and they wanted to make a
change.
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Furthermore, Wentz (2004) suggested that “abiding by the structure of a cooperative
collective bargaining model can yield a high potential of success for the endeavor” (p. 98).
Similarly, the district’s commitment to organization and to the process allowed the MEA’s IBB
model to operate as designed.
The district had a history of contentions labor relations and faced challenges during
implementation. On the other hand, the district wanted to make a change, was committed to the
process, and implemented IBB. The researcher’s view, today, is that districts with a history of
contentious labor relations can successfully implement collaborative collective bargaining
models.

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

142

References
Bass, B., & Bass, R. (2008). The bass handbook of leadership: Theory, research, and
managerial applications. New York, NY: Free Press.
Barrett, J., & O’Dowd, J. (2005). Interest-based bargaining: A user’s guide. Bloomington, IN:
Trafford.
Bloomberg, L., Volpe, M. (2016). Completing your qualitative dissertation: A road map from
beginning to end (3rd ed.). Los Angeles, CA. Sage Publications, Inc.
Brown, A. (2016). The impact of interest-based bargaining on community college faculty and
administrative relationships (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3745450)
Candido, C., Santos, S. (2015). Strategy implementation: What is the failure rate? Journal of
Management and Organization, 21(2), 237–262.
Cihon, C., & Castagnera, J. (2011). Employment and labor law (7th ed.). Mason, OH: Cengage
Learning.
Collective Bargaining Agreement. (n.d.) West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2.
(2008). Retrieved July 18, 2017 from http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com
Conry, T. (1999). Why aren’t we getting to yes? Mutual gains bargaining: diffusion of the theory
and practitioners’ understanding (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9928233)
Creswell, J. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches
(4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

143

Cunningham, P. A. (2014). Exploring the efficacy of consensus-based decision-making.
International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis, 7, 233–253.
doi:10.1108/IJHMA-06-2013-0040
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, J., Kochan, T., & Wells, J. C. (2001). In whose interest? A first look at
national survey data on interest-based bargaining in labor relations. Industrial Relations,
40, 1–22. doi:10.1111/0019-8676.00193
Czarnik, E. (2012, May 4). West Bloomfield schools to outsource workers. The Oakland Press.
Retrieved from http://www.theoaklandpress.com
Dundon, T., & Ryan, P. (2009). Interviewing reluctant respondents: Strikes, henchmen, and
Gaelic games. Organizational Research Methods, 13, 562-581
Elephant in the room. (n.d.). Retrieved July 10, 2017, from https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/elephant in the room
Feldman, A. (2015, June). STEAM rising: Why we need to put the arts into STEM education.
Retrieved from http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/06/steam_vs
_stem_why_we_need_to_put_the_arts_into_stem_education.html
Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to yes negotiating agreement without giving in.
London, United Kingdom: Penguin Books.
Fonstad, N., McKersie, R., & Eaton, S. (2005). Interest-based negotiations in a transformed
labor-management setting. Negotiation Journal, 20, 5–11. doi:10.1111/j.15719979.2004.00002.x
Freeman, K. W. (2012). The impact of traditional bargaining versus interest-based bargaining
on faculty salaries and administrative and faculty relationships (Doctoral dissertation).
Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 3520915)

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

144

Friedman, R. (1993). Bringing mutual gains bargaining to labor negotiations: the role of trust,
understanding, and control. Human Resource Management, 32(4), 435–460.
Friedman, R. (1994). Front stage, backstage. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Fullan, M. (2001). Leading in a culture of change. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Hargrove, S. (2009). Interest based bargaining: Achieving improved relationships through
collaboration. Library Management, 31, 229–240. doi:10.1108/01435121011046308
Heale, R., & Twycross, A. (2015). Validity and reliability in quantitative studies. EvidenceBased Nursing, 18(3), 66–67. doi:10.1136/eb-2015-102129
Hess, F., & West, M. (2006). A better bargain: Overhauling teacher collective bargaining for
the 21st century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
Hiraoka, L. (1994). Interest-based bargaining puts diplomacy before the war. The Education
Digest, 60(3), 11–13. Retrieved from https://www.eddigest.com/
Hopkins, C. (2011, April 1). West Bloomfield school administrators respond to teachers’ 10
percent pay cut. The Oakland Press. Retrieved from http://www.theoaklandpress.com
Hoynes, J. A. (1999). A comparison of contract language in Ohio school districts: Interest-based
bargaining vs. traditional bargaining (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 304512322)
Gantert, T. (2011, February 18). The West Bloomfield teacher ‘sick out.’ Michigan Capital
Confidential. Retrieved from http://www.michigan capitolconfidential.com
Grier, R. (2011, March 17). West Bloomfield teachers, parents show their ‘colors’ at board
meeting. The Oakland Press. Retrieved from http://www.theoaklandpress.com
Klingel, S. (2003). Interest-based bargaining in education: A review of the literature and current
practice. Washington, DC: National EA.

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

145

Lewicki, R., Saunders, D., & Barry, B. (2011). Essentials of negotiation. New York, NY:
McGraw Hill.
Lewis, P., Goodman, S., & Fandt, P. (1998). Management: Challenges in the 21st century.
Cincinnati, OH: Thomson.
Mattos, J. (2011). Improving teacher practice: teachers’ perspectives on capacity-building
initiatives in literacy (Doctoral dissertation). Available for ProQuest Dissertations and
Theses database. (UMI No. 3484681)
Martin, E., & McFerran. (2008). A dictionary of nursing. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford
University Press.
McKersie, R., Eaton, S., & Kochan, T. (2004). Kaiser Permanente: Using interest-based
negotiations to craft a new collective bargaining agreement. Negotiation Journal, 20, 13–
35. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2004.00003.x
McKersie, R., Sharpe, T., Kochan, T., Eaton, A., Strauss, G., & Morgenstern, M. (2008).
Bargaining theory meets interest-based negotiations: A case study. Industrial Relations,
47, 66–96. doi:10.1111/j.1468-232X.2008.00504.x
Michael, B., & Michael, R. (2012). Interest-based bargaining: Innovating from the basics.
International Journal of Business and Social Science, 3(9), 40–48. Retrieved from
http://www.ijbssnet.com/
Michael, B., & Michael, R. (2013). Interest-based bargaining: Efficient, amicable and wise?
Employee Relations, 35, 460–478. doi:10.1108/ER-10-2011-0057
Miles, M., Huberman, M., & Saldana, J. (2014). Qualitative data analysis: A methods
sourcebook (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

146

Miller, J. K., Farmer, K. P., Miller, D. J., & Peters, L. M. (2010). Panacea or snake oil? Interest
based bargaining in the U.S. airline and rail industries. Negotiation Journal, 26, 177–201.
doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2010.00268.x
Michigan Department of Education. (2017). MI school data: Student counts [database].
Retrieved from https://www.mischooldata.org/DistrictSchoolProfiles/StudentInformation
/StudentCounts/StudentCount.aspx
Moolenaar, N., Daly, A., & Sleegers, P. (2010). Occupying the principal position: Examining
relationships between transformational leadership, social network position, and schools’
innovative climate. Educational Administration Quarterly, 46, 623–670.
doi:10.1177/0013161X10378689
Murray, D. (2010, June 12). Schools, teachers struggle over shrinking funds. The Oakland Press.
Retrieved from http://www.theoaklandpress.com
Murray, D. (2011, September 27). Snyder signs law requiring public employees to pay more for
insurance, teachers unions leaders call it ‘an attack.’ Mlive Media Group. Retrieved from
http://www.mlive.com
Paquet, R., Gaétan, I., & Bergeron, J. G. (2000). Does interest-based bargaining (IBB) really
make a difference in collective bargaining outcomes? Negotiation Journal, 16, 281–296.
doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2000.tb00219.x
Peace, N. (1994). A new way to negotiate – Collaborative bargaining in teacher contract
negotiations: The experience in five Massachusetts school districts. Journal of Law &
Education, 23, 365–379. Retrieved from http://www.law.sc.edu/jled/
Post, F. (1990). Collective collaborative bargaining: Toward and ethically defensible approach to
labor negotiations. Journal of Business Ethics, 9, 495–508. doi:10.1007/BF00382843

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

147

Price, W. (2015). Taking the mystery out of Michigan school finance: A handbook for
understanding state funding policy for Michigan publish school districts (6th ed.).
Ypsilanti, MI: National Council of Professors of Educational Administration.
Rath, T. (2011, April 3). School district, parent, teachers react to contract imposition. West
Bloomfield Patch. Retrieved from http://www.patch.com
Rayfield, R. (2000). The effects of interest-based bargaining on the relationship between
employees and management in one rural public Ohio school district (Doctoral
dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No.
9978727)
Ridge, R. (2015). Mastering interest-based negotiations. Nursing Management (Springhouse),
46(10), 53–55. doi:10.1097/01.NUMA.0000471588.16314.0f
Sanes, M., & Schmitt, J. (2014). Regulation of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the States.
Washington DC: Center for Economic and Policy Research.
Sharp, W. L. (2012). The role of the superintendent and school board in collective bargaining:
1989-2010. Educational Research Quarterly, 35(4), 29–52.
Spalding, A. (2014). Roadblocks to reform? A review of union contracts in Michigan schools.
Retrieved from Mackinac Center for Public Policy website:
http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/archives/2014/S2014-02.pdf
Stepp, J.R., Sweeney, K.M., & Johnson, R.L. (2003). Interest-based negotiation: An enginedriving change. The Journal of Quality and Participation, Sept/Oct 1998, 1–5.
Straut, D. S. (1998). Negotiations in interesting times: The impact of interest-based negotiations
on educational labor relations (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9837870)

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

148

Wall, F. A. (1999). Interest-based bargaining: An alternative to position-based bargaining for
public school employee wage and benefit negotiations. Available from ProQuest
Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9928121)
Wang, X., & Howell, J. (2010). Exploring the dual-level effects of transformational leadership
on followers. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 1134–1144. doi:10.1037/a0020754
Wentz, A. D. (2004). The potential for successful application of interest-based bargaining in
public sector labor negotiations. Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses
database. (UMI No. 305103779)
Wilson, R. (March 1999). The life cycle of labor and management relations. Negotiator's
notebook. Salem, OR: Oregon School Boards Association.
Yin, R. (2014). Case study research: design and methods (5th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING
APPENDICIES

149

IMPLEMENTING INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING

150

Appendix A: EA Wage and Step History
Table B1
EA Wage and Step History
School Year
2000–2001
2001–2002
2002–2003
2003–2004
2004–2005
2005–2006
2006–2007
2007–2008
2008–2009
2009–2010
2010–2011
2011–2012
2012–2013

2013–2014

2014–2015

2015–2016

2016–2017

Step Movement
Steps awarded

Salary Movement
2.5% increase
3.25% for staff at the top step
Steps awarded
2.25% increase
2.75% for staff at the top step
Steps awarded
3% increase
Steps awarded
3% increase
Increase delayed to second semester.
Steps awarded
2% increase
Steps awarded
2% increase
Steps awarded
1.5% increase
Steps awarded
1.5% increase
Step freeze
1% increase
Steps awarded
1.5% increase
Change to an elongated 15 step
5% off-schedule reduction in wages and
salary schedule from 11 steps.
one furlough day.
Step Freeze
7.5% off-schedule reduction in wages and
three furlough days.
Steps awarded
Continuation of 6% off-schedule wage
reduction at all step levels with the
exception of the top step. Reduction at the
top step was 5.75% off-schedule.
Employees eligible for a step
Continuation of 6% off-schedule wage
increase received an off-schedule reduction at all step levels with the
salary adjustment at the beginning exception of the top step. Reduction at the
of the second semester. The
top step was 5.25% off-schedule.
payout was one half (1/2) of the
full step amount.
Off schedule step increase from
Continuation of 5.5% off-schedule wage
2013–2014 was put on-schedule. reduction at all step levels with the
exception of the top step. Reduction at the
top step was 4.75% off-schedule.
Step freeze
Wage freeze and continuation of 5.5% offschedule wage reduction at all step levels
with the exception of the top step.
Reduction at the top step was 4.75% offschedule.
One half (1/2) step on schedule at Continuation of 5.5% off-schedule wage
the beginning of the 2016–2017
reduction at all step levels with the
school year, and an additional one exception of the top step. Reduction at the
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second semester if the 2016 Fall
count reached 5,375 student FTEs
or more. Enrollment target was
met.
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top step was 4.75% off-schedule. $500 offschedule for all employees who are on the
top of the salary schedule and not eligible
for steps. Employees who are at the top of
the salary schedule and not eligible for
steps will receive an additional $200 offschedule if the 2016 Fall count reached
5,375 student FTEs of more. Enrollment
target was met.
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Appendix B: August 26, 2013 BOE Meeting Minutes
Regular Meeting
BOE
XXX School District

August 26, 2013
______________________________________________________________________________
MEMBERS PRESENT:

Mrs. XXX, Mrs. XXX, Mr. XXX, Dr. XXX,
Mr. XXX, Mrs. XXX, and Mrs. XXX.

MEMBERS ABSENT:

None.

ADMINISTRATORS PRESENT:

Dr. XXX, Mr. XXX and
Mr. XXX.

ADMINISTRATORS ABSENT:

None.

CALL TO ORDER BY PRESIDENT XXX
President XXX called the meeting to order at 7:00 p.m. in the Media Center at XXX High
School.
PUBLIC COMMENTS
XXX (MEA UniServ director) and Mr. XXX (employee) shared
their concerns about outsourcing the Informational Technology Department to Oakland
Schools.
TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT WITH
OAKLAND SCHOOLS
Mr. XXX, Assistant Superintendent for Business and Operations, explained that District
retained the services of Plante and Moran in order to conduct a study of the current
Informational Technology Department Operations. This thorough study was conducted
during the 2012–13 school fiscal year. Three BOE member Representatives were
presented with the preliminary study results at a meeting on June 13, 2013. The full BOE
was presented with the report and discussed this matter at the BOE Study Session of
August 12, 2013.
Plante and Moran is recommending that based on the results of their findings, it would
benefit the XXX School district both operationally and financially to contract with
Oakland Schools Intermediate School District for them to provide contracted
informational technology management and oversight.
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Motion by Mr. XXX, supported by Mrs. XXX, to approve the Technology Support
Intergovernmental Agreement with Oakland Intermediate School District, per enclosure
6b.
BOE discussion centered on the exhaustive study of the agreement at the BOE Study
session, displaced employees may interview with Oakland Schools, the need to move
forward with technology and breath of services Oakland Schools can offer.
Motion carried, 7–0.
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol


The researcher will begin each interview by thanking the participant for their
participation, explaining the purpose of the study, and reminding the participant of the
procedures put in place to protect their confidentiality.



Interview questions will be unstructured (see Appendix D for the questions that will
guide the interviews).



The interviews will occur in a private office.



The researcher will take notes and audiotape all interviews.



The notes will be taken on a password protected Microsoft Word document with a header
that that indicates the date, time, location, interviewer, and interviewee. Spaces will be
left on the document between the questions to record the responses.



At the end of the interview, the researcher will thank the participant for their participation
in the study.



After the interview, the researcher will fill in any gaps not captured in the notes with
those from the audiotape.
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Appendix D: Interview Questions
These are the questions that will guide the unstructured interviews:
1. Describe how IBB was implemented in the district?
2. What factors influenced how IBB was implemented in the district, what implementation
decisions were made due to these factors, and why were these decisions made?
3. What implementation decisions do you feel were unique to the district, what factors
influenced these decisions, and why were these decisions made?
4. What were the most successful and challenging components of implementing IBB in the
district? Why did these successes and challenges exist?
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Appendix E: Consent Agreement

Informed Consent Form
The person in charge of this study is Arthur C. Ebert. Mr. Ebert is a student at Eastern Michigan
University. His faculty adviser is Dr. Ella M. Burton. Throughout this form, this person will be
referred to as the “investigator.”
The purpose of the study
The purpose of this research study is to investigate how one school district implemented interestbased bargaining (IBB).
What will happen if I participate in this study?
Participation in this study involves
 Participating in an interview where you will be asked a number of questions about
how the district implemented IBB.
 There may be a need to meet with you for a second short follow-up interview for
further clarification.
We would like to audio record you for this study. If you are audio recorded, it will be
possible to identify you through your voice. If you agree to be audio recorded, sign the
appropriate line at the bottom of this form. If you do not want to be audio recorded, you
cannot participate in the study.
What are the anticipated risks for participation?
The primary risk of participation in this study is a potential loss of confidentiality.
Some participants, through reflection, may experience dissatisfaction with decisions made when
the district implemented IBB.
How will my information be kept confidential?
Data is considered identifiable since it will be audio recorded. Audio recordings will be stored on
a password-protected computer and destroyed after they have been transcribed. Dissemination of
results will be anonymous, and any information you give will remain confidential. This file will
be destroyed when the study is completed.
Will I be paid for participation?
You will not be paid for participating.
Study contact information
If you have any questions about the research, you can contact the Principal Investigator, Arthur
C. Ebert, at aebert@emich.edu or by phone at 248–520–9516. You can also contact Mr. Ebert’s
adviser, Dr. Ella M. Burton, at eburton1@emich.edu.
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For questions about your rights as a research subject, contact the Eastern Michigan University
Human Subjects Review Committee at human.subjects@emich.edu or by phone at 734–487–
3090.
Voluntary participation
Participation in this research study is your choice. You may refuse to participate at any time,
even after signing this form, with no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled. You may choose to leave the study at any time with no loss of benefits to which you are
otherwise entitled. If you leave the study, the information you provided will be kept confidential.
You may request, in writing, that your identifiable information be destroyed. However, we
cannot destroy any information that has already been published.
Statement of Consent
I have read this form. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and am satisfied with the
answers I received. I give my consent to participate in this research study.
Signatures
______________________________________
Name of Subject
______________________________________
Signature of Subject

____________________
Date

I agree to be audio recorded for this study.
______________________________________
Signature of Subject

____________________
Date

I have explained the research to the subject and answered all his/her questions. I will give a copy
of the signed consent form to the subject.
________________________________________
Name of Person Obtaining Consent
________________________________________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent

_______________________
Date
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Appendix H: PCC Staff Survey Results and Findings
May 2015 teacher survey results and findings.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Disagree
Somewhat
3

Agree
Somewhat
4

Agree
5

Item
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Developing the social skills of students is important.
I continue to find new ways to improve my teaching.
I spend time in personal reflection about my work.
I am proud to be an educator.
Teachers are willing to help whenever there is a problem.
We are willing to help each other when problems arise.
My building’s leaders support risk-taking and innovation in teaching.
I feel comfortable approaching my administrator with a problem or concern that I
have.
My building’s leaders value teachers’ ideas.
Teachers and staff discuss instructional strategies and curriculum issues.
Student behavior management strategies are not discussed sufficiently.
Teachers have an understanding of how to support each other.
I feel my evaluation accurately reflects my performance as a teacher.
Teachers are encouraged to share ideas.
Administrators in my building trust the professional judgments of teachers.
Leaders in our school facilitate teachers working together.
Administrators are kept informed on current issues in the district.
Administrators are encouraged to share ideas.
We do not consistently evaluate the success of existing school programs.
Teachers value administrators’ ideas.
The district mission statement reflects the values of the community.
Teachers trust each other in our district.
Leaders in our school facilitate teachers working together.
Administrators are willing to help out whenever there is a problem.
Teachers value administrators' ideas.
We work together to implement the decisions of meetings.
My building’s leaders take time to praise teachers that perform well.
The school staff is empowered to make instructional decisions rather than waiting for
supervisors to tell them what to do.
We often compare how we assess student achievement.
Parents trust teachers’ professional judgments.
The district mission provides a clear sense of direction for administrators.
Administrators and teachers work in a collaborative fashion.

Strongly
Agree
6
Avg/6.0
5.6
5.5
5.4
5.0
4.8
4.6
4.4
4.4
4.3
4.3
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.2
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.7
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Item
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

There is unity of purpose among administrators and teachers.
Teachers are generally aware of what other teachers are teaching.
Teachers are kept informed on current issues in the school.
Our district has a rich and robust tradition of rituals and celebrations including
holidays, special events and recognition of goal attainment.
Teachers and parents have common expectations for student performance.
Teachers are kept informed on current issues in the district.
Overall, West Bloomfield Schools is a good place to work.
Administrators and teachers agree on professional development needs.
There is a strong sense of collegiality between administrators and teachers.
My involvement in policy or decision-making is taken seriously.
People work here because they enjoy and choose to be here.
When something is not working in our school, the faculty and staff predict and
prevent rather than react and repair.
Administrators are reluctant to share problems with each other.
The district mission provides a clear sense of direction for teachers.
Teachers are reluctant to share problems with each other.
Central office leaders support risk-taking and innovation in teaching.
When something is not working in our school, the faculty and staff predict and
prevent rather than react and repair.
The student behavior code is a result of collaboration and consensus among staff.
Teachers have opportunities for dialogue and planning across grades and subjects.
Faculty value the professional development offered by the district.
Teachers are involved in the decision-making process.
Our district reflects a true “sense” of community.
Central office leaders value teachers’ ideas.
Teachers and staff work together to develop the school schedule, e.g. grade level,
course assignments.
Teachers do not make an effort to maintain positive relationships with colleagues.
Teachers take time to observe each other teaching.
Colleagues do not usually support my professional decisions.
Central office leaders take time to praise teachers that perform well.
Members of the central administration show a genuine concern for me as a person.
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Avg/6.0
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.2
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.0
3.0
2.9
2.8
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.2

The following themes emerged from the open response questions from the survey and are
presented in order starting with the most cited listed first.
1. Evaluation
The teacher evaluation system has a negative impact upon teacher's attitudes leading to
mistrust with administration, competition among teachers and fear of losing their jobs. For
this reason, teachers do not want to collaborate with one another. The system is unfair and
puts too much focus on being highly effective, creating stress and anxiety for teachers.
Teachers do not feel as if they are treated in a professional manner, and therefore do not feel
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respected or appreciated. It is a very time-consuming process (testing, dictation, etc.) that
takes away valuable teaching time in the classroom. The evaluation process should be used
to strengthen pedagogy and promote professional growth, rather than used as a punitive
measure.
“Changes need to be made on evaluations, it is pitting us against each other instead of
building unified staff.”
“We must find the best and most efficient way to keep our best teachers without burdening
the teachers with obscure goals and expectations.”
2. Central Office
There is a lack of follow-through and visibility with the Central Office. Teachers want there
to be more of a physical presence in the buildings, establishing relationships and building
connections. Not just formal walk-throughs, but coming to staff meetings, for instance, and
getting to know the staff. There is a disconnect and lack of communication between staff and
Central Office, leading to a lack of trust and teachers not feeling valued, appreciated or
supported. Central Office often does not reply to emails, or is very delayed in their
responses.
“Develop administrators in the schools and in central office that demonstrate a true sense of
caring of their staff, and make every effort to value and show appreciation of the hard work
that their staff put in day in and day out.”
3. Administration
Administrators need to be more visible in their buildings. Teachers want Administration to
visit more often, and not just for formal evaluations. There is an overall lack of trust with
Administration. Teachers are in the classroom on a daily basis and know what students need
and want. Therefore, they want to be part of the decision-making process, and be able to
share ideas and suggestions. Teachers do not feel like professionals who are respected and
appreciated for the hard work and dedication that they put forth. Teachers want more
support from Administration and need to be respected, valued and appreciated as
professionals. Communication needs to be improved. Administrators need to follow-through
with initiatives that were started. Administrators should be more transparent.
“Administrators need to be visible in the building. There is no sense of a captain guiding the
ship in my building, and it creates behavior problems from students, confusion for staff, and
a lack of confidence in our building. “
“Ask for teachers’ professional opinions before implementing ideas that affect students.”
4. Pay Cuts
Constant pay cuts and step freezes are impacting teacher morale. Teachers feel that they are
working longer and harder than ever for less pay, which leads to not feeling valued,
respected or appreciated. They notice that Administration pay levels remain high and
constant, and do not think this is fair. Pay cuts should be equitable across all levels of
employment, including upper management. Teachers want wages increased.
“With such a small district and declining enrollment, it appears as administrators' salary in
central office are not impacted, and in fact in some cases their salary is increasing while
others of us lose our jobs, take a pay cut, or are not getting a step increase. If this is not the
case, this is the perception among teachers and other staff. “
“...increasing the pay one gets is the best way to show them they are appreciated!”
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5. Professional Development
Professional development needs to be more meaningful and explore new initiatives.
Professional development time is sometimes spent as just a usual staff meeting. More
training on specific topics is welcomed (i.e. technology, data collection and analysis).
Teachers want to develop skill sets and become successful, rather than moving from one
topic to another. Teachers want more 'take always' from the professional development
sessions that they can practice and refine.
“Do not take on so many initiatives. It takes time and PD for staff to become successful in an
initiative, and often the time and PD for teachers to become skilled is not there or we are
moving on to something new.”
“Training sessions and professional development opportunities should have follow-up
components instead of being a one day activity.”
6. Value
There is a general low sense of morale and teachers do not feel valued or appreciated by
Administration or Central Office. Many of the reasons for this lack of feeling valued, stems
from the evaluation system, administration and constant pay cuts and freezes. Teachers feel
that they may lose their jobs at any moment and can be easily replaced. Teachers do not feel
as though they are treated as professionals.
“Trust the professionalism/professional opinions of the teaching staff. Many of us have
Master's degrees and beyond. Many of us have been teaching for a while. We have
knowledge and experience. Believe us when we tell you something about a student.”
7. Behavior
There needs to be a district-wide consistent behavior plan and policy which is communicated
to teachers by Administration. If there is a student code of conduct, it is not clearly and
consistently used or understood by teachers. Expectations need to be made clear. Teachers
would like more support from Administration regarding student behavior issues. Teachers
fear that extreme behavior issues in the classroom may impact their rating as being highly
effective by the current evaluation system.
“Support the teachers with extreme behaviors in the classrooms. This involves increasing
social work time in the buildings and following the student code of conduct across all
levels.”
8. Collaboration
More time is needed for collaboration where teachers can talk, plan, build relationships and
strategize. There is not enough common preps and planning time available for teachers to
collaborate about students, curriculum or school initiatives. Half hour PLC meeting once a
week is not enough collaboration time to make any type of significant impact. Teachers want
to be able to learn from each other, and possible visit each other's classrooms for coaching
and learning experiences.
“More time for staff to discuss issues and opportunities in the buildings and form strategies
together about how to improve the learning environment for our students.”
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May 2015 paraeducator survey results and findings.

Strongly
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Disagree
Somewhat
3

Agree
Somewhat
4

Agree
5

Item
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Developing the social skills of students is important.
I am proud to be an educator.
I continue find new ways to improve my professional skills.
We are willing to help each other when problems arise.
People work here because they enjoy and choose to be here.
Paraeducators have an understanding of how to support each other.
Paraeducators trust each other in our district.
The school mission statement reflects the values of the community.
Leaders in our school facilitate support staff working together.
We work together to implement the decisions of our building meetings.
Paraeducators trust building administrator’s professional judgments.
Paraeducators are encouraged to share ideas.
The school mission provides a clear sense of direction for staff.
Our school reflects a true “sense” of community.
Student behavior management strategies are not discussed sufficiently.
Leaders in this school trust the professional judgments of the paraeducators.
Secretaries and staff work together to develop the school schedule.
Building administrators take time to praise paraeducators that perform well.
Building administrators value paraeducators’ ideas.
There is a rich and robust tradition of rituals and celebrations including holidays,
special events and recognition of goal attainment.
Overall, West Bloomfield Schools is a good place to work.
My involvement in policy or decision-making is taken seriously.
Building administrators support risk-taking and innovation.
The school staff is empowered to make decisions rather than waiting for supervisors
to tell them what to do.
When something is not working in our school, the faculty and staff predict and
prevent rather than react and repair.
Paraeducators’ ideas are valued by all staff.
Administrators are willing to help out whenever there is a problem.
Professional development offered by the district is valued by the faculty.
We do not consistently the success of existing school programs.
Paraeducators are involved in the decision-making process.
Paraeducators are kept informed on current issues in the school.
Members of the administration show a genuine concern for me as a person.

Strongly
Agree
6
Avg/6.0
5.6
5.5
5.1
4.8
4.6
4.5
4.4
4.4
4.2
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.2
3.1
2.9
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33.
34.
35.
36.

Paraeducators are reluctant to share problems with each other.
Paraeducators trust district administrator’s professional judgments.
My professional decisions are not usually supported by colleagues.
Paraeducators do not make an effort to maintain positive relationships with
colleagues.
37. District administrators value paraeducators’ ideas.
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Avg/6.0
2.8
2.5
2.4
2.2
2.1

The following themes emerged from the open response questions from the survey.


Behavior/Discipline — Increasing behavior and discipline problems of the students was an
overall concern. Behavior problems in the classroom can be very disruptive for the entire
class. One of the main duties of the paraeducators is to help with students who are disruptive
so that teachers can focus on instruction. They may also help to redirect student causing
disruptions in the classroom. With increasing class sizes and increased behavior problems,
paras are a necessity. Would like administration to be more diligent about discipline and
behavior problems.
“Make classrooms more conducive to learning by giving teachers more support when
dealing with students that are very disruptive to the learning process.”
“I think that the support staff is integral to classroom teaching. In our group, if the paras are
not managing behaviors, it would be difficult for the teacher to teach.”



Teacher Support — They feel that they are an integral part of the teaching environment. The
support that the paras give teachers help to enhance classroom instruction and initiatives,
which ultimately benefits the students. Essentially, they are teaching partners. Some duties
listed include: Help with materials, technology, discipline/behavior problems, adapt lessons,
prepare instructional materials, help execute IEP and behavioral plans, copies, mailbox filing,
data collection, maintain scheduling, order textbooks, and distribute summer school
materials.
“The perception of paraeducators as 'not integral to classroom teaching' is misguided. This
thinking needs to stop immediately as paraeducators provide support to classroom teachers
which enhances their instruction and benefits all student outcomes.”



Student Support — Increased class size increases the importance of paras. The duties vary
from one Para to another, but may include the following: Reading groups, help with
lessons/assignments/projects, engage shy students, greet and dismiss students, bathroom
help, feed students, technology, redirect students, relationship building, personal care,
physical needs, maintain safety and welfare of students, administer tests, take students to and
from classrooms, adjust curriculum, create additional material, and monitor student
transitions.
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“I communicate with the teachers to know my students progress and always ask how to make
it better. There are too many students in the classrooms and not enough people helping
them.”


Layoffs/Pay Cut — They would like better pay with benefits. Pay raises have been frozen for
many years. More equitable pay cuts are needed. There is a perception that administrators are
not impacted by the pay freezes/cuts, which impacts overall attitudes. The constant layoffs
make them feel insecure — each spring wondering if they will be losing their jobs. They also
do not want their hours cut.
“Stop laying people off every year! That makes us insecure as workers. We are always in
fear to lose our job when the month of May comes along.”



Staff Meetings — They would like to be more involved with staff meetings so that their
ideas and concerns can be shared. Involvement in these meetings would help the
paraeducators feel more like part of a team. They also want to be informed about what is
happening in their building.
“Include all paras into everyday communications and social committees.”
“Included in team building staff meetings.”

May 2015 secretary survey results and findings.
Strongly
Disagree
1

Disagree
2

Disagree
Somewhat
3

Agree
Somewhat
4

Agree
5

Item


















Developing the social skills of students is important.
I still find new ways to improve my professional skills.
I am proud to be an educator.
Secretaries trust each other in our district.
We are willing to help each other when problems arise.
People work here because they enjoy and choose to be here.
Administrators are willing to help out whenever there is a problem.
Secretaries have an understanding of how to support each other.
Leaders in our school facilitate staff working together.
Secretaries are encouraged to share ideas.
The school mission statement reflects the values of the community.
Our school reflects a true “sense” of community.
Leaders in this school trust the professional judgments of the secretaries.
Student behavior management strategies are not discussed sufficiently.
We work together to implement the decisions of our internal secretarial meetings.
Leaders support risk-taking and innovation.
We do not always evaluate the success of existing school programs.

Strongly
Agree
6
Avg/6.0
5.8
5.3
5.2
5.1
5.1
4.9
4.9
4.7
4.5
4.4
4.4
4.3
4.2
4.1
4.1
4.1
4.1
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 There is a rich and robust tradition of rituals and celebrations including holidays,
special events and recognition of goal attainment.
 The school mission provides a clear sense of direction for staff.
 Overall, West Bloomfield Schools is a good place to work.
 Secretaries trust administrator’s professional judgments. (Building/District)
 The school staff is empowered to make decisions rather than waiting for supervisors
to tell them what to do.
 Members of the administration show a genuine concern for me as a person.
 Leaders take time to praise secretaries that perform well.
 Secretaries’ ideas are valued by all staff.
 Leaders value secretaries’ ideas. (Building/District)
 When something is not working in our school, the faculty and staff predict and
prevent rather than react and repair.
 My involvement in policy or decision-making is taken seriously.
 Professional development offered by the district is valued by the faculty.
 Secretaries are kept informed on current issues in the school.
 Secretaries and staff work together to develop the school schedule.
 Secretaries are involved in the decision-making process.
 My professional decisions are not usually supported by colleagues.
 Secretaries are reluctant to share problems with each other.
 Secretaries do not make an effort to maintain positive relationships with colleagues.
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Avg/6.0
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.4
3.3
3.1
2.9
2.8
2.8
2.3
2.2
1.7

The following themes emerged from the open response questions from the survey.


Cutting Positions — There was an overall fear of having their positions cut. They feel
that they are working harder and have more responsibilities than ever, which they
believe impacts their primary duties (see below). Jobs are cut and then those
responsibilities dispersed to the secretaries. Therefore, these added responsibilities
prohibit them from giving adequate student support, for instance. Consequently, the
quality of service they provide diminishes. They feel that they are doing a lot of duties
well, but none of them that great. Continual job cuts impact morale and leaves them
feeling unsupported and unappreciated. They feel expendable, knowing that their jobs
can be cut at any moment which impacts their sense of security.
“Unfortunately, the elimination of full time positions has increased everyone 's
workload, adding responsibilities with very little direction or support.”



Privatization — When asked “Does fear of privatization and reduction in affect your
daily working environment” 100% of the respondents agreed and responded yes. The
possibility of privatization leads to a sense of insecurity, fear, decreased morale, and a
lack of appreciation and respect.
“Eventually, the attitude has become — no matter how I perform my job there is no
assurance that the district/BOE will fight to keep me or that I will continue [to] have a
job. Then, why do I care how well I perform? Of course, it is my own work ethic that
goes against this attitude.”
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“I feel that the secretaries are seen only as support and completely expendable. Our
numbers have been reduced dramatically in the last few years —positions not filled as
people leave and full-time positions cut to halftime.”


Administration — They feel unsupported from building administration. They would like
administration to fully understand their day-to-day responsibilities and duties.
Resentment appears to arise when the secretaries feel that their duties are not understood
or supported and then salaries and jobs are being cut.
“Administration and BOE need to be more visible in the daily day-to-day events of the
district, not only showing up for walk-throughs and such. Address staff by name, get to
know people instead of just dropping in when required.”



Superintendent — Central Administration was often referred to as BOE members or the
superintendent, so these terms appear to be used interchangeably. They felt as though the
superintendent was not very visible in their buildings, and does not take the time to
develop relationships, talk to or get to know them (i.e. Greet them by name). There was
also a lack of trust that emerged from Central Office. The secretaries feel that central
administration really does not have a sense of daily operations and what is going on in
the buildings. Showing up for formal walk-through evaluations is not enough.
“I think that the BOE and HR do not have enough visibility to the daily operations of
what is going on in the buildings. I think if they made more of an effort to come visit, ask
people on the front lines what they do, and what their greatest challenges are, and
actually witness the daily happenings' (as opposed to a pre-planned walk through once
or twice a year) they would not only have a better feel for what would benefit the
district, it would have a tremendous impact on morale.”



Morale, Valued, Support — There was an overall sense that their duties were under
estimated and unsupported. There appears to be two categories that employees are
referred to — “clerical” and “staff”. They would like to be included as “staff”. To not be
included makes the secretaries feel less valued and unappreciated.
“I feel that we are not valued for all that we do. The fact that we 're called clerical only
supports that feeling.”



Customer Service — Many of the secretaries feel that they are responsible for the
positive first impression many will have when visiting the district. They deemed this
aspect of the job as extremely significant, but feel as though nobody else sees the value
in this. Secretaries meet and greet families inquiring about the district. This initial
contact can “make or break” a family's decision to join the district.
“We are a service industry. The face we present to the public determines whether or not
parents choose to send their students to our district. The support staff is the first and
most accessible face presented to the public on a daily basis and the things we do which
may seem small weigh hugely on the success of our students and families.”
Pay Raise — The lack of raises definitely effects morale and their perceived value or
worth. They also feel that pay' cuts should be more equitable; having a perception that
administration is not impacted by the cuts. More equitable cuts would lead to an
increased sense of morale.
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“We have not had a significant pay/step raise since I started here. In the working world
compensation is generally a good indicator of how valuable the employee is to the
organization.”
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Appendix I: March 24, 2016, IBB Training Joint Communication
Subject: IBB Update 3.24.16
From: XXX (ASHR)
To: XXX (All Staff)
Timestamp: Thursday, March 24, 2016 at 12:58 p.m.
XXX Staff,
We wanted to take this opportunity to update you on the IBB process. On March 23rd and 24th
we completed a two-day training with all EA, PA, SA, Maintenance, Administration, and BOE
members that will be sitting on our bargaining teams. The training was two full days led by a
pair of facilitators arranged through the MEA, which is intended to build the relationships and
skills needed to effectively engage in IBB.
IBB is a collaborative team approach, guided by our two facilitators, that requires full consensus
and problem solving. The process is centered on interests opposed to the traditional model where
the two sides battle back and forth over positions.
All team members are excited to engage in bargaining using the IBB model, which will start
shortly after we return from Spring Break. We have challenging issues before us, but are
confident that this process will forge contracts that continue our work of building healthy
relationships, shared purpose, and a collaborative culture.

Your bargaining team members,
XXX (EA–president), XXX (MEA UniServ director), XXX (Administration), XXX (EA), XXX
(BOE), XXX (EA), XXX (Administration), XXX (BOE), XXX (Administration), XXX (PA),
XXX (Administration), XXX (SA–president), XXX (Administration), XXX (SA), XXX
(Administration), XXX (SA), XXX (EA), XXX (PA), XXX (Maintenance), XXX
(Administration), XXX (Administration), XXX (Administrative Assistant), Karen XXX (PA–
president), XXX (BOE), XXX (Administration), XXX (SA), XXX (EA), XXX (Administration),
XXX (SA), XXX (PA)
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Appendix J: April 25, 2016, IBB Joint Communication
Subject: EA IBB Update
From: XXX (ASHR)
To: XXX (EA Staff)
Timestamp: Monday, April 25, 2016 at 3:00 p.m.
Dear EA,
For the last two days, the EA IBB team has started the negotiation process. We are joined by our
facilitators XXX and XXX who have been excellent additions to the team. We are all committed
to no hidden agendas, honest communication, and collaboratively solving problems both inside
and outside of negotiations. While we cannot share the specifics of the issues, we can share that
we have joined together successfully through transparency, open dialogue and shared interests.
We begin by listing the issues important to us, sharing our reasons why they are important, and
then brainstorming a list of solutions. When we have agreed on a solution for an issue we
collaboratively write the language for the contract. This is not a quick process, and it requires
continual discussion. We are confident that together we will create a contract that is best for all
parties.
We will continue to update you throughout the IBB process
XXX (EA president) and XXX (ASHR)
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Appendix K: September 14, 2015, MEA UniServ Director Email
Subject: IBB Bargaining
From: XXX (MEA UniServ director)
To: XXX (ASHR)
Timestamp: Monday, September 14, 2015 at 2:16 p.m.
Hi XXX (ASHR),
I have information about IBB bargaining from MEA:


There is a two-day training prior to bargaining. It should be held close to the start of
actual bargaining. There are two facilitators, one union (we provide at no cost) and one
management (we have a list for management). The management facilitators are former
administrators from school districts. There is no cost for the union facilitator, however
there is a cost for the management facilitator (costs are estimated around $600 per day,
plus expenses). The training is two days and is done by both facilitators, again there is
only a cost for the management facilitator.



If needed, there is an assessment to determine is both sides are ready for the IBB process
and the facilitators do the assessment and they make a recommend to the union and
management. Involved in this process is the bargaining teams for both sides,
Superintendent and maybe a BOE member.

I would be happy to explain more, give me a call anytime.
XXX XXX
MEA UniServ director
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Appendix L: October 12, 2015, BOE Study Session Minutes
BOE Study Session
BOE
XXX School District
October 12, 2015
MEMBERS PRESENT:

Dr. XXX, Mrs. XXX, Mr. XXX, Mrs. XXX, Mrs. XXX,
Mrs. XXX and Mrs. XXX.

MEMBERS ABSENT:

None.

ADMINISTRATORS PRESENT:

Dr. XXX, Mr. XXX, Mr. XXX, and Ms. XXX

ADMINISTRATORS ABSENT:

None.

1. CALL TO ORDER BY PRESIDENT XXX
The meeting was called to order by President XXX at 6:30 p.m. in the Main Conference Room at
the Administration and Community Services Building.
2. DISTRICT IMPROVEMENT PLAN GOALS
Ms. XXX reviewed several documents with the BOE that support the District’s Improvement
Plan Goals. A District Dashboard planning document was reviewed. BOE members were asked
what they would like to see on the district’s dashboard.
BOE discussion centered on:
 Should be a promotional piece
 Showcase student Achievement and instructional opportunities
 Needs to be concise, not crowded
 Opportunities for students should be highlighted
 Seven-hour block – affords more elective opportunities for students
 Extra-Curricular activities
 Instructional Priorities
 Student Opportunities – Courses offered, Clubs, Teams, Bands, Magnet Program, Radio
Station
 Advanced Placement Opportunities – Successes
 District level dashboard – school level dashboards
 What makes us unique
 Diversity as a strength–successes
 Testimonials
 Visual images
 The Total Package – Why XXX
 Links to other sites
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Number/amount of scholarships – acceptance into selective schools
Percentage of graduates attend University of Michigan

3. INSTRUCTIONAL PATHWAYS
Ms. XXX reviewed the K–12 Instructional Pathways document with the BOE.
BOE discussion centered on:
 Should include Clubs, Sports, Honors Classes, Engineering Academy, Political
Mentorship, DECA, etc.
 Use the term College Prep instead of Traditional
 Include Oakland Early College and Transition Center
 Early Childhood programs should be included
BOE Members will send suggestions to Ms. XXX.
4. INTEREST-BASED BARGAINING
Mr. XXX explained the Interest-Based Bargaining concept and process to the BOE.
Administration will move forward with the assessment process to see if the group is ready for
this approach.
5. ENROLLMENT UPDATE
Mr. XXX gave the BOE an enrollment update as follows:
 We are up approximately 158–164 students from our projections
 This is a $1.36 million to $1.42 million increase in revenue
 We added 4.6 FTE at a cost of $400,000
 Should realize net revenue of $700,000 after budget adjustments
 Will result in a Fund Balance of 3%.
 If the sale of the Ealy School property closes this fiscal year, the Fund Balance will be
6%.

Mr. XXX cautioned that we are still down 169 students from last year. We still need to stabilize
enrollment.
6. PUBLIC COMMENT
XXX XXX (community member) shared comments on private school advertising of open
houses, instructional pathways document, and the unveiling of the district historical project on
March 30, 2016, 7:00 p.m. at the Main Library.
7. ADJOURNMENT
The BOE Study Session adjourned at 8:20 p.m.
Respectfully submitted,
________________________

XXX XXX, Secretary
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Appendix M: December 16, 2015, IBB Assessment Recommendation
December 16, 2015

XXX XXX, MEA UniServ director
XXX XXX, ASHR

XXX and XXX,
Thank you so much for giving us the opportunity to meet your key leaders and to assess the
district’s readiness for IBB. We found the participants to be encouraged by the idea of using
problem solving strategies in lieu of traditional bargaining strategies.
After having the opportunity to interview members of the EA, PA, SA, administrators, and the
BOE, we believe that your district can be successful by using the collaborative method, IBB.
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact either one of us. Should you
decide to go forward, please contact us and we will work with our facilitator colleagues to make
assignments for facilitators for your district.

Sincerely,
XXX XXX (MEA Assessor)
XXX XXX (Management Assessor)
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Appendix N: January 5, 2016, Anticipated Cost of IBB Memo
Date:

January 5, 2016

To:

Dr. XXX (Superintendent), BOE Members

From:

XXX XXX (ASHR)

Re:

IBB

Purpose:

To improve the organizational health of the XXX School District

Proposal:
Implement the following IBB model with the EA, PA, and the SA during the 2016
bargaining season. Upon completion of negotiations, we will evaluate the model’s effectiveness,
and either continue this model in future years, continue IBB without paid facilitators in future
years, or discontinue using IBB in future years. This evaluation will be reported to the BOE.
Below is an example of what the cost of IBB may look like based on previous bargaining
experience. We have factored in the cost of the IBB facilitator at $961 per session based on the
following breakdown:
District Facilitator:
Association Facilitator

Event

Position

IBB Training –
Two Sessions

Cost paid by the District
Cost paid by MEA

$600 session fee
$200 lodging fee
$161 mileage reimbursement
$961 Total per Session

EA Bargaining –
Seven Sessions

Facilitator
EA Substitute Costs
PA Substitute Costs
SA Substitute Costs
Facilitator
EA Substitute Costs

Number of
Staff
1
5
4
5
1
5

Number of
Days
2
2
2
2
7
7

Cost
$1,761
$1,000
$640
$0
$6,727
$3,500

PA Bargaining –
Six Sessions

Facilitator
PA Substitute Costs

1
4

6
6

$5,766
$1,920

SA Bargaining –
Four Sessions
Total Cost

Facilitator
SA Substitute Costs

1
5

4
4

$3,844
$0
$25,158
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The number of bargaining sessions listed above is based on previous bargaining experience. We
cannot know for sure the number of sessions under this new format. Previous practice had
bargaining sessions meeting half of the time for full days and half of the time for half days. With
the more forward to the IBB sessions will be full days in an effort to reduce facilitator fees.
Please keep in mind that an attorney attended several bargaining sessions during the summer of
2015. The attorney charges came to $34,937.00. We do not plan on using attorney support with
the IBB model.
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Appendix O: January 19, 2016, ASHR Email
Subject: IBB email to BOE
From: XXX (ASHR)
To: XXX (BOE)
Timestamp: Tuesday, January 19, 2016 at 3:24 p.m.
BOE.
By now you have had an opportunity to review the memorandum dated 1/5/16 that gave an
overview of the IBB process and costs. We are going to move forward with the interest based
bargaining process, and would like to invite BOE participation. Our goal is to have one BOE
member sit on each bargaining team (teachers, secretaries, and paraeducators). Most of the
bargaining will be during the school day. It is important that bargaining team members attend the
two-day training, and all bargaining sessions. We have not picked the dates for the training
sessions or the bargaining sessions yet, because we want to build those dates with input from the
facilitators and bargaining team members.
If you are interested in sitting on one of our bargaining teams, please email Dr. XXX with
the following information:
1. What bargaining team(s) are you interested in sitting on (teachers, secretaries, and
paraeducators)?
2. Are there any days of the week that typically do not work with your schedule?
3. Are there any dates or weeks that you are out of town, and would like us to avoid?

XXX XXX
ASHR
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Appendix P: February 8, 2016, ASHR Email
Subject: Next Steps – Staff Survey / PCC
From: XXX (ASHR)
To: XXX (All Staff)
Timestamp: Monday, February 8, 2016 at 7:04 a.m.
XXX Staff,
We hear you, and are invested in you and your concerns. The PCC Committee facilitated 30
Staff Survey Data Meetings between January 5th and January 31st. The committee then met on
February 4th to review the survey data, read through all of the written feedback you provided at
the staff survey data meetings, engaged in rich and honest discussion, and ran through a protocol
to prioritize the themes that we will begin tackling as a district. Below is the work that the
committee has prioritized as our next steps.

THEME 1: Shared purpose and healthy relationships, because WE are XXX
WHY: We all make a difference, we all have innovative ideas, we all want what is best for kids,
and we all seek opportunities for meaningful dialogue. The current feelings are that these things
are not always valued, heard or considered. These feelings can then lead to low morale, untapped
collaboration, internal competition, inconsistent communication, and silos throughout the
organization.
HOW: A sub-committee of staff throughout the district will be formed to do this work. To form
this sub-committee, we will send an invitation to those that indicated on their exit slip (from the
staff survey data meeting) that they wanted to sit on a sub-committee. Those that are interested
will then have an opportunity to sit on this sub-committee.

THEME 2: Teacher evaluation process
WHY: We all want to improve as professionals, and do the best possible job for our students.
The current feelings are that the process is cumbersome, stressful, and pits staff against one
another. These feelings can then lead to low morale, untapped collaboration, internal
competition, inconsistent communication, and silos throughout the organization.
HOW: We have a standing teacher evaluation committee. This committee will be given the
feedback gathered from staff regarding the teacher evaluation process, and will be charged with
addressing these concerns. This is important, but challenging work, because some of this process
is dictated by the state and out of our control. Having said this, meaningful progress can be made
here.
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THEME 3: Compensation
WHY: We all have families to support, and want to be valued as professionals. The current
feelings are that people are struggling financially due to low and stagnant wages. The
consequence is that staff, especially staff at entry level steps, feel unappreciated and are inclined
to look for higher paying employment outside of the district.
HOW: We are embarking on Interest Based Bargaining (IBB). These bargaining teams will be
given the feedback gathered from staff regarding compensation, and will be charged with
addressing these concerns. This is important, but challenging work, because we have
experienced loss in enrollment, increased retirement costs, and a stagnant foundation allowance
from the state. Having said this, meaningful progress can be made here.

THEME 4: Student behavior systems and supports
WHY: We all want to provide our students with the safest and most supportive learning
environment possible. The current feelings are that there are not consistent systems and supports
in place for student behaviors, and increasing behavior challenges in combination with shifts in
staffing have compromised our ability to achieve these goals.
HOW: A sub-committee of staff throughout the district will be formed to do this work. To form
this sub-committee, we will send an invitation to those that indicated on their exit slip (from the
staff survey data meeting) that they wanted to sit on a sub-committee. Those that are interested
will then have an opportunity to sit on this sub-committee. We will make sure that staff with
expertise in this area are sitting on this team.

Thank you for your engagement throughout the process, and we are confident that together we
will accomplish meaningful change! Attached are the comments passed out at the staff survey
data meetings from the EA, PA, and SA groups. It was suggested, through your feedback, that
we send out the comments from all three groups for your review, because the only comments
you received in print were those from your group.
XXX XXX
ASHR
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Interest-Based Strategies Training
Agenda
March 23–24, 2016
DAY 1
A. Creating a Learning Environment
1. Welcome
i. Introduction of Trainers
ii. Parking Lot
iii. Expectations
iv. Schedule
v. Objective–Attitudes–Skills–Knowledge
2. Introduction of Participants
3. Training Agenda and Materials
4. A Negotiations Experience…Appleton v Baker
B. Problem Solving Skills
1. Listening
2. Communications
LUNCH
3. Brainstorming
4. Consensus…Energy Crisis
5. Constituencies
6. Ladder of Inference
CHECK OUT

DAY 2
A. Check-In Process
B. Team Building
C. Introduction of IBB Process
D. Story
E. Interests
F. Options
LUNCH
G. Straw Designs…Reaching Agreement and Closure Techniques
H. Relationships
I. Back at the Ranch
J. Question/Answer Period
CHECK OUT
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Appendix R: June 21, 2016, Actual Cost of IBB Memo
Date:

June 21, 2016

To:

Dr. XXX (Superintendent), BOE Members

From:

XXX XXX (ASHR)

Re:

IBB Costs

On January 5, 2016, a memo was sent to you outlining the following costs:



The attorney’s negotiating costs for the summer of 2015 which totaled $34,937.00
Anticipated IBB bargaining costs based on previous bargaining experience which totaled
$25,158.00

Listed below is the actual cost for the IBB:
Name of Unit
IBB Assessment and Training
EA
PA
SA
Total Cost

*Cost includes the following:
 Facilitation Fees
 Guest Teacher/Substitute Costs
 Supplies

Cost*
$4,180.55
$8,825.66
$3,684.86
$3,647.80
$20,338.87
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Appendix S: June 24, 2016, BOE Special Meeting Minutes
Special Meeting
BOE
XXX School District
June 24, 2016
MEMBERS PRESENT:

Dr. XXX, Mrs. XXX, Mr. XXX, Mrs. XXX, Mrs. XXX,
and Mrs. XXX.

MEMBERS ABSENT:

Mrs. XXX.

ADMINISTRATORS PRESENT:

Dr. XXX, Ms. XXX, Mr. XXX, and Mr. XXX.

ADMINISTRATORS ABSENT:

None.

1. CALL TO ORDER BY PRESIDENT XXX
President XXX called the meeting to order at 7:40 a.m. in the Main Conference Room at
the Administration and Community Services Building.
2. XXX EA – CONTRACT APPROVAL
Motion by Mrs. XXX, supported by Mrs. XXX, to approve the ratified XXX Educators
Association Contract for the 2016/2017 school year, with the added Letter of
Understanding regarding Pay-to-Participate.
Motion carried, 4–0. Mrs. XXX and Mr. XXX abstained due to a Conflict of Interest, as
both have family members in the Association covered by the contract.
3. TEAM MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION – CONTACT APPROVAL
Motion by Mrs. XXX, supported by Mrs. XXX, to approve the ratified Team
Management Contract for the 2016/2017 school year.
Motion carried, 6–0.
4. XXX ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATIONAL SECRETARIES – CONTRACT
APPROVAL
Motion by Mrs. XXX, supported by Mrs. XXX, to approve the ratified contract for the
XXX Association of Educational Secretaries for the 2016-2017 school year.
Motion carried, 6–0.
5. PARAEDUCATORS – CONTRACT APPROVAL
Motion by Mrs. XXX, supported by Mrs. XXX, to approve the ratified contract for the
Paraeducators for the 2016/2017 school year.
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Motion carried, 6–0.
6. MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS – CONTRACT APPROVAL
Motion by Mrs. XXX, supported by Mrs. XXX, to approve the ratified Maintenance
Technicians Contract for the 2016/2017 school year.
Motion carried, 6–0.
7. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS – APPROVAL
Motion by Mrs. XXX, supported by Mrs. XXX, that the XXX BOE approve the contracts
of employment for the following employees effective July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2019:
XXX, XXX, XXX, and XXX (with Mr. XXX’s title to remain as Executive Director of
Human Resources and Employee Relations).
Further motion that the XXX BOE approve the contracts for employment for the
following employees effective July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2018; XXX, XXX, XXX, XXX,
and XXX.
Further motion that the XXX BOE approve the contracts for employment for the
following employees effective July 1, 2016 – June 30, 2017: XXX, XXX, XXX, and
XXX.
Motion carried, 6–0.
8. COMMUNITY EDUCATION – WAGE AGREEMENT APPROVAL
Motion by Mrs. XXX, supported by Mrs. XXX, to approve the Community Education
Wage Agreement for the 2016/2017 School Year.
Motion carried, 6–0.
9. PUBLIC COMMENT None.
10. OTHER Dr. XXX announced that BOE members are able to purchase health insurance
through the district, as long as none of the costs are born by the district. This does not
present a Conflict of Interest, as the BOE members pay 100% of the premiums. Dr. X
will be purchasing the insurance.
Mrs. XXX referenced a document that she had provided to the BOE, in which she voiced
concerns about this issue.
11. ADJOURNMENT
The BOE meeting adjourned at 8:00 a.m.
Respectfully submitted,
XXX, Secretary

